


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
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Some Thoughts on Global Citizenship

Thomas J. Ward
Dean of the International College



The term “global citizen” is increasingly identified as an educational objective¹ by many American colleges and universities. International NGOs such as Oxfam have also made the term “global citizenship” a central fixture in their outreach efforts and have developed a free curriculum with numerous resources that spans from pre-school to age 19.² As a concept or an ideal, global citizenship makes great sense. The inhabitants of our globe share a common real estate. Photographed from the International Space Station, disputed borders and territories fit together seamlessly. The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan and claimed thousands of lives caused the Fukushima Daichi nuclear plant meltdown. By Spring 2012³ that resulted in radioactive contamination of portions of the US food supply. Global citizenship proponents are correct in their view that we are all interconnected.

Many of the aspirations associated with Global Citizenship make sense. Nevertheless, I suspect that I am not alone in feeling uncomfortable with the current usage of the term. One is often left with the impression that an elite, mostly an Anglo-Saxon elite, has emerged, seeing itself as having already achieved “global citizen” or “world citizen” status. In a 2011 interview, Francis Fukuyama observed that global citizenship’s appeal was limited and that it had not “won over very many converts, apart from fairly narrow elites in fairly rich countries.”⁴

Global citizenship would need to be developed on a foundation of core values. Will global citizens, like the founding fathers of the United States, recognize a Supreme Being as the source of freedom, equality and the pursuit of happiness or should the government of global citizenship be agnostic on this topic? What happens, however, if this becomes a key bargaining chip for the inclusion of certain Christian and Muslim societies? What if a compromise on this topic then becomes an obstacle for more secular states such as France and China? To what extent have today’s “global citizens” grappled with cultural fault lines in their ostensible transcendence of nationality?

There are so many issues to address before we can identify ourselves as “global citizens” who are prepared to train others to become the same:

- A constitution will need to define global citizens' views on the powers of the central world government vis-à-vis those retained by regional governments.
- That constitution will need to specify a delegation of powers for the executive (including the military), legislative, and judiciary branches of government.
- Global citizens will need to articulate the dimensions of sovereignty that states will need to share with a central government or federation headquarters.
- A decision may need to be made on the lingua franca. Should it be English, Chinese or Arabic? How should this be determined?
- A decision will need to be made on the model of political economy that will be adapted. Will the model lean more towards free markets or favor greater government intervention or will this be left to the member states?
- How will the duties of citizenship such as military conscription, payment of taxes and jury duty be delineated?
- Whom could the world coalesce around as the founding father or mother of "Global Citizenship" and learn to emulate?

Without ever having addressed these issues, some proponents already view global citizenship as a de facto reality. It has especially become the assumed status of an emerging cultural elite in the English-speaking world. When I explore the term "global citizenship" in other languages and cultures, I don't find the same enthusiasm for the term that one finds in English. When, for example, I do a Google Search on the Spanish term "*ciudadano global*," most of the top page hits are from organizations which have their headquarters in English-speaking countries or, in one case, on a page that pays tribute to the fact that the Anglo-Saxon world is at the forefront of Global Citizenship.⁵ When I did a Google.fr search of the French term "*citoyen global*," I found the first page of findings to be either skeptical of the undertaking⁶ or interested in debating the extent to which the European Union did or did not serve as a laboratory for a future international federation (with a clear focus on the European Union rather than "global citizenship").⁷ Otherwise, I found French translations or adaptations of English language commentary⁸ on the topic. I have done similar searches in several other European and Asian languages and am increasingly convinced that global citizenship remains an Anglo-centric phenomenon. The most vocal supporters of "global citizenship" are from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and other developed English-speaking countries. Granted there is also a residual of individuals from other parts of the world but even they appear to have

spent a great deal of time in the US or UK.

As we move towards a more tightly networked global community, we can expect that policies that have gained acceptance in the United States will continue to face strong resistance in other societies. In March 2012 the UN Commission on the Status of Women flatly rejected an effort by the United States delegation to include abortion as a reproductive right. This included strong opposition from the Holy See as well as Catholic and Muslim member states.⁹ On March 7, 2012 the United Nations Human Rights Council provided a forum for debate on the need for the humane treatment of gays and yet most Arab and African states staged a walkout, stating that they “refuse to legitimize same-sex relations.”¹⁰ How will the proponents of global citizenship respond to religious and cultural views that sharply clash with their own?

Granted, the United States is the most "international" country in the world but progressive American or European thought and liberal democracy, which the advocates of global citizenship are quite vocal in supporting, may not “sell” as essential underpinnings of global citizenship in the case of East and South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, or even Mother Russia. Which of the extant values of global citizenship’s proponents will need to be trimmed in order to have buy-in from other parts of the world?¹¹ Will proponents be willing to make those compromises?

Like many of the faculty in the International College in the University of Bridgeport (who don't necessarily share my views on this topic), I have lived, studied and worked on several continents. I am fortunate to have learned to speak a few languages and think that, through my studies and my lived experiences, I have developed a genuine appreciation of a number of religions and cultures in the world; however, I am under no illusion that I am a "Global Citizen."

What I have learned from my experiences is that, in approaching any new culture, there are great things to learn and also "mine fields" in my own cultural baggage that I must learn to navigate. I have learned better over time about how to survey the landscape when in new territory. Some self-proclaimed global citizens, I fear, may not have done so. There is something to be said about Fukuyama’s description of them as “fairly narrow elites in fairly rich countries.”¹²

Rather than propagating a naïve, elitist view with excessive western accouterments, educators have a responsibility to help students both to understand their own culture and its value. They must also help students to have the foundation to understand and respect

the religious and social traditions that inform the world's cultures. Students must learn the importance of being open to opinions that challenge their views. Even if they cannot concur with positions counter to their own, they should at least be able to digest and explain the countervailing views to others in an objective manner and *tone*. Students, particularly American students, need to learn to listen to others. Those with whom we differ should at least feel that we understand and appreciate the rationale for their viewpoint. We must learn to be open to a *respectful* exchange of ideas and positions and recognize that understanding the other is at least as important as agreeing with her.

While the Anglo-Saxon tradition has many strengths, it cannot serve as the measure of global citizenship. For now, I recommend a more modest approach for those of us who are educators. In the United States, there is a growing emphasis on so-called STEM education, highlighting the importance of Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. I have no quarrels with this as a partial articulation of education's priorities; however, STEM alone is not enough. Today's American students also need to develop deep knowledge of at least one language and culture besides their own. They should not live under the illusion that, in addition to the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," they are endowed with "global citizenship" because they happen to speak the "world's language" and have American values. Students and teachers alike must strive to see the peoples, religions and cultures of the world through a new prism so that we are prepared philosophically, scientifically, linguistically, and, above all, *attitudinally* to contribute to a global conversation about humanity's shared future. If American educators fail to prepare themselves and the next generation with the tools needed for genuine intercultural discourse, we may soon discover that there is not as much of a difference between "global citizens" and "ugly Americans" as some think.

This issue of the *Journal of Global Development and Peace* represents a new experiment in the development of the journal. For the first time, we include both the work of faculty and of students in this edition. I am pleased to include the work of Professor Mohammed Al-Azdee, who recently joined the faculty of the International College. Professor Al-Azdee comes to the University of Bridgeport upon completion of his doctoral studies in communications at Indiana University. Originally from Iraq, he has had an impressive career in the field, having worked as a reporter during the Iraq War with *Reuters*, *Newsweek* and *USA Today*. His research in the area of the rise of anti-semitic discourse in post-war Iraq breaks new ground and we appreciate him having chosen to do so in JGLDP. Daulat Jha comes to the University of Bridgeport with a wealth of experience as a researcher in a variety of venues in his home country of Nepal and with the Carter Center in Atlanta. We have been pleased to have him join the University's Global Development and Peace program and are confident that readers will appreciate his research here on the linkage between foreign financial support and good governance. Dr. Quanyi Zhang of Zhejiang University offers a useful article on the challenges of Sino-American relations in the Asia

-Pacific region at a time when China emerges as a world power. His countryman, Yuan Cura Zhang, a reporter with Shanghai English television and an alumnus of the Global Development and Peace program provides excellent insights into the growing role that China plays in Latin America. Seray Teleke, also a graduate of the GLDP graduate program who currently is employed by the University is originally from Turkey and her article explores the role of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as a means to further political and economic integration among countries sharing the Black Sea. Seray was one of two University of Bridgeport students who were invited to the Kroc Institute at the University of Notre to present on their research in the area of peace and conflict studies.

We are fortunate as well to have four additional articles that have been written by students who are currently enrolled in our graduate program in Global Development and Peace. Two of them, Rebecca Witherington and Kristine LeBlanc recently presented at the Northeast Political Science Association (NPSA) conference in Boston. Kristine is a professional librarian by training who has spent time in Africa and has traveled widely. Rebecca has worked with the Kennedy Center in Bridgeport and, together with Kristine, has explored the issue of water rights in Africa. She has attended briefings at the United Nations and her contribution to this issue of the journal addresses the challenge of AIDS and the trajectory toward realizing this and other Millennium Development Goals in South Africa. Stella Kim has worked in retail and in banking overseas; she has particularly helped in the acculturation of Americans in Europe. She has also traveled widely including in Africa and serves on the Board of a Non-Governmental Organization working to address social and educational needs in Africa. Stella's article here explores the role that regional integration might play in the search for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Katie Kilroy spent three years as a Peace Corps volunteer in Senegal before joining the Global Development and Peace program. She speaks Wolof, the *lingua franca* of Senegal, fluently as well as French. This article looks at Rule of Law in Senegal and the challenges that surround. Katie was pleased with the peaceful transition of leadership that took place in Senegal this past Spring.

We do hope that you will enjoy this issue of the *Journal of Global Development and Peace* and we welcome your comments.

Endnotes:

1. Grand Canyon University, Fairleigh Dickinson University, University of South Oregon and Case Western Reserve University are among those that appear on the first page of a Google Search using the terms “Global Citizenship AND University Mission.” Cf. http://www.google.com/#hl=en&sugexp=les%3Bcq%20Crate_low%3D0.035%20Crate_high%3D0.035%20Cmin_length%3D2%20Cconf%3D1.2%20Csecond_pass%3Dfalse%20Cnum_suggestions%3D1%20Cignore_bad_origquery%3Dtrue&gs_nf=1&gs_mss=Global%20Citizenship%20AND%20U&cp=41&gs_id=1z0&xhr=t&q=Global%20Citizenship%20AND%20University%20Mission&pf=p&scient=psy-ab&oq=Global+Citizenship+AND+University+Mission&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_qf.&fp=d1aa21f378a355e6&biw=1318&bih=619 retrieved on October 6, 2012.
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Picture with Paul Bremer: Example of Anti-Semitic Discourse in Post-Saddam Iraq

Mohammad Al-Azdee



Abstract

Many Iraqis perceive the 2003 War and the subsequent U.S. military presence in their country as a plot that has made Israel safer. This study employs a qualitative method of textual analysis to examine anti-Semitism in post-Saddam Iraq. The research displays an example of this discourse by analyzing visual frames embedded in an anti-Semitic picture that has been circulating among Iraqis through e-mail. The picture's Judaic symbolism influences anti-Jewish opinions and emotions by stressing specific anti-Semitic values and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue of Israel and the Iraq War.

Biography

Mohammed Al-Azdee is an Iraqi assistant professor of mass communication at the University of Bridgeport–Connecticut, USA. His area of interest combines content analysis, media effects, political communication, advanced research methods, and new media technologies. His research has been presented at varied academic conferences in the United States, receiving awards from the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC), the International Communication Association (ICA), the Indiana University (IU) Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism (ISCA), the IU Center for the Study of the Middle East (CSME), and US Department of State. Al-Azdee had his PhD and MA in mass communication from the IU School of Journalism–Bloomington.

Introduction: Jews in Iraq Today

Barely a dozen members of the 2,600-year-old Jewish community in Baghdad remain to observe Jewish holidays in the Iraqi capital. Most are afraid to gather; besides, where would they go? Baghdad's only remaining synagogue, a pink and yellow building with no identifying marks, has been boarded up since it was denounced after the war in 2003 as "the place of the Zionists."¹

Most Jews in Baghdad rarely leave their homes at all for fear of being kidnapped or executed. The community of Jews in the Iraqi capital has all but vanished in a land where their heritage recedes back to Abraham of Ur, to Jonah's prophesying to Nineveh, and to Nebuchadnezzar's sending Jews into exile in Iraq. Some of the remaining Iraqi Jews are middle class, including two doctors. Others are poor and unemployed, dependent on handouts; yet, they say they are too old to start a new life somewhere else or to leave their life-long friends behind.²

It is hard to imagine that the last Jewish wedding in Iraq was held in 1978.³ Just over half a century ago, Iraq's Jews numbered more than 130,000. But now in Baghdad, in the city that was once the community's heart, they cannot muster even a minyan, the 10 Jewish men required to perform some of the most important rituals of their faith. They are scared even to publicize their exact number, which was recently estimated at six. That is not enough to read the Torah in public, and too few to recite a proper Kaddish for the dead.⁴

The current research uses a qualitative method of textual analysis to examine visual frames embedded in an anti-Semitic picture that has been circulating among Iraqis through e-mail. The picture embraces different aspects that deserve a framing-based analysis, and the scope of this study will not be limited only to factors that contribute to the anti-Semitic nature of the photo. Circumstances that Iraqi Jews have been experiencing raise a question about the issue of anti-Semitism in Iraq in its public and official dimensions which each seem to be complementary to each other. Some have argued that anti-Semitism in Iraq under the totalitarian regime of former President Saddam Hussein was due to the ideology of the Arab Baath Socialist Party that dominated every aspect of the political life in that country prior to 2003; however, anti-Semitism in Iraq has continued past this date because it is fueled not only by politics but also by public sympathy with anti-Jewish emotions and opinions that have been promoting an anti-Semitic discourse in the country. For example, average Iraqis were not allowed to freely use the Internet before the U.S.-led military operation in Iraq in 2003; yet, when they have had a climate of freedom and democracy that has been offering them the opportunity of enjoying unlimited access to the World Wide Web, some have used it to advance anti-Semitic agendas that are broadly condemned around the globe.

An Overview of Anti-Semitism in Iraq, 1963–2010

When Arab nationalists took power in Iraq in 1963, they imposed severe restric-

tions on the remaining Jews in that country; those were not allowed to sell property and were forced to carry yellow identification cards. After the Arab defeat in the Six Day War of June 1967, more repressive measures were forced on Iraqi Jews: Jewish properties were confiscated, Jewish bank accounts were frozen, Jews were dismissed from public positions, Jewish private businesses were shut down, trading permits of Jews were cancelled and telephones were disconnected, and many Jews were put under house arrest for long periods of time.

But persecution peaked under the Baath Party (a faction of Arab nationalist ideology) that controlled power in Iraq after the July 17, 1968 coup. By the end of that year, a number of Iraqi Jews were arrested upon the discovery of an alleged local spy cell that was composed of Jewish businessmen and others. Fourteen men, eleven of them Jews, were hanged in Baghdad's public squares. Other Jews died of torture during interrogation for the same accusation. On January 27, 1969, the Baghdad state-run radio station called on Iraqis to "come and enjoy the feast." Around five hundred thousand men, women, and children responded and danced in the streets before the gallows where the bodies of the hanged Jews swung. The crowds chanted "Death to Israel" and "Death to all traitors." This act brought a worldwide public condemnation that Radio Baghdad dismissed by stating: "We hanged spies, but the Jews crucified Christ."⁵

Jews in Iraq remained under constant surveillance by the Iraqi Baathist govern-

ment's comrades. An Iraqi Jew (who later fled the country) wrote in his diaries about the hardships of Jewish life in the early 1970s: "Ulcers, heart attacks, and breakdowns are increasingly prevalent among the Jews...The dehumanization of the Jewish personality resulting from continuous humiliation and torment...have dragged us down to the lowest level of our physical and mental faculties, and deprived us of the power to recover."⁶

As a reaction to international pressures, the Iraqi government in Baghdad secretly allowed most of the remaining Jews to emigrate during the first half of the 1970's, but under further restrictions. Most of Iraq's remaining Jews became too old to leave; however, they were forced by Baathist authorities to hand over more than \$200 million worth of the Jewish community's property without compensation.⁷ The Iraqi Baathist authority was aware that allowing the Jewish minority to immigrate to Israel would strengthen the "Zionist Entity," as the Baathists call it, but national interests and the need to concentrate on solving internal problems (such as Arab-Kurd tensions that reached the point of open military conflict in 1975) took priority over the party's pan-Arab cause. This balance of interests had been the same since the beginning of the Jewish exodus from Iraq in 1948.⁸

The U.S. State Department said that there was no evidence of overt persecution of Jews in Iraq in the early 1990s, but the Iraqi Baathist regime restricted their travel (particularly to Israel) and contacts with Jewish groups abroad. The report noted that 75 Jews fled Iraq between 1986 and

1991 and relocated in Holland, England, or Israel.⁹ Between 1990 and 2003, Iraq was under UN sanctions for invading Kuwait and violating subsequent Security Council Resolutions; however, the Iraqi Baathist government continued promoting an anti-Semitic message through the state-run media that projected the same old anti-Jewish stereotypes by describing Jews as descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshippers of the infidel tyrant.

In 2003, a U.S. led military operation in Iraq toppled the Baath regime, and the party was banned by law. But after living for 40 years in pan-Arab environments, 35 of them under Baathists, only 35 Jews were living in Baghdad in 2004, and by 2006, the community of Jews that once represented one third of the Iraqi capital's population had dropped to below 10, in addition to a handful more in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.¹⁰ Currently, the only synagogue left in Baghdad is closed. It is a crumbling buff-colored building tucked away in an alleyway in what once was Baghdad's main Jewish neighborhood. There are almost no children to be bar or bat-mitzvahed or couples to be married. Although Jews left in the Iraqi capital can practice their religion, they cannot do prayers openly or show Jewish symbols to the public in the No-Baath, No-Saddam Iraq.

The U.S. civil authority in Iraq (March 2003 – June 2004) tried to put the country on a different track to achieve a moderate state where people comprehend and practically apply the principle of freedom of religion. Ambassador Paul Bremer, who was the head of this authority, ap-

proved the Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that emphasized the freedom of religious belief and practice;¹¹ however, this supreme law was later superseded by the Iraqi-drafted Permanent Constitution that stresses the role of Islam.¹²

Currently, the only synagogue left in Baghdad is closed. It is a crumbling, buff-colored building, tucked away in an alleyway in what was once Baghdad's main Jewish neighborhood.

Picture with Paul Bremer

This study employs a qualitative method of textual analysis to unveil symbolism and the consequent meanings of visual frames embedded in the picture below, which has been circulating among many Iraqis through e-mail. Four Iraqi politicians and one U.S. diplomat appear on the photo. They are (from left to right): Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Paul Bremer, Ahmed al-Chalabi, Adnan al-Pachachi, and Adil Abdul-Mahdi:

Mowaffak Baqer al-Rubaie

Mowaffak al-Rubaie is an Iraqi Shiite politician. He was appointed a member of the Iraqi Governing Council (GC) in July 2003 and was subsequently assigned the position of Iraq's National Security Advisor in April 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). He held this post for its full five years term until



April, 2009 when he became a lawmaker in Iraq's former Parliament.

Lewis Paul Bremer III

Paul Bremer (also nicknamed Jerry Bremer) is an American diplomat, and is most remembered for being the U.S. administrator of Iraq that was charged with overseeing the country's reconstruction process. In his role as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), he reported primarily to U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2001–2006) and exercised authority over Iraq's civil administration represented by the GC. He served in Iraq in this position from May 12, 2003 until limited Iraqi sovereignty was restored on June 28, 2004.

Ahmed Abdel Hadi al-Chalabi

Ahmed al-Chalabi is an Iraqi Shiite politician and head of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) political entity. He became a GC member after 2003, and then he occupied the position of Iraq's interim oil minister from April to May 2005 and from December 2005 to January 2006, being deputy prime minister from May 2005 until May 2006. Chalabi and his INC failed to win a seat in Parliament in the December 2005 Iraqi elections, and when the cabinet of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was formed in May 2006, Chalabi was not awarded a ministerial post. Rather, he continued to supervise the Supreme National Debaathification Commission that he had been in charge of since it was formed in November 2003, when the country was under the authority of U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer, who was responsible for signing the CPA order that established the commission.

In the March 2010 parliamentary election, Chalabi and his INC won seats in Iraq's House of Representatives after joining the Iraqi National Alliance (i.e., INA – Shiite bloc).

Adnan Muzahim Amin al-Pachachi

Adnan al-Pachachi is an Iraqi secular politician of Sunni roots. Pachachi was Iraq's permanent representative to the United Nations (UN) from 1959 to 1965, and minister of foreign affairs from 1965 to 1967. He again served as permanent representative to the UN from 1967 to 1968. After the Baath Party seized power in Iraq in 1968, Pachachi spent a long period in exile. Pachachi became a GC member after the 2003 Iraq War, but has not occupied any other post after that.

Adil Abdul-Mahdi

Adil Abdul-Mahdi is an Iraqi Shiite politician and economist. He was one of the two Vice Presidents of Iraq. He was formerly a GC member, then finance minister in the interim government. Abdul-Mahdi is a member of the Shiite party Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). Although the group was long based in neighboring Iran, it holds close ties with both the U.S. and U.S.-backed Iraqi groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. After the March 2010 elections, Abdul-Mahdi was one of the nominees to hold the position of Iraq's prime minister.

The Picture's Jewish Symbolism

Individuals learn each other's intentions

and motivations in many ways, including the use of significant symbolism in the form of gestures, both verbal and non-verbal.¹³ The meaning of symbols arises directly from social interaction.¹⁴ Surprisingly, symbolism and understanding the meanings of symbols produce a common culture.¹⁵ Consequently, different symbols – Jewish ones – have been added to the original picture examined in this research. The textual analysis in this part of the paper focuses on three visual frames of a Jewish nature: Chanukah, Star of David, and Yarmulke.

Chanukah

Chanukah (or Hanukkah) is the Jewish festival of lights. It is an eight-day celebration that begins on the 25th day of the Jewish month of Kislev (the ninth month of the Jewish year, which usually occurs in November/December). Chanukah is one of the best known Jewish holidays and, thus, can serve as a significant Judaic symbol. Chanukah's meaningful historic roots are located in revolution against assimilation and suppression of Judaism. It is a celebration commemorating the military victory of the Jewish Maccabees over the Seleucid Empire. Chanukah also recognizes the rededication of the Second Temple in 164 B.C.

These days, Chanukah appears to be almost a secular holiday on the Jewish calendar. In celebrating Chanukah, Jews light candles on the Menorah (a candelabrum) one at a time for eight nights. On the last day of Chanukah, all the candles are therefore lit. Jewish families observing Chanukah sing chants and recite

blessings while the candles are being lit. They also have some prepared meals, play games, or exchange gifts.

Star of David

Intertwined equilateral triangles represent a common symbol even in non-Jewish places, because it is thought that it brings good luck; yet, the Star of David is a sign of evil throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds; Iraq is no exception. I still remember my first art class in Baghdad when I was in first grade, and how my teacher told the whole class never to try to draw the Star of David in any form unless in a picture that shows an Israeli defeat in battlefields. The Star of David (also known as Magen David or Shield of David) supposedly represents the shape of King David's shield or the logo on it, but there is really no support for this claim in any early rabbinic literature nor in early Jewish documentation.

While theories about this symbol are theologically interesting, they are not strongly grounded in historic literature. For example, some explain that the top triangle is directed upward, toward God, and the lower triangle refers downward, toward the real world, while others note that the overlapped triangles are inseparable, just like the Jewish people. Some say that the three sides represent the three branches of Jews: Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites, while others argue that there are actually 12 sides (i.e., three exterior and three interior on each triangle) to represent the 12 Jewish tribes. It is true that the Star of David appears occasionally in early Jewish artwork, but it has never

been perceived as a Judaic symbol exclusively; however, the Star of David is the universally recognized symbol of today's Jewry; it appears on the flag of Israel, and the Israeli Red Magen David, the Israeli equivalent to the Red Cross.

Yarmulke

During my military service as a soldier of the Iraqi army (1992–1993), I used to cover my head as part of the uniform. I saw officers more than once punishing soldiers for nothing but covering only the upper rear parts of their heads. I heard those officers telling the soldiers not to do what the Zionist enemy does. Years after I was discharged from military service, I had an interest in knowing more about Islam. Over the period 1996 to 1997, I took classes in a Sunni mosque at the al-Adhamiya neighborhood of Baghdad where I heard imams warning other students and those engaged in prayer not to cover only the upper rear parts of their heads because that's what "dirty Jews" do, according to their description.

Although it is a style in Western cultures that a man displays a sign of respect by removing his hat, in Eastern cultures it is a sign of respect to cover the head. Jews belong to an Eastern culture, and Jewish men have a tradition but not a religious command to cover their heads during prayers to show respect to God. Islam is an eastern religion, just like Judaism. Muslim men are encouraged to cover their heads during prayers as part of their religion's teachings; however, Muslims cover the entire upper part of their heads, while Jews typically cover the upper rear

part only.

The yarmulke is the Jewish traditional head covering. It is the most commonly known and recognized symbol of Jewish culture, but actually the one with the least religious significance. The word yarmulke, which is usually pronounced yammica, is Yiddish and comes from a Tartar word meaning skullcap. But some Orthodox and Hasidic rabbis say it comes from the Aramaic words – yerai malka – fear of or respect for The King. The Hebrew word for this head covering is kippah.

Why use Jewish Symbols on Chalabi?

Although four Iraqi politicians and one U.S. diplomat appear on the picture, the three visual Jewish symbols of Chanukah, Star of David, and Yarmulke have been all put on the image of one Iraqi figure only, Ahmed al-Chalabi, who was specifically selected for this purpose by the photo's modifiers due to his political history and his position on the picture standing next to U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer. Ahmed al-Chalabi was a vital part of an executive council that represented the umbrella Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which was created with U.S. blessings in 1992 with the intention of overthrowing former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

It is true that the INC received major funding and assistance from the United States, but it never had any real influence in Iraq after the 2003 War. The INC's power gradually diminished until the December 2005 elections when this party failed to win a single seat in Parliament,

while in the March 2010 elections, Chalabi and his bloc won seats in the Iraqi Parliament as part of the Shiite coalition. In the buildup to the 2003 war on Iraq, Chalabi and his INC provided a major portion of the information on which U.S. intelligence based its evaluation of Saddam Hussein, including reports on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and alleged ties to al-Qaida terrorist organization.¹⁶

Ahmed al-Chalabi had enjoyed close political and business relationships with members of the U.S. government, including some of the Pentagon's leading neo-conservatives under the administration of President George W. Bush (2000–2008). Chalabi had political ties to the Project for the New American Century, in particular to Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. Chalabi also enjoyed considerable support within the political arena of the United States, even being a special guest of First Lady Laura Bush at the 2004 State of the Union Address.¹⁷

In 2003, a CPA decree issued by Ambassador Paul Bremer appointed Chalabi as the director of the Supreme National De-baathification Commission in Iraq. The Baath Party, whose name means "rebirth," was founded in Syria in 1947 and has supported a platform of secular pan-Arab nationalism, socialist economics, and strong opposition to Israel and western influence in the Middle East region. It solidified its power in Iraq in a coup in 1968. Under Saddam Hussein's leadership (1979–2003), the Baath Party became highly militarized. The party functioned somewhat clandestinely, recruiting mem-

bers for small organizational cells in towns, villages, and cities. These cells would report to regional party committees that, in turn, would report to Saddam Hussein. In exchange for providing information and assisting the party, members were rewarded jobs in state-run companies and institutions, the opportunity to study in a university, housing preferences, and increased payments. Teachers, for example, used to receive a bonus equal to 10 times their monthly salary for becoming full party members.¹⁸

Ambassador Bremer, the U.S. administrator of Iraq from May 12, 2003 to June 28, 2004, issued a sweeping order in May 2003 outlawing the Baath Party and dismissing all senior members from their governmental posts. In November 2003, Bremer established the Supreme National Debaathification Commission to root out senior Baathists from Iraqi ministries and hear appeals from those who were in the lowest ranks of the party's senior leadership. The party's foremost leaders – some 5,000 to 10,000 individuals – were not permitted to appeal their dismissals. Although, theoretically, any Iraqi could join the party, its membership in the final years of the regime was mostly Sunni Arab, as were the party's top ranks.¹⁹ Baathism in Iraq might have been a secular-nationalist ideology on the surface, but in heart it has yet been a Sunni Arab movement. Many Shiites embraced Arab nationalism and some were prominent members in the leadership of the Iraqi Baath Party but by the time the party took full control of power in Iraq in 1968, it was led by a group of Sunnis who belonged to the tribes of Saddam's home-

town of Tikrit and its suburbs.²⁰

Shiite prominence in Iraq after April 9, 2003 was taken by Sunni Arabs as a threatening sign. Iraqi Sunni leaders, whether in suits or clerical robes, objected vigorously to the Shiite revival in Iraq. After the United States began the Debaathification process in governmental institutions, Sunni concerns turned to alienation and anger.²¹ Many Sunni Arabs in Iraq have perceived the Debaathification process as a method designed by the CPA of the neoconservative Paul Bremer to punish Baathists for their anti-Jew and anti-Israel ideologies. They have also seen it as a Desunnification process²² operated by the Debaathification Commission of Shiite Ahmed al-Chalabi, who had strong ties to neoconservatives as well.

The Anti-Semitic Meaning of the Picture: Israel and the US War in Iraq

Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his Baath regime were virulent enemies of Jews, Zionism, and of Israel. Saddam called for the destruction of the Jewish State, and he did not hesitate to order his army to launch SCUD missiles to hit Israel in 1991 during the 1st Gulf War. In October, 1973, when Saddam was the Vice President of Iraq, the Iraqi army engaged with the Israeli Defense Army on the Syrian Front during the Yum Kippur War, while the Iraqi Airforce was attacking Israeli targets on the Egyptian Front.

The photo analyzed by this research was taken on December 14, 2003, only hours after Saddam was in U.S. custody. Am-

bassador Bremer wanted to be sure that the man U.S. troops captured the day before at a farmhouse in ad-Dawr suburb, near Tikrit city, was the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, and not someone else; therefore, Bremer took the four Iraqi politicians: Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Ahmed al-Chalabi, Adnan al-Pachachi, and Adil Abdul-Mahdi to check and confirm. The four Iraqi statesmen also wanted to assure themselves and their parties that Saddam, not anyone else, had become a prisoner in a U.S. detention center. The photo was taken after the five men met and talked to Saddam in his first day in a cell. I knew this information from my position as an Iraqi journalist covering the War in Iraq for the U.S. press from 2003 to 2007.

Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League defines a criterion of three components to detect anti-Semitism: (1) Attributing mysterious power to Jews. (2) Accusing the Jews of disloyalty. (3) Identifying the Jews as a group in the service of Jewish goals.²³ By applying Foxman's criterion of anti-Semitism, this picture's modifiers charge Jews with bringing upon them the U.S. war in Iraq for the interest of Israel, and are therefore projecting anti-Semitism. This allegation attributes mysterious overarching powers to Jews, much in the tradition of the infamous Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.²⁴ Jewish symbolism added to the photo mediates a claim that American Jews through the neoconservative movement have somehow determined U.S. policy toward Iraq (represented by Ambassador Paul Bremer, a neoconservative but not a Jew) in order

to satisfy their greater concern about Israeli interests.

Therefore, the picture points to the Jewish community in the U.S. and presumes that neoconservative Jews involved in the buildup to the 2003 Iraq War and its aftermath, such as Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and Elliot Abrams, no matter how long their distinguished records as American civil servants, are inherently more loyal to Israel than to their own country. Disloyalty is another longstanding anti-Semitic stereotype.²⁵ Thus, the modified photo conveys an incorrect notion that unlike other U.S. citizens, Jews in the United States do not function as American individuals trying their best to serve America, but as a group of organized conspirators in the service of Israel and some alleged Jewish goals.²⁶

Having said this, it seems that some American neoconservative Jewish officials were individually involved in CPA's controversial decisions that have worsened the situation in Iraq, and made U.S. efforts in that country look fruitless amid huge sacrifices, such as the decision to dismantle the former Iraqi army. The rise of the Sunni-led insurgency has been blamed on the fact that former Iraqi army officers grew resentful of their loss of status and incomes. This argument is one of the central themes of the post-conflict scene in Iraq. In a detailed written submission to the Chilcot Inquiry (Iraq War Inquiry), Ambassador Paul Bremer dismissed claims that Saddam Hussein's armed forces could have been used to hold the disintegrating country together, but he admitted that ex-Iraqi officers had

caused trouble for coalition forces. “No doubt some members of the former army may have subsequently joined the insurgency,” he said.²⁷ But on July 20, 2010, The MI5 Former Director General, Eliza Manningham-Buller, delivered an assessment of the case for war against Iraq to the Chilcot Inquiry. She revealed that she had been asked by the British government after the invasion to persuade then-Deputy U.S. Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz (U.S. official with Jewish roots) to ditch his plan to disband the Iraqi army. She said that she had tried to persuade Wolfowitz not to dissolve the Iraqi army during a visit to New York. When asked whether she had any chance of succeeding, she said: “Not a hope.”²⁸

Who Could Possibly Do It?

Texts are neither scientific data nor historical documents, but are literally forensic evidence, because their material reality allows for the recovery and critical interrogation of discursive politics in an empirical form.²⁹ Although the photo was sent to me via email by an Iraqi Sunni Arab, there are other factors in this investigation that confirm that it is more likely that the original picture of the five politicians was modified by Sunni Arab(s) who may have had an affiliation with the Baath Party in Iraq. Those who added Judaic symbols to the picture wanted to emphasize the interests achieved by Jews, Zionism, and Israel through the U.S. war in Iraq, because this kind of framing effect is one thing that gains them popularity within at least a tangible part of Iraqi society where individuals who cannot fully

understand the world around them after April 2003 are continuously struggling to employ their previous life experience to make sense (i.e., meaning) of their new surroundings.

In order to efficiently digest the new political climate in Iraq that has emerged after April 9, 2003, Iraqi individuals tend to categorize information and to interpret it in a meaningful way by applying interpretative schemas or primary frameworks of reference,³⁰ such as those related to Jews, Zionism, and Israel, to their lives, because texts alone do not determine the meaning of these things but rather interface with collective memory.³¹ Some framing devices are so powerful that a single reference to them suffices to activate certain schemes of interpretation.³² Therefore, the picture’s visual frames of reference influence anti-Jewish opinions and emotions by stressing specific anti-Semitic values and other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issues of Israel and the Iraq War than they might appear to have under an alternative condition.

But the outcome of the U.S. war in Iraq is not in the interest of Israel. In a meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2006–2011) on July 7, 2010, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed concerns about the Jewish State’s security once U.S. troops leave Iraq.³³ Yet, many people in Iraq perceive that Iraqi politicians who supported the U.S. military operation in their country in fact have offered a service to Israel by making the Jewish State safer. This perception could be attributed to two reasons: First,

the U.S.-led military operation in March 2003 toppled former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and criminalized his pan-Arab Baath Party that called for the annihilation of Israel. I still remember that once in 1990, a few months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saddam swore to God he would let Iraqi fire eat half of Israel. Second, the U.S. political agenda has always told Iraqis and Arabs in general that America sponsors Israel's security. For example, on July 6, 2010, President Barack Obama received Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the White House, and said: "The United States is committed to Israel's security; we are committed to that special bond; and we are going to do what's required to back that up, not just with words but with actions."³⁴ Less than three months before that, on March 9, 2010, Vice President Joseph Biden said from Jerusalem: "Progress occurs in the Middle East when everyone knows there is simply no space between the United States and Israel. There is no space between the United States and Israel when it comes to Israel's security."³⁵

Therefore, Arabs always perceive that the United States of America talks to them with an Israeli plan in the pocket. But this is a wrong perception of U.S.-Israeli relations and American foreign policy in the Middle East region, because America supports Israel for very reasonable reasons. In so doing, the United States is not anti pan-Arab or anti-Palestinian; in fact, far from it. Indeed, America has been able to help bring Arab countries, like Egypt and Jordan to peace agreements with Israel because the United

States is the only international power to have the trust of both sides. There is no conspiracy in this argument. Instead, there is a sensible and balanced approach to conceive U.S. efforts in the Middle East: support for Israel, support for peace, and support for reform in the Arab world, including Iraq.³⁶

Is this Picture Representative of Anti-Semitism of Iraqis, and not only Sunni Arab Iraqis?

It is hard to accurately judge the representativeness of this picture with respect to current Iraqi public perceptions associated with anti-Semitism, but available evidence could help extrapolate a conclusion in this regard. Although the picture was taken on December 14, 2003, it was e-mailed to me in 2010, without any detailed information about the producer or production date. In fact, there were even no comments on the message body; yet, throughout the period 2007–2009, Sunni and Shiite sources sent me at least three e-mail messages with pictures of U.S. Jewish soldiers doing prayers in Baghdad, specifically in residential locations of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The sources made different comments on the Jewish soldiers' pictures, most remarkably, "That's the Real Face of the U.S. Invasion," and "The Zionist Invasion of Iraq."

The Iraq Media Study – National Audience Analysis on April 21, 2010 shows a growing interest in using the Internet among Iraqis, especially with younger generations;³⁷ nevertheless, low download speeds and shortages in power supply still

represent obstacles that face the prospect of reliable Internet service in Iraq. However, it is hard to find a university student in that country that does not have at least one e-mail account. Yet, what this picture represents for the whole of Iraqi society is not about the ability of Iraqis to have access to the Internet, it is about anti-Semitism as an attribute of both Sunni and Shiite communities in Iraq. Although my argument is that it is more likely that the original picture of the five politicians had been modified by Sunni Arab(s), this decision does not relieve Shiite Arabs in Iraq of anti-Semitism. They are anti-Semitic in as much as they repeatedly voted for the same anti-Semitic proxies of the anti-Jewish Iran in Iraq: The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and its armed wing Badr Organization, the Dawa Party, and the Sadr Movement and its Mahdi Army. In fact, when the Israel–Hezbollah War took place in July 2006, the ISCI and its Badr Organization, the Dawa Party, and the Sadr Movement all took the same stance of Iran by supporting Hezbollah. Officials of those Iraqi Shiite political blocs put the Israel–Hezbollah War issue at the top of their agendas despite the fact that Iraq was drowning in sectarian violence that took away hundreds of lives every day throughout the 2006–2007 period. Although Iraq has been in need of every cent to rehabilitate its infrastructure, the leaderships of the ISCI, the Dawa Party, and the Sadr Movement financially assisted Hezbollah during the war, and news reported that members of the Mahdi Army travelled to Lebanon to fight side-by-side with other Hezbollah combatants against the Israeli Defense Force.

The same Iraqi Shiite groups have been acting in this way by also supporting the Assad regime in Syria.³⁸

On September 18, 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed his policy toward Israel by stressing that the Jewish state has no place in the future of the Middle East region.³⁹ This is not a new position of his toward Israel; in October 2005, Ahmadinejad called for wiping Israel off the world’s map. “Our dear Imam [i.e., Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran that toppled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in 1979] ordered that the occupying regime in al-Quds [i.e., Jerusalem] be wiped off the face of the earth. This was a very wise statement,” Ahmadinejad said in an anti-Zionism conference. He also denounced and threatened any country that approves Israel’s right to exist: “Anyone who would recognize this state [i.e., Israel] has put his signature under the defeat of the Islamic world.”⁴⁰ Ahmadinejad claims that the Holocaust “is a myth that has been used for 60 years by Zionists to blackmail other countries and justify their crimes in the occupied territories,”⁴¹ and he is persistent in his verbal attacks on the Jewish State to the extent that he left no doubt his regime has an intent to destroy Israel with a military – or nuclear strike when it becomes possible. “The Zionist regime is a rotten, dried tree that will be eliminated by one storm,” he said, “Its existence has harmed the dignity of Islamic nations.”⁴²

In 2002, *United Press International (UPI)* quoted an adviser of the ISCI (then the

Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) saying that Iran supplied the ISCI with offices and funding for its soldiers in southern Iraq.⁴³ Another *UPI* report in January 2003 depicted that ISCI activities are harmonized by the Nasr Command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is the same organization that is “responsible for funding and training Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”⁴⁴ In September 2004, American officials told the *Washington Post* that after the toppling of Saddam Hussein in March 2003, Iran provided tens of millions of dollars and other material support to a range of Iraqi parties, including the ISCI, the Dawa Party, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.⁴⁵ This arrangement has remained the same until today.

Some commentators have said that Iran will exercise substantial influence in Iraq over the long term.⁴⁶ They have shared the same perspective that Iran’s influence in Iraq would become more effective, especially after the full military withdrawal of the United States from the country in December 2011. Iraqi Kurdish Lawmaker Mahmoud Othman says that Iraq’s future has fallen into the hands of the U.S., Iran, and Arab countries.⁴⁷ But Iraqi Kurdish Lawmaker Abdilbari Zebari is more specific in saying that Iran will keep activating the National Coalition (i.e., NC = ISCI + Dawa party + al-Sadr Movement) to nominate the prime minister of Iraq from within, describing the Iranian move in this regard as a big and strong effort in order to eliminate any counter U.S. effort.⁴⁸ Izat al-Shabandar, a leading Shiite Arab lawmaker of the National Coalition, says that Iranian presence in Iraq relies on

the existence of the NC, stressing that “as far as the NC continues, Iran will find a role for itself in the Iraqi issue.”⁴⁹

Iran practices both religious and political influence on Iraqi Shiites through three clergies: ISCI, the Dawa party, and the Sadr Movement. Moqtada al-Sadr, who currently lives in Qum, Iran, has both religious and political authority over a big faction of Iraqi Shiites (i.e., the Sadrists), but the ISCI and Dawa Party have only political authority over the rest of Shiites in Iraq; yet, they rely on the religious clergy of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani to complete their power by acquiring religious aspects. The Iraqi permanent constitution, which was drafted after 2003, stresses the crucial role of the Shiite clergy represented by Sistani, who himself is an Iranian.

Contrary to what some scholars think,^{50&51} Shiite clerics hold influence on their followers in Iraq where there is no wide gap between the clergy and the day-to-day life of average Shiites. Through a complicated combination of religion, politics, finance, and violence, Iran has been able to impose its blueprint on both the Shiite community and on the ongoing political process in Iraq since 2003. In the 2005 parliamentary election, the ISCI, Dawa Party, and al-Sadr Movement jointly won 128 seats out of 275 (47%), and in the 2010 election, seats of the three Shiite parties totaled at 159 of 325 (49%).⁵² As a continuation of this scheme, while the U.S. administration was busy with the process of pulling out troops from Iraq, in August 2010 Iran appointed Hassan Danaifar as an ambassador to Iraq.

Danaifar is a ranking member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and has a decades-long relationship with many Iraqi politicians.⁵³

Some may argue that Iraq is not Iran and that Shiites in Iraq are not the same as Shiites in Iran, and that if the Iranian regime has a successful formula to manipulate the Iranian society, that the same formula will not necessarily be successful in Iraq. Regardless, when it comes to the anti-Semitism of elite and average Shiites in both Iran and Iraq, it is clear that they share the same values of hate. There has not been a *marjaa taqlid* either in Najaf (Iraq) or in Qum (Iran) who tolerated Jews, Zionism, and Israel; therefore, why should we think that their followers could be different?

On Friday, September 3, 2010, residents of big Shiite cities in Iraq recognized the Khomeini's al-Quds (i.e., Jerusalem) International Day by launching demonstrations to demand support for the Palestinian people. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Badr Organization called for the demonstration under the nose of the Iraqi government, headed by the Dawa Party. "We joined this peaceful demonstration to demand justice to the Palestinian people in their Jihad against Israel," a Shiite demonstrator said. He explained that the demonstrators demanded to "encounter the Zionist entity's settlement scheme in the al-Quds, which aims at Judaizing the capital of Muslims [i.e., al-Quds]." Another demonstrator said that the demonstration is an annual tradition that responds to the call of Imam al-Khomeini in 1979 that the last

Friday of every Ramadan be the al-Quds International Day. "We need a serious stand with the Palestinian people against the occupying Zionist entity," he said. "The demonstrators condemned the Zionist entity's schemes associated with Palestine and its capital, the al-Quds," he added, illuminating that "although the demonstration was called for by the ISCI and the Badr Organization, we voluntarily joined it for humanitarian reasons that motivate us to support the Palestinian people who have been in crisis since 1948 [i.e., when Israel was established]."⁵⁴

More Symbolism: Chalabi, the Unfaithful Woman of the Pirate Cowboy Bremer

The picture's modifiers put a cowboy hat on Ambassador Paul Bremer's head to highlight his American identity. Just in case some Iraqis are unable to interpret the cowboy hat symbol in this way, the hat was rapped with the American flag to stress the meaning that this figure (Bremer) represents the American Imperialism of Uncle Sam. But the photo presents Bremer as a special kind of cowboy in some other ways; he is a pirate cowboy. Bremer in this picture has no guns; instead he has pirate style swords. Piracy symbols are globally used to refer to thieves, and adding such symbolism to Ambassador Bremer's image reflects common public perceptions in Iraq that the U.S. military intervention there was for oil. In the photo, Pirate Bremer has six swords: three on each side of his belly to portray the meaning that the United States is using Jewish tools in its operation in Iraq, because this number of

swords is exactly the same as the number of angles in the David Star, which is an Israeli symbol. In 2008, former speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani (Sunni Arab), told Al-Arabiya TV that the U.S. has destroyed Iraq according to an Israeli plan.⁵⁵

Excluding Chalabi, whose head cover shows his alleged relationship with Jews, the head covers of the three other Iraqi politicians reveal no affiliation to stress the meaning that they are not only not Iraqis but also rootless, like mercenaries of the U.S. in its war in Iraq. Pachachi and Abdul-Mahdi were given magnified eyeglasses to present the meaning that they are unable to see things correctly and judge them wisely, while Chalabi was given flamboyant party glasses to mediate the meaning that Chalabi is something else than he appears to be. Iran might have been using Chalabi to develop sources of information on U.S. operations in Iraq. Press reports say that Iraqi political leader Ahmed al-Chalabi gave his Iranian contacts information on U.S. acquisition of Iranian intelligence codes,⁵⁶ but he has repeatedly denied these allegations. This argument does not contradict the interpretation of the Jewish symbols on Chalabi, because disloyalty and deception are longstanding anti-Semitic stereotypes.

Pirates and cowboys in movies have girls, and those who modified this picture did not miss that point; therefore, they gave the Pirate Cowboy Bremer four women instead of one, because polygamy of up to four women is allowed for men in Iraq under Muslim, tribal, and even civil laws.

Although eyeglasses of both Pachachi and Abdul-Mahdi were made big, they were given the shapes of women's eyeglasses as well. In the picture, Ambassador Bremer stands between Chalabi and Rubaie. The modifiers introduced the female symbol of a woman's purse to the image of each of these two Iraqi politicians. In a relationship between a man and a woman in a country like Iraq, the woman is the weaker partner; therefore, by adding women's eyeglasses and pink purses to the images of the four Iraqi politicians, the intention is not to claim they are women, but to stress that they are the weaker part in their relationship with Bremer, or in local Iraqi parlance, they are not "the men who can say yes and no" in this relationship. Within a broader interpretation, Iraq is the weaker part in its relation with the United States.

Iraqis are not interested in having pets in their houses especially when it comes to dogs, because people in Iraq think they are dirty, and Iraqi people are religiously and socially encouraged to keep cats and dogs away. Even when some Iraqis (not more than five percent of households in the best cases) decide to have dogs in their houses for protection, they keep them in house yards and never let them inside. But, in order to stress the meaning that Chalabi is not Iraqi, though he is truly an Iraqi man, the photo's modifiers put a small dog in his arms. The dog was used in the photo to convey the meaning that Chalabi does not live up to Iraqi standards or desires. However, the same dog conveys some other meanings. Iraqis interpret the symbol of a dog like the one in the picture as a pet of a rich woman,

which serves two purposes: Chalabi is a rich man; yet, he is the weaker side in the relationship with Bremer.

Although the picture suggests that Chalabi is an unfaithful partner of Bremer or the U.S., it portrays Rubaie as a partner but fails to present his unfaithfulness. Rubaie claims that he “deceived the Americans when he brought them in to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein.”⁵⁷ The photo also tells nothing about the faithfulness of both Pachachi and Abdul-Mahdi in terms of their relations with the United States.

Conclusion

Textual deconstruction is a method that obtains meaning from a text by focusing on revealing a center. The meaning of a text is dependent on a center represented by a set(s) of binary pairs that communicators introduce to the text in order to make meaning rather than being the opposite. Framers establish a center by making each pair’s member dependent on its companion for meaning and, we might say, existence within a context. In all binaries, one of the terms is always subordinated to the other or both of them are subordinated to each other to mediate global meaning(s). In this specific case study of analyzing the picture shown above, the binary pair is Israel/U.S. within the context of the Iraq War and the Iranian intervention in Iraq.

This binary has been framed to provide a guarantee of anti-Semitic symbolism that constantly slips from one Jewish sign to the next. Signifiers did not invent the Ju-

daic signs in this photo; they merely put them in an endless chain of signification. The picture of the four politicians aims at eliciting specific responses in Iraqi audiences with respect to each of the four individuals in the photo, because significant symbolisms implicitly encourage the responses that they arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in the target audience to whom they are addressed.⁵⁸

The above photo is an example of the psychological origins of framing effects that explain how different presentations (i.e., framings) of essentially the same issue alter people’s perceptions and evaluations associated with that issue.^{59&60} Exposure to the Jewish symbols added to this picture makes anti-Semitic Iraqi audiences assign greater weights (i.e., cognitive preferences) to those frames when making subsequent judgments about the four Iraqi politicians within the contexts of the U.S. war in Iraq and U.S.-Israeli relations. An Iraqi individual perceives the Jewish symbols (i.e., frames) mediated by the picture as important to interpret the Iraq War issue, because they carry values (i.e., meanings) that meet the receiver’s anti-Judaic principles; therefore, Iraqi audiences label themselves as anti-Semitic once they choose to employ any of these frames to make meaning of the four Iraqi politicians’ relations with the U.S.,⁶¹ because representations of things provide models for behavior, and subsequently, for related identities.⁶²

Endnotes:

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6. Max Sawadayee, *All Waiting to be Hanged* (Tel Aviv: Levanda Press, 1974), 115.
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Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) towards Political and Economic Integration

Seray Teleke



Abstract

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation group is creating a foundation for an area of potential economic and political integration for its member countries. Ever since these countries started BSEC, they have had to face many barriers on their way to developing this group. Although these countries are generally all in the same region, their political history and economic situations are very diverse. In addition to this, they do not all have stable relationships between them. This article will focus on how to develop the political and economic integration of the Black Sea region. In order to do that, this article will provide some general information about the Black Sea region. Second, it will give some information about the foundation and operation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group. Third, it will analyze the obstacles that present themselves through the political and economic integration of the area. Finally, this article will provide recommendations for the integration of the region through BSEC.

Biography

Seray Teleke received her B.A. degree in International Relations from Gazi University, Ankara in 2010 and her M.A. in Global Development and Peace at University of Bridgeport, in Bridgeport, Connecticut in 2012. Her research interests are in the areas of international conflict resolution, peace building, peacekeeping and human rights.

Turkey is growing as a regional power. For the past few years, Turkey's long running membership process in the European Union has affected Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Turkey's focus has since shifted from the West to the Middle East and Africa. This has been especially true under the current government, led by the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which has worked to strengthen its relationships with the Middle East. Because of this, Turkey is playing a key role in the Arab Spring. The current president of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, has indicated in an interview published in the May/June 2012 issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine that "Turkey can be a democratic model for the Middle East."¹ However, Turkey also has another option it may focus on: the Black Sea Region.

The Black Sea is an inland sea between Asia and Southeastern Europe. Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia all border this sea. It is connected to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas through the Bosphorus and Dardanelle straits of Turkey, which in turn give Turkey substantial leverage in the region. The Black Sea has also hosted historically important civilizations such as the Byzantine Empire. It was a frozen space during the cold war, since all of the countries that border it, except for Turkey were part of the "Iron Curtain". Turkey later developed relations with the newly independent states of the Black Sea region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkey then acted fast in recognizing these countries and bilateral cultural and economic treaties soon followed.² One of the most important initiatives of the

Turkish state after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone.

This paper will focus on Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which is an important political and economic integration area for Turkey and other member countries. The goal is to look at the ways in which this cooperation was successful and unsuccessful in terms of the political and economic integration of the member countries, and to recommend steps to increase the political and economic integration of that area. In order to do that, this paper will mention the importance of the Black Sea for the countries that border it. Second, it will look at the foundations and goals of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone. Third, it will explore how political relationships of the countries affect the organization and the challenges that the BSEC is facing. Finally, this paper will give suggestions on what can be done to increase the political and economic integration of the region.

The Strategic Importance of the Black Sea

The Black Sea carries a heavy strategic importance for the countries that border it. Not only does it have an important role to play for the countries of the region, but it has importance to the European Union as well, since the EU has broadened its borders to the shores of the Black Sea with the EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania. Also, the location of the sea is unique since it is on the path to the gas and energy resources of the Caucasus.

The Caspian Sea, which is an important body of water for the Caspian-Caucasus region, is located between the countries of Central Asia and the regions of the Caucasus and the Black Sea. The Caspian Sea is connected to the Black Sea by the Volga and Don rivers. The Caspian-Caucasus region gives importance to the Black Sea and has received attention because it can be considered a source of oil and natural gas for the world's energy markets.³

It is worth stressing the strategic importance of the Black Sea for the two biggest countries in the region, Turkey and Russia, and the biggest regional organization, the European Union.

As mentioned previously, the sea is important for Turkey, since it is connected to the Aegean and the Mediterranean Seas through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles in Turkey. It gives strategic leverage and helps Turkey in having control over the area. Although there are other ways for the Black Sea region countries to access the rest of the world, the cost of usage of the Black Sea is more affordable than that of other available options. Additionally, Turkey may use the region to present its leadership skills to the "Western" world.

For Russia, the Black Sea is an important area for keeping Caucasian energy resources under control. Other than that, it is a gateway for Russia to have access to the world's other oceans. Also, around 25% of Russian foreign trade is carried out the Black Sea route.⁴ Another important aspect for Russia is that of security. The Black Sea is the only body of water

with direct access to Moscow, the center of Russia.

The European Union gained access to the Black Sea with the membership of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Immediately, the EU declared that "the prosperity, stability and security of our neighbors around the Black Sea are of immediate concern to the EU", continuing by indicating that "Three EU policies are relevant in this context: the pre-accession process in the case of Turkey, the European Neighborhood Policy (with five eastern ENP partners also being active in Black Sea cooperation) and the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation."⁵ Also, the Black Sea area can be considered an important trade route for the EU.

Overall, the Black Sea establishes its importance in the world with rich natural resources and its strategic location. As indicated in the European Union Black Sea Synergy Report, "the region is an expanding market with great development potential and is an important hub for energy and transport flows."⁶

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSEC)

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone was founded on June 25, 1992 in Istanbul, Turkey. The organization is at the centerpiece of a multilateral political and economic initiative that aims to ensure peace, stability and prosperity in the Black Sea region. The borders of the organization cover the entire Black Sea region and consist of 11 neighboring countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bul-

garia, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In 2004, Serbia joined the organization. In the member countries, one can see that it is not required to have a direct border to the sea in order to become a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group. However, the applications for membership of Montenegro and the Greek side of Cyprus have been denied.

According to the official website of the organization⁷:

- “BSEC covers a geography encompassing the territories of the Black Sea littoral states, the Balkans and the Caucasus with an area of nearly 20 million square kilometers. The BSEC region is located on two continents;
- BSEC represents a region of 350 million people with a foreign trade capacity of over US\$ 300 billion annually;
- After the Persian Gulf region, it is the second-largest source of oil and natural gas along with its rich proven reserves of minerals and metals;
- It is becoming Europe's major transport and energy transfer corridor.”

At the beginning, BSEC was a regional organization based solely on economics, but later on, its scope was broadened and it has been made to include other policy areas. BSEC mostly has locally based concerns in mind. For example, it intends to upgrade the transport infrastructure in and around the Black Sea, keep the sea and the inflowing rivers clean, and pro-

mote interstate cooperation in the fields of culture and education.⁸ Below are the areas of cooperation of BSEC:

- Agriculture
- Banking & Finance
- Combating Crime
- Culture
- Customs Matters
- Emergency Assistance
- Education
- Energy
- Environmental Protection
- Exchange of Statistical Data and Information
- Health Care and Pharmaceuticals
- Information & Communication Technologies
- Institutional Renewal & Good Governance
- Science and Technology
- SMEs
- Tourism
- Trade & Economic Development
- Transportation⁹

This cooperation was built out of a comprehensive institutional structure. It has ministerial councils, a permanent secretariat, working groups of senior officials and experts on sectorial topics, a development bank, a parliamentary assembly and a policy research institute.

The decision-making body of the organization is the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Council comes together every 6 months in April and October. However, if there is a need for an additional meeting, one or more member states may request one.¹⁰ The Council of Ministers may adopt resolutions, deci-

sions, or recommendations. The decisions and recommendations can be made by a two-thirds majority vote, while resolutions only require a simple consensus.¹¹ It is indicated in the framework of the BSEC objectives that the council shall:

- “decide on all issues pertaining to the functioning of the BSEC;
- consider all matters submitted by the Subsidiary Organs and to take accordingly appropriate decisions;
- take the decisions on membership and observer status;
- adopt and modify the Rules of Procedure;
- establish Subsidiary Organs within the BSEC, to assign tasks to them, to define, modify or terminate their mandates;
- consider any other related matters it may deem appropriate.”¹²

The Chairmanship of the organization changes alphabetically between the member countries every 6 months. The current Chairman of the organization is Serbia.¹³ The responsibility of the Chairman is to coordinate the actions of BSEC under the existing framework and to control the implementation of the resolutions and decisions by the member countries.¹⁴

Another important organ of the organization is the Permanent International Secretariat, in Istanbul, which carries out the secretarial services of BSEC. The Secretariat is under the authority of the Chairman.¹⁵

Other than that, BSEC maintains 20 different subsidiary bodies for its work.

Each subsidiary body has its own specific role, which is assigned to it by the Council of Ministers.¹⁶

Membership in the organization is not based on having a border on the Black Sea. It is indicated in the Charter that “The BSEC is open to any State which desires to become a Member and is deemed to be able and willing to fulfill the principles and objectives of the BSEC as set forth in the present Charter.”¹⁷ Although membership is open to any country, it is worth indicating that some member countries, especially Turkey, are not willing to enlarge the organization, since they believe that it will have a negative effect on the organization and that it will slow down cooperation between the member countries.¹⁸

BSEC also gives countries and other international organizations observer status depending on their request. The observer status of a given country or international organization is established by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and that Council may also choose to suspend or terminate the observer status of any particular group at their will. Currently, the countries and the international organizations which have observer status are: Egypt, Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia, USA, the International Black Sea Club, the Energy Charter Secretariat, the Black Sea Commissions, and the European Union.¹⁹ The European Commission was granted permanent observer status in June 2007. However, the United States refused their own permanent observer status. There-

fore, the United States has been granted a renewable observer status.²⁰

Obstacles in the Political and Economic Integration of BSEC

As one can see, the BSEC countries are very diverse. Except for Turkey and Greece, all of these countries are post-Soviet countries that have been in a period of transition. The transition process makes their economic and political development harder than that of Turkey and Greece. Other than that, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania are member states of the European Union, and Turkey is a candidate. The benefits of being a member of the EU have increased the difference between the countries of the BSEC. Those countries are more developed and integrated within the global economy. Below is a list of the Gross Domestic Product per capita of these countries in US dollars according to UN Statistics Division evaluation in 2010²¹:

Albania	\$3,677	Moldova	\$1,626
Armenia	\$3,031	Romania	\$7,522
Azerbaijan	\$5,638	Russia	\$10,351
Bulgaria	\$6,365	Serbia	\$5,123
Georgia	\$2,680	Turkey	\$10,095
Greece	\$26,504	Ukraine	\$3,035

As one can see, the difference between the more developed member countries of BSEC and the developing member countries is considerable. Moldova, Armenia, Albania and Georgia are all facing high

rates of poverty. Greece is the leading economy in the organization. However, it is well known that Greece has this welfare because of its membership in the EU, and with the crisis that they are facing, their economic situation is also questionable. Russia and Turkey are then left as the leading economies in the region other than Greece.

Russia and Azerbaijan seem to have built their economies on the transfer of energy, while Ukraine's economy depends upon low value added heavy industries.²² Those countries need to diversify their markets for better political and economic integration. Also, the economic crisis that Latin America experienced at the beginning of the 20th century can serve as a lesson to other countries that they should diversify their economy and not only depend on the production of luxury goods. However, being in a transitional process and having distinct economic differences are not the only obstacles to a successful BSEC; the historical and political relationships of member countries also have a big effect on the depth of cooperation between them. One example would be the membership denial of Montenegro. It was mentioned earlier that the membership of Montenegro has been vetoed by the organization. This was an interesting case, because Montenegro was a member of the organization while the country was united with Serbia. Therefore, the application of Montenegro can be considered as an effort at regaining membership. However, before the application of Montenegro, another country applied to have membership status: the Republic of Cyprus. With the application of Cyprus hav-

ing been vetoed by Turkey, Greece vetoed the application of Montenegro.²³

Another example of history getting in the way of the organization would be the historical leadership race between Russia and Turkey in the region. Both of the countries are also competing for the leadership of the organization. So far, Turkey has always been in the leading role in the BSEC, to the displeasure of Russia. Another reason for Russia to have a diminished interest in the organization is that it was created by the initiative of Turkey. Russia approaches the organization not as a regional development organization, but as an organization that will increase the economic and political development of Turkey. Russia also hesitates cooperating because, in their view, Turkey will become the main regional power through the organization, something they could not achieve by themselves.

Both Russia and Greece seem to create obstacles when it comes to the creation of decision-making bodies for the discussion of political matters through BSEC channels, largely based upon their political relations with Turkey.²⁴

There are also important historical issues that need to be solved in the region, in order to have a durable political and economic integration. Below is a list of the most important issues that need to be addressed in order to take steps towards the political and economic integration of the region:

- The Armenian Genocide issue: The relations of Turkey and Armenia are

always stretched thin because of claims about the Armenian Genocide. This issue is sensitive for both sides. It may not be possible to solve the issue in the short term, but both of these countries may start negotiating and using diplomacy for both their development and the political and economic integration of the region, instead of holding on to their current positions.

- The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: One of the major areas of instability in the region is in Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh and the military presence of Armenia in the area creates an insecure environment for BSEC. This conflict not only affects the relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it also affects relations between Armenia, Turkey and Russia. Turkey is involved in this conflict because of its shared history and culture with Azerbaijan. In the past, Turkey based its diplomatic relationships with Armenia not only on claims of genocide but also on the situation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, Russia is also involved in the conflict on Armenia's side, due to their shared history. This situation puts Turkey and Russia in another conflict as well. Taking positive steps in solving this issue will help the operation of BSEC.
- The Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflict: The conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia negatively affects the relationship between Georgia and

Russia. Their relationship is always tense. Improvement of the relations between them will also help BSEC member countries cooperate.

- Transnistria conflict: This conflict has damaged relations between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine and Russia are still not completely free from feeling the effects of this conflict. Ukraine and Russia need to improve their relations in order to serve their greater needs. Although this relationship is an obstacle for BSEC, these countries may also reverse course and increase their relations through BSEC, thus reducing the damage that is done.

The impact of the European Union in the region is both a strength and an obstacle for BSEC. It is a strength because the European Union supports the organization and has permanent observer status. As a major power in the area, it is important to have the European Union on one's side. However, it is an obstacle because the priorities of Romania, Bulgaria and Greece are with the EU, and not with BSEC. Besides that, because the EU sees the problems of BSEC, they are also in search of another kind of partnership in the Black Sea region that will work faster than BSEC. BSEC needs to address this issue properly, so that it may overcome these challenges from within in its efforts toward political and economic integration.

Conclusion - Recommendations towards Political and Economic Integration through BSEC

It is a fact that the member countries of BSEC need to solve many major issues in order to reach political and economic integration in the Black Sea region. However, it is not impossible. The countries may start with baby steps while they are trying to solve the other major issues between them in order to continue developing and reach political and economic integration in the region.

The first step would be determining ways on how to overcome the extreme poverty of some member countries such as Moldova, Armenia, Albania and Georgia. The member countries should strengthen their economic relations with those countries and guide and support them to develop their economies. Upon determining how to develop these countries' economies, another step for BSEC would be the strengthening of preferential trade agreements. Although these countries have trade agreements, the implementation and development of them is equally important. Strong preferential trade agreements would give the necessary background for the third step: the development of a Free Trade Area. During the creation of BSEC, it was initially foreseen that the organization would lead to a free trade zone, but unfortunately no agenda was set up to reach that goal.²⁵

If the organization worked systematically and set up time frames to reach its goals, it could be more effective in its efforts towards political and economic integration. It will also be beneficial to have an alternative to the EU in the region for the non-European Union countries.

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
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A Perspective on the American Strategic Shift in the Asia-Pacific Region¹

Quanyi Zhang



Abstract

The relationship between China and the U.S. has been described as “positive, cooperative and comprehensive.” However, apart from limited collaborations during the recent financial crisis, Sino-American relations have experienced troubles on various issues. Such issues include military rehearsals and exercises in the South China Sea, arms sales to Taiwan, the US meeting with the Dalai Lama, appreciation of the Chinese Yuan, the DPRK nuclear issue, web censorship, and other ideological differences. One author in “The Diplomat” assumed that the United States and China “are entering a prolonged period of elevated tensions and more frequent disputes between China and the West—the ‘new normal’ in geopolitics”. This article uses the Prospect Theory of political psychology, utilizing its tools of risk warning, framing effects, and ingrained mindsets to analyze the relationship between China and the US, with a particular focus on the Asia Pacific region, in order to promote a healthier China-US relationship. Due to limited resources, this paper bases its deductions from other academic works.

Biography

Quanyi Zhang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at China’s Zhejiang Wanli University. He has a PhD in law from Shanghai International Studies University, and has published numerous articles and commentaries on international politics. He was a columnist with United Press International (Asia) from 2007-2010, and he is now a guest researcher at the Centre for Non-traditional Security and Peaceful Development Studies at Zhejiang University, having recently published the book “Evolution of a World State: Study of the Generation and Transformation of Global Collective Identity.” with the Guangming Daily Press.

While there is much debate about China-US relations within circles of academics and politicians at the official level, both China and the US have agreed to build up a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship” in the 21st century.² Therefore, many have high expectations for the smooth development of China-US relations, or at the very least, they hope to avoid any dire confrontations. However, in the last three years, there have been repeated conflicts and skirmishes between the world’s two biggest powers, one being a developed country, and the other, a developing one. These quarrels have ranged across subjects from arm sales to Taiwan, to the Dalai Lama’s visit to the US, to the evaluation of the Chinese Yuan, to the North Korean nuclear issue, to web censorship and cyber espionage, and even to ideological debates. One author from “The Diplomat” argued that China and the US have entered “a prolonged period of elevated tensions and more frequent disputes”, leading to a ‘new normal’ stage in geopolitics.³ These tensions have resulted in increasing levels of conflict between the two states, as exemplified by American geopolitical maneuvers, particularly in East Asia.

It was not very long ago that phrases like “Stakeholder,” “Group 2,” and “staying in the same boat” were so popular that a vision of “Chinamerica” seemed in sight, signifying that the two states were working toward such a scenario.

Even in 2009, during her February visit to China, Hillary Clinton remarked, “We are truly going to rise or fall together. We are in the same boat and thankfully we are



rowing in the same direction.”⁴ Chinese leaders were also regarded as smart, sophisticated and farsighted; its diplomats were praised as diligent, knowledgeable and smooth.⁵

However, in reality there are strong feelings that are simmering at the strategic level with regards to the emergence of China as a global power. In contrast to earlier American feelings towards a rising China, the US appears to have become more cautious, if not reluctant, to embrace a China that plays an active role in global affairs, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The contrast between previous views and current views can be seen from various reports and papers. A 2005 report by the Rand Corporation explained the Sino-American relationship in positive terms.

Because of China’s successful globalization, we no longer have such problems. China is no longer a vacuum that sucks the world’s great powers into gigantic conflicts. China no longer sponsors insur-

gencies in Southeast Asia and Africa and Latin America. China no longer seeks to undermine global financial institutions. We obtain benefits from a China that supports stable capitalist democracy in Thailand and the Philippines; that joins the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and that counsels its neighbors about the benefits of political stability, free trade, and free investment.⁶

Such documents made it clear that the US was happier with China's economic development, with China's capability of playing a bigger role in global affairs, and with the Chinese tendency of using soft power rather than hard power in gaining influences. The current state of growing tensions between the two states gives rise to new questions and requires new interpretations of facts. Why did Sino-US relations take a U-turn, reversing the "positive, cooperative and comprehensive" discourse? Why is it that the US now appears to be unwelcoming in encouraging China to play a leading role as it did before? What were the reasons that made the US change its attitude towards "deliberately" confronting Chinese engagement in global affairs, particularly in the Asia-Pacific? On the other hand, what measures are to be taken by both sides in order to lessen tensions, to promote healthier bilateral relations, and to encourage better global governance?

There are different perspectives through which the China-US relationship can be looked at, based upon the various theories of International Relations. A realist perspective would argue that a rising China threatens US interests, thereby necessitating a shift in its strategy towards China. A liberalist perspective would ar-

gue that China's growing economic might would eventually result in its swallowing the US economy. Similarly, a constructivist approach would interpret the US as being afraid of losing value. In a word, regardless of the differing approaches, these theories of international relations are helpful in understanding the status of Sino-US relations.

However, it must be noted that states also exist in a geopolitical context and are not isolated atoms operating under an anarchic international system. States can also be seen as individuals to some extent, acting not only with rationality and their own interests in mind, but also with emotion, adding a psychological element to their behaviors.⁷ Furthermore, rational deductions in many cases fail to provide adequate explanations for a state's foreign policy alignment; some psychological factors or latent reasons may become useful for policy analysis. As such, states can be viewed as persons with psychological motivations. Subject to these assumptions, this article tries to apply Prospect Theory, a unique analytical tool of behavior in interpreting the American policy shift with regards to China.

This discussion will be divided into three parts. The first part of the paper will provide a brief introduction to the concept of Prospect Theory. It will be followed by bringing out the key ideas of the theory – namely risk warning, framing effects, and ingrained mindsets to be applied to US foreign policy towards China for a deeper analysis. This paper focuses only on the behavioral motivations of the US vis-à-vis China in the Asia Pacific region, while

touching upon other regions as well. The paper will then conclude by making recommendations on how to improve the bilateral relationship between China and the US, which would be beneficial to the world at large.

Forces of Prospect Theory for understanding the US mindset⁸

Prospect Theory has become one of the most influential behavioral theories in the social sciences, and was originally related to utilitarian interpretations in economics. It was later developed as a leading alternative to “expected utility theory,” particularly as a theory of decision-making. It was first formulated by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979, and was overwhelmingly accepted, culminating with the formulators being awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics for their theory. Prospect theory posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point, rendering it a critical variable in making judgments for decision-making. As such, people give more weight to losses than to comparable gains, so that they are generally more risk-averse with losses than bullish with gains. The hypothesized pattern of loss aversion and the salience of framing one’s mindset in such a way have received tentative confirmation by a series of diverse and robust experimental tests that are now well known in the literature on behavioral decision theory, particularly in the field of international relations.

Since the 1970s, a handful of international relations scholars, most prominently Robert Jervis, have applied the concepts

of framing, loss aversion, and varying risk propensities to interpretations of foreign policy decision-making. Key components of Prospect Theory have been given a more central role in case studies of foreign policy decision-making, particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis. After 9/11, such analytical tools flourished as ways of interpreting terrorist acts, as well as state reactions. Prospect Theory’s central finding is that a state’s attitude towards risk depends on whether they face losses or gains in relation to their reference point.

I. The American Fear of Losing Influence in the Pacific

Prospect theory argues that historical lessons help form cognitive propensities that result from historically painful events, and the lessons learned from them can guide the subjects to deduct a scenario in the future. As such, when China’s role in the Asia-Pacific becomes greater than expected, a feeling of being driven out is generated. China’s engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, and particularly ASEAN states has experienced historical fluctuations. As far back as the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), China’s relations with the smaller, Southeastern states were based on a system of “tribute,” whereby smaller states became more submissive to the central kingdom. The tribute system flourished in Tang and Song dynasties (960-1127 CE) and peaked during the Ming (1368-1644 CE) and Qing dynasties (1644-1911). Due to the European occupation of China, the tribute system gradually dissolved in the latter part of 19th century. Following civil strife in the 1920s, Japan’s occupation of China

during the Second World War, and the struggle between Chinese Communists and Nationalists (1946-1949), China became unable to engage other states. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, up until the 1990s, China was unable to engage with most of the ASEAN states, except during the period of the Cultural Revolution when Maoism encouraged a wave of exporting communism, even though China was itself economically in trouble. When the Chinese economy improved in the latter part of 1990s, China tactically adopted an apparently altruistic "good neighbor" policy, helping its neighbors when they suffered from economic and natural disasters. Prior to that, China had been inwardly minded, looking for "self-dependence," restraining from "internationalism," and avoiding "transporting revolutions," as it had done in Mao's era.⁹ When ASEAN countries suffered from financial crises, earthquakes and tsunamis, China came to their immediate aid, while taking the risk of fanning a strong nationalistic fervor in Indonesia, which resulted in criminal acts such as robberies and rapes to which overseas Chinese were exposed in 1998.¹⁰ Since the strong trend of integrated common markets was prevalent in examples such as that of the European Common Market, China was encouraged by international society, including the US, to engage with the ASEAN states under the regimes of 10+1 and 10+3, which included other relevant states like China, Korea, and Japan.

According to the Chinese interpretation, these mechanisms greatly favored the ASEAN states in the areas of tariff reduc-

tion, communications and technology, logistics and labor, and in the functioning of a common Asian market. With Chinese participation in ASEAN's efforts towards economic integration, China once again won greater popularity within the region. In reality, the ASEAN states benefited from Chinese participation, becoming immune to falling into depressions like those Korea and Japan had experienced earlier. As a result, under the Chinese framework, the relationship between China and the ASEAN states started to flourish, encouraging the Chinese to further engage or integrate with those ASEAN states. Amidst the gloomy world economy, Asia's economy experienced stable development resulting from China's economic engine. This led the world to believe that China's commitment was well-timed and necessary. That said, the Rand Corporation, as mentioned above, highlighted Chinese engagement in global affairs.

It was under such circumstances that the US felt a little uneasy over China's aggressive "engagement strategy." Contrary to its liberal idea of encouraging the trend of market integration for the expansion of global governance, American approval of Chinese initiatives toward ASEAN states gradually declined. The US felt that it was being driven out or displaced from some US strategic "front lines" which was perceived as a threat in its fight against communism. Actually, in the eyes of most Chinese, such anti-China thought was even apparent in the latter part of Bill Clinton's administration, though it was particularly evident in George W. Bush's administration, when the 9/11 terrorist

attacks forced the US to change what many Chinese interpreted as a “hostile policy” in order to coordinate with China for antiterrorism purposes. Due to the Afghan War and the War in Iraq, America could not address its differences with China, not to mention that it required the help of China to bolster its economy in 2008.

Southeast Asia has been one of the most important regions for American foreign policy, similar to the role once played by Latin America during the Cold War. To compete with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, America formed strong alliances or rather, quasi-alliances with Asian states by deliberately developing military ties with Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand through several pacts and agreements that were intended to prevent the spread of communism. Known popularly as the “Domino Effect”, the belief was that if America did not partake in a containment policy, then more communist states would emerge in the region, a thought that resulted in American aggression in Vietnam.

Following the end of the Cold War, the confrontational relations between major international players made way for economic cooperation as the primary tool of satisfying national interests. China adopted an open-door policy in 1979, ending the rhetoric of class struggle and “exporting Communism,” putting economic development at the top of its agenda.

To decrease the negative impacts of its revolutionary engagement with Southeast

Asian states during the Cultural Revolution, China deliberately shifted its disengagement policy with the ASEAN states, particularly those hostile to it. However, a real change in relations between China and the ASEAN states did not occur until the economic crisis in 1997, before which many ASEAN states were more cautious of China’s interference in their sovereignty. It took no one by surprise when China saved some of those states from bankruptcy. The Chinese strategy was popular and acclaimed both by the affected nations and by the international community.

However, despite China’s “good neighbor policy,” relationships remained strained between China and the involved nations due to certain conflicts with those states, particularly in regards to tensions surrounding the South China Sea. Similarly, America’s economic downturn and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also contributed to strained relations between America and China.

In addition to this, there was also a perceived threat of China’s growing economy being hurtful to America’s economy. It was assumed that the US was economically and politically threatened. Thomas Heffner stressed the vulnerability of America’s economy when he warned that the American economy was being swallowed by the trillions of U.S. dollars of currency reserves that were being held by China.

Now with this huge stockpile of money and the leverage it gives them, they are threatening to dump these bonds and our U.S. dollar on the

*market. If they take this irresponsible action, it would immeasurably devalue the worth of our money, send the cost of goods skyrocketing, and cripple our economy.*¹¹

Thus, a growing feeling of threat was being caused by the Chinese economy. The US also felt that China might manipulate the growing integration of the world market for its own strategic purposes, whereby China would apply its ideological system within its sphere of influence, like in the past when other nations were paying tribute to the kingdom of China. This would happen to such an extent that the Chinese would be “pocketing all other finances and resources for the guarantee of [their] own gigantic needs.”¹² Jervis argues that if state actors cannot automatically receive information that corresponds to their viewpoints, then they often tend to interpret that information to confirm their views.¹³

Framing is a means of political manipulation. One can deduce that the U.S. is trying to borrow “historical memory” to create “collective memory.” Such a deduction or persuasion would help ASEAN states in recalling the past, therefore connecting those past events to their present stories.¹⁴ Jervis argues that people always apply historical events to similar scenarios, even when they realize that this will lead to some misperceptions,¹⁵ which often result in self-fulfilled prophecies.

The new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China is necessary, one top official insists, *because the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the “center of gravity” of world economic activity...If the United States is to re-*

*tain its title as the world’s paramount power, it must restore its primacy in the region and roll back Chinese influence.*¹⁶

In a recent article in *Foreign Policy* magazine, Secretary Clinton revealingly suggested that an economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple regions simultaneously.

*“Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership [and] secure our interests... One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment - diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise - in the Asia-Pacific region.”*¹⁷

II. Chinese Maritime Strategy Goes Beyond US Expectations, Affecting US National Interests

In prospect theory, the term ‘reference point’ refers to the decision-making or judgment process that takes place when framing a choice. According to the American framing of the issues, the thought is that China is more a nation of the Asian continent than a nation of oceans, which means that they necessarily have a less aggressive policy in protecting their interests in the oceans. As a matter of fact, historically, China has sought a more defensive continental policy rather than an offensive policy, whereby any Chinese readjustment of its strategic positioning may raise suspicions. It is presumed that most scholars hold that Chinese maritime strategy should be limited

to protecting its land sovereignty, otherwise it could possibly mean that China would seek a more aggressive policy, threatening or challenging the status quo, which goes beyond America's expectations. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, America's policy is reminiscent of previous experiences, and particularly those that took place during the Cold War, when risk warnings affected America's mindset. As one scholar argued, the architects of China's military transformation have also placed a high priority on the acquisition of so-called *shashoujian*, or "assassin's mace" technologies. While the exact meaning of the term remains elusive, as early as 2004, a Pentagon report said that "assassin's mace" is used to designate a wide array of technologies that might afford an inferior military an advantage in a conflict with a superior military power.¹⁸

Such reference points or standards may frame the thinking of US elites to believe that China is starting to go beyond US anticipations. For instance, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the US military establishment believe that China's military is undergoing a "strategic shift" as it moves from a focus on ground forces to a focus on naval and air power. Hillary Clinton argued in July 2010 that "the peaceful resolution of competing sovereignty claims to the South China Sea is a U.S. 'national interest,' leading Beijing to paint Clinton's words as the U.S. inserting itself into the region."¹⁹

As a consequence, such shifts in China's geopolitical strategy seem to generate more US security concerns. "China's in-

vestment in anti-ship weapons and ballistic missiles could challenge America's primary means of projecting power, and helping allies in the Pacific. Whatever the reason, the US believes that China's military has become more assertive in Asia, particularly in the South China Sea, and that this assertiveness has caused concern among China's neighbors in the region as well."²⁰ This has gone on to such an extent that Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced plans to deploy combat ships to Singapore for joint exercises, which he said showed US commitment to the strategically vital Asia-Pacific region.²¹



However, China holds that their maritime shift is legitimate and reasonable. China's maritime status is listed as the weakest when compared to its land forces, which is detrimental to its comprehensive capacities for protecting its interests. China holds that with the increasing development of its economic influence, China should gradually expand its maritime power, so as to guarantee the safety of its sea waters for the protection of its trade and to carry out other missions, in such areas as protecting its vessels and crews from piracy. Furthermore, China is developing new aircraft while conducting more

patrols and surveillance activities. China also explains that the development of maritime forces would benefit international cooperation in instances such as peace-keeping, emergency assistance, and fighting against terrorists.

From the Chinese perspective, since the Chinese navy has sent six ships to the Gulf of Aden and Somalia, to Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania, to the Seychelles and Bangladesh since 2008 for sea escort and medical care, it can be said that such missions are helpful to build a "harmonious world" and a "harmonious ocean." China argues that the Chinese path of peaceful development is a long-term "strategic choice." China is not going to challenge the development of the national defense forces of other nations in order to promote world and regional peace and stability. China has been scornful about increased American military activity in Asia, saying that it is proof of the "Cold War mentality" of Washington.²²

Such a reference point for America makes it obvious that the US intends to strengthen its Asia-Pacific alliance, or at least build a firewall in response to the rise of China. One analyst also proposes that "the United States should also join Indonesia and Vietnam in protesting China's expansive U-shaped claim of sovereignty in the South China Sea. It should follow this protest by deploying an increased naval presence in the South China Sea, particularly in the vicinity of the islets occupied by China."²³ Thus, before attending the 2011 East Asia Summit in Indonesia, US President Barack Obama remarked that the gathering is the

"premier" arena to discuss concerns over maritime security, a topic that China has refrained from addressing at international forums.²⁴

American military and diplomatic backing has emboldened the Philippines to press its territorial claims against China. The U.S. aims to balance China in the region to ensure "there isn't kind of a big thumb on the scale."²⁵

According to Prospect Theory, the mindset of loss-aversion results in a person's reluctance to see their investments wasted, and would therefore consider the cost of decline during decision-making, rather than potential for gain.²⁶ Furthermore, applying the mentality of risk warning, the US concludes that the need for containing China is imminent, whereas during the Cold War, the US successfully manipulated its containment policy with the former Soviet Union and China during the beginning of the formation of the People's Republic of China in terms of using an alliance or quasi-alliance strategy. As a consequence it is not surprising that the US desires to make Taiwan an unsinkable aircraft carrier, so that weapon sales are greatly encouraged and manipulated.²⁷

Similarly, no one is surprised that since 2011, the United States has conducted a series of military rehearsals with Japan, India, Vietnam, and South Korea, which included close interactions and frequent exercises. In February 2012, the US co-held its largest Cobra Gold rehearsal, where Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade practiced war games with service members from Thailand, the Re-

public of Korea, the Republic of Singapore, Malaysia, the Republic of Indonesia and Japan, along with more than 20 other observing nations. “Cobra Gold offers us a great opportunity to train alongside the soldiers and Marines of seven other countries within the Asia-Pacific region,” said U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Mark A. Brilakis, 3rd MEB commanding general. He stated: “The multinational training that we conduct will directly support any future operation or contingency that may occur in the region, ranging from humanitarian assistance to disaster relief. With this being the 30th iteration of Cobra Gold, the foundation of support and security that we have built between countries grows stronger every year.”²⁸

American anxiety over China’s military expansion has helped foster increased pressure from neighboring countries. Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries are experiencing sea disputes and skirmishes, one after the other, against China over claims in the Spratly Islands. In October 2010, the Japanese Defense Minister met with representatives from Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia and Singapore and issued a joint declaration that “the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are a Japanese territory.” Furthermore, Japan adopted an aggressive demarcation process in the Eastern disputed areas, which the Chinese have since protested. The Asia Weekly reported that Japan was experiencing subtle changes in their political environment and in public opinion, and as one analyst pointed out, Japan's new right-wing organizations appear younger, highly educated and tend to use nationalism and liberal democracy to

link human rights together with these issues in the fight against China.²⁹

Furthermore, the US seems to be engaging India to influence Indian relations with China. When President Obama visited India in 2010, he noted during his trip that the relationship between the United States and India is “one of the defining and indispensable partnerships of the 21st century.” His visit there has helped bring the two countries together on shared interests and has moved the relationship forward significantly.³⁰ One India expert even predicted that four security arrangements might emerge in Asia in the next four years, therefore calling upon defending the Chinese dominance scenario.³¹

III. Positioning Maze: It is important to stop China from Challenging US Hegemony

For most American elites, it is a common belief that America’s destiny is to maintain American hegemony as a leader of global affairs. In reality, America’s comprehensive capacity in terms of economy, politics, military, and values make it the only option for guiding the world. Seen in this light, any rivals to US hegemony should be contained. Since cognitively, the US holds that “seeing is believing,” the US believes that China is catching up with the US, and as a result, China could overtake the US sooner or later, challenging US power and even its value system. The United States is convinced that China has already challenged the US economy, their military, and their values of freedom, as can be seen by their refusal to imple-

ment the sharp appreciation of the Yuan, and their ending the purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds, allowing China “maximum leeway.” As such, China is held responsible for America’s big deficits. It also rejects radical political reforms, and there have been no releases of dissidents. In the next 20 or 30 years, the Chinese economy will override that of the US and the age of America will soon end.³⁴

In this regard, Paul Kennedy concludes: *For a long while, many other nations within the U.S. political orbit accepted, and didn’t make a fuss about, the artificiality of the American currency position. But those were closely bound allies - Britain, Japan, Germany, Spain, and South Korea. There seems to be absolutely no indication that today’s rising powers - Brazil, South Africa, India - have the same deferential attitude. As for China, well, it will never march to America’s tune.*³⁵

This author could not help but think of the late U.S. President Richard Nixon’s widespread remark, “We Americans do not know how to be the world’s second, do not even know how to be parallel No.1 with others.” As such, these framing or reference points of positioning always make the US sensitive to any rising powers, especially if that power is an expansionist China. Building on this assumption, maintaining US hegemony and preventing the rise of China are both rational and appropriate risk management. Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate for the 2012 Presidential elections, has articulated a China policy focused primarily on economic issues to attack President Obama’s handling of the American econ-

omy. On the few occasions that he discussed China from a security standpoint, Romney emphasized the need for U.S. military dominance to deal with a potentially threatening China with opaque intentions.³⁶ Michael Swaine concluded in his book “America's Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century:”

As the world's predominant political, economic, and military force, the United States faces a significant challenge in responding to China's rising power and influence, especially in Asia. This challenge will require more effective U.S. policies and a reassessment of America's fundamental strategic assumptions and relationships.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Prospect Theory provides us with a good methodology for interpreting America’s psychology concerning China’s emerging influence in Southeast Asia and other areas. However, this does not mean that we can ignore other factors of history, the environment, norms, accidents, or even the personality of individuals or elites, including that of the US President. On the other hand, it is also essential not to single out or separate those psychological variables, since they tend to overlap or mingle with each other.

Due to flawed assumptions, America may have relied too much on guesswork. Thus, the logic of “seeing is believing” is not without fault. Many misperceptions may be generated, resulting in erroneous judgments and actions. On the other hand, it does not mean that all of the blame resides with the US. China also needs to

reflect on its strategy and ways of engaging itself with ASEAN states. Some questions for China also demand to be answered: How to manage America's more aggressive stance towards Asia? Should China take further actions to stop US initiatives? How to make ASEAN a healthier regime for the prosperity of the Asia Pacific and other regions? Should the European Commission model be followed for the future of ASEAN?

Answering these questions is a challenge that is beyond the scope of this article. However, a psychological analysis of the current state of China may be required. Both the US and China should bear in mind that psychological factors often lead to wars.³⁷ In this regard, we need to psychologize state rationality on one hand, and rationalize psychology on the other. In conclusion, all international actors live in a complex global system where national interests are mingled and overlapped. Thus, the strong global powers have the responsibility of bringing together systems that cover the interests of all actors regardless of state. Reference points therefore should be established to all human interests, carefully framing one's own security. In a more globalized world, interdependence makes all actors aware and more communicative with each other. As Joseph Nye pointed out: "Given the issues of financial stability, cyber security and climate change, the two countries have much to gain from working together."³⁸

It is worth mentioning that among the numerous publications on U.S.-China relations, Swaine's book "America's Chal-

lenge" stands out for several reasons. Swaine looks beyond this bilateral relationship and takes into consideration other factors that may lessen US-China tensions. He is confident that growing U.S.-China economic interdependence will reduce the possibility of military conflict. Swaine also concludes that "there is little evidence that Beijing is seriously considering altering its current peace and development-oriented grand strategy." He is also positive about China's emerging civil society groups and their improvement of governance. However, he acknowledges that "the process of attaining U.S. goals within China regarding human rights and democracy is likely to remain incremental." The most fundamental policy problem, as Swaine puts it, is to maximize China's cooperation with the United States and with international institutions, and to prevent Chinese actions that could undermine America's vital interests. He concludes that U.S. policy towards China should be "cooperative engagement balanced with hedging."³⁹ Such deduction is true for China as well.

As such, China and the United States have to do more with governing this world rather than confronting each other. In a time of international and global systems, only soft power and spiritual forces can mitigate and resolve conflicts. As such, Confucianism and Christianity should work together for eternal peace, setting a universal vision of peace for the world.

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Endnotes

1. This essay is part of the periodical studies under my project “Causes of Group Conflict and Resolution Management” under the Chinese Ministry of Education (11YJA810026).
2. Despite the disagreement in “defining” this relationship, particularly within US conservative blocks, this positioning has been elevated to “competitive partnership” between the two states as defined by the Bush administration.
3. “Recent diplomatic and economic disputes between China and the West have caught many by surprise. ...we are entering a prolonged period of elevated tensions and more frequent disputes between China and the West – the ‘new normal’ in geopolitics”. See Minxin Pei, “An Assertive China a ‘New Normal?’”, *The Diplomat*, 24 November 2010.
4. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/22/us-china-clinton-economy-idUSPEK28223020090222>
5. “It wasn’t all that long ago that China could do no wrong. Besides its seemingly unstoppable economic growth, the country was said to be acquiring soft power, earning respect and charming its way around the world. Its leaders were regarded as smart, sophisticated and far-sighted. Its diplomats were praised as diligent, knowledgeable and smooth. It’s doubtful that such adjectives would be applied to them today” See Minxin Pei, “An Assertive China a ‘New Normal’”, *The Diplomat*, 24 November 2010.
6. http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_05_19_20wrts/overholt_william_wrts.pdf.
7. Constructivism has more or less compared states as persons. For a detailed discussion, please see Quanyi Zhang, *Evolution of a World State, Study of the Generation and Transformation of Global Collective Identity*, Chinese Guangming Publication, 2010, pp.121-130; For the Constructivist view of the state as a person, see Alexander Wendt: “The State as Person in International Theory”, *Review of International Studies*, 30, 2004, p.291.
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9. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), many youths came to neighboring countries to spread Maoism, even though the

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28. From its beginning in 1982, Cobra Gold has been a vital part of United States strategy in the Pacific. Hosted annually in the Kingdom of Thailand, the exercise, which is one of the largest of its kind in the world, has grown from a bilateral training exercise to one that includes the direct participation of several other nations in the Pacific. <http://maritimesmagazine.dodlive.mil/2011/12/02/a-look-at-cobra-gold/>
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30. Ashley Tellis, *Foreign Policy*, 16 November 2010, IPRIS Digest Vol. 3 No.224, 17 November, 2010.
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CHINLAMERICA: Challenges and Opportunities for the Future of Sino-Latin-American Relations

Yuan Cura Zhang



Abstract

As two growing powers in economics and politics worldwide, both China and Latin America have become formidable forces on the global stage. With the development of these two regions, the relationship between China and Latin America seems to have a strong influence, not only on them, but on the world as well. Based on the idea of fostering South-South cooperation, this paper notes a breakthrough study of Sino-Latin-American relations, and concludes with recommendations and visions for the future. This paper analyzes the political, economic and cultural aspects that strengthen and challenge the harmonization of this bilateralism. The word “CHINLAMERICA” has been proposed to bind the relationship between China and Latin America. This paper focuses on CHINLAMERICAN political and economic relations, as well as the cultural integration of China and Latin America. This paper also illustrates CHINLAMERICA and the balance of world powers, with special attention being paid to the U.S. and China combating each other in Latin America. This paper then concludes with findings and proposes possible visions of what the future holds for the CHINLAMERICAN relationship.

Biography

Yuan Cura Zhang is the Chief Reporter of Shanghai Media Group’s (SMG) International TV Channel. He graduated from the University of Bridgeport’s Master’s program in Global Development and Peace studies, earning his degree in 2011. During his time at the University of Bridgeport, Yuan interned as the media coordinator of the UN Youth Assembly. In addition to this, he received his Bachelor’s Degree in Economics from Fudan University in 2009, and was Media Executive of the Shanghai Media Group from 2007 to 2009.

The relationship between China and Latin-American countries blossomed during the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. “China fever”¹ gripped the region. Latin-American Presidents, ministers and business executives were thrilled to see China and its rapidly growing impact on the world’s economy and on Latin America itself. The common explanation for the boom in “China fever” was China’s own economic eruption and its widening and deepening involvement in global affairs. In the current decade, Sino-Latin-American relations have grown at a spectacular pace. Improved political relations were a necessary part of the expansion in economic relations since intergovernmental agreements facilitate economic relations, but the exuberance of the economic boom outpaced the improvement in political relations. What’s more, military or militarily sensitive relations have prompted some U.S. fears in regards to this question.

For Latin-American countries, the expanded relationship with China has long had substantial and broad domestic political support. It long precedes the emergence of social democratic governments in Latin America during the current decade. “The political foundations for good Sino-Latin-American relations were set under military dictatorships in Latin America in the 1970s.”² Thus, Latin America has been ready for the warming of the relationship with China; however, under the condition that China demonstrated the ability to capitalize on such opportunities.

As one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China’s increasing influence in Latin America has emerged as a crucial topic in global collaborative affairs. China was regarded as a lesser nation 40 years ago. Although the PRC was recognized as a legal representative at the United Nations in the 1970s, no one could have predicted that China was on its way to becoming a superpower. When China assumed the role of a regional leader in Asia, experts were still unaware of the strength of China in global leadership. Today, China’s influence is everywhere, whether in the political field or economic mode, and as mentioned above, Latin America is one of the major partner continents for China. The Chinese presence and its effects on Latin America have expanded rapidly during the past several years, and the region’s leaders are seeking better understandings and opportunities being presented by China as it assumes a new role as a rising global power.



Latin America is a key component for the future of China’s economic growth. From Latin America’s side, “In 1995, China was the twelfth largest trading partner with Latin America. Today it is the third, after

the United States and the European Union. In 2000, reciprocal trade reached \$12.2 billion. This figure rose to \$107 billion in 2007, and in the first three quarters of 2008, [it] totaled \$111 billion.”³ As explained in a report published by *The Economist* in 2008, “Although the PRC remains behind the United States as an energy consumer, China’s oil and natural gas consumption has more than quadrupled over the past 25 years.”⁴ For obvious reasons, the economic growth of China is multifaceted, but one of the cornerstones for its competitive development is the hunger for a reliable supply of commodities. It is important to highlight that Latin America also exports manufactured goods to China, but the comparative advantage is concentrated in the supply and demand of commodities like soybeans, copper, crude oil, iron ore, coffee, bananas, and zinc.

China’s economic engagement in Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly ten percent a year for the past quarter century. Some extra economic figures in regards to China’s involvement in Latin America are also impressive. “In the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated \$50 billion in 2005.”⁵ China has become a principal consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, principally benefiting the commodity-producing countries of South America, and particularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. “While Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at

some \$6.5 billion through 2004, that amount represents half of China’s foreign investment overseas. China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to \$100 billion by 2014, although there is concern that several investment pledges are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere.”⁶

Latin America was once considered the “backyard” of the U.S.; however, with the rapid growth of Chinese influence in Latin America, in areas such as politics, economic integration and cultural development, the U.S. feels concerned in regards to China. Indeed, U.S. policymakers have seen some need to respond to Beijing’s keenest political interest: its effort to establish formal diplomatic ties with the Latin-American countries that now recognize Taiwan and represent nearly half of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies worldwide. Washington has expressed some concerns about China’s activities in the hemisphere, and bilateral tensions threaten to grow over time. There are U.S. officials and members of Congress who now view China as the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region since the end of the Cold War—citing concerns about the Panama Canal, the deployment of Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti, and China’s support for Cuba’s Fidel Castro, as well as Beijing’s growing interest in Venezuelan oil. Other U.S. officials, however, believe that economic links with China can play a positive role in helping to build a more prosperous and globally minded Latin America. China’s role is now seen as an important agenda item for U.S. policy in Latin America⁷.

For the sake of this research, emphasis will be placed on the political, economic and cultural relations between China and Latin America. Through a quantitative and qualitative approach, this research attempts to draw recommendations and conclusions for the challenges and opportunities in the future of Sino-Latin-American relations. This research would also like to introduce the word “CHINLAMERICA” for the strengthening of the relationship between these two partners, to see if it is possible for China and Latin America to reach a higher and tighter collaboration, and build an “All-weather Partnership”⁸ in the coming future. The mentioned word “CHINLAMERICA” is inspired by a similar concept introduced by Harvard Professor Niall Ferguson, who presented the term “CHIMERICA” as signifying the interdependent relationship between China and United States, based upon the “puzzling buoyancy of global asset markets in recent years.”⁹ This research also tries to serve as a catalyst for track II diplomatic efforts to bond the two regions based on the reinforcement of mutual understandings and under the framework of South-South cooperation.

CHINLAMERICAN Political Status

Although there are great distance and scant historical contacts between China and Latin America, these two regions have recently become closer than ever. They have allowed political relations between them to flow freely. China’s interest in the region is not new, but it has increased significantly in the last few years. Unlike what has happened with the

United States or European countries, such as Spain or Portugal¹⁰, there are no historical episodes that can overshadow

Common benefits, mutual interests, and similar developing goals have pushed forward the collaboration between China and Latin America

the relationship. As per the development of China in political stature, cooperation can further Chinese-Latin American integration.

Overview of the CHINLAMERICAN Political Status at the Present Stage

Both China and Latin America are developing regions. Common benefits, mutual interests, and similar developmental goals have pushed forward collaboration between China and Latin America under the frame of South-South cooperation. There were frequent exchanges of high-profile official visits by the leadership of these regions. Chinese President Hu Jintao has visited Latin America three times in his presidency. Costa Rica, Cuba, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico have all witnessed President Hu’s visit in the past few years.¹¹ Other standing committee leaders of China, including Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, CPPCC’s Chairman Jia Qinglin,¹² former Vice President Zeng Qinghong (and others), have also paid

official visits to Latin America, deepening cooperation between the regions during these high-level visits.

Both China and Latin America have clear visions of the direction in which CHINLAMERICAN political relations will be moving. China and Latin America look at each other from a strategic perspective and have made efforts in building the two regions into an all-around comprehensive partnership. Such cooperative frames have been made and are being perfected. The Chinese Central Government has even issued a white paper in November 2008, which treated Latin America as a priority partner in China's development. This official documentation illustrates general goals and specific steps in the development of Sino-Latin-American relations. These new policies and thoughts have earned positive feedback from Latin-American countries.

With efforts from both sides, political collaboration between China and Latin America has improved. A Common Development Strategic Partnership has been created between China and Venezuela. On a different scale, a Strategic Partnership was established with Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Peru. China and Chile have also signed agreements to further their relationships into a Comprehensive Partnership.¹³ In addition to these strategic thoughts, detailed plans and long-term working schedules have been made by the two sides to maintain good bilateral relations from both sides, political collaboration between China and Latin America has improved. A Common Development Strategic Partnership has been created

between China and Venezuela. On a different scale, a Strategic Partnership was established with Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Peru. China and Chile have also signed agreements to further their relationships into a Comprehensive Partnership. In addition to these strategic thoughts, detailed plans and long-term working schedules have been made by the two sides to maintain good bilateral relations.

The Expanding Influence of China in Latin America

There is no doubt that the expanding volume of trade and investment between China and Latin America is impressive; moreover, the expanding weight of China in the calculations of political leaders, business people, and others in Latin America has undergone a significant transformation. China is influencing that region as much as it can, just as the United States has done for decades. The perception that China is emerging as a key political partner has been the motivation for leaders to take the time and resources to accommodate this new reality. The decision by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias to establish diplomatic relations with China in June 2007¹⁴ was motivated, in part, by his conviction that positioning his country in line with China's rise was necessary for it to play a positive role in Latin America¹⁵. As mentioned before, the investment of time by Latin-American leaders to promote their countries' commercial and political relationship with China through official visits has been similarly impressive.

In the private sector, the calculation of business people that China will be among the most important markets of the future has motivated a wide range of corporate leaders to dedicate significant time and capital to involve them in China, “even when those companies do not expect to generate a profit from their China operations for years.”¹⁶ The United States used to play the most important role in Latin America, and the United States even regards Latin America as its backyard; however, with the growing influence of China in the region, there have been some shifts of balances between the big nations. Although the United States still holds some advantages, China is experiencing super-national treatment in Latin America now as well. Latin-American countries began to realize that it is beneficial to keep up a good relationship with China, in addition to cooperating politically and economically with the Americans.

Global Recession and the Rise in CHINLAMERICAN Cooperation

The transformation of China’s relationship with Latin America during the past few years may be seen as an inadequate measure of the rate of change to come. In particular, the deepening global recession, which may bring about financial and political upheaval, can fundamentally transform the roles of actors in the international system, such as China and Latin America. In the short to medium term, the recession is likely to severely strain China’s relationship with Latin America.

China is likely to increase its purchase of primary products from Latin America,

while simultaneously seeking to boost its sale of goods there to compensate for lost sales to its traditional customers in the United States and Europe, despite the existing controversy of their trade deficit with China. The benefits of China as a consumer of Latin-American goods will lead to long-term expansion and growth. It is likely to strengthen political forces with the social constituency in the region¹⁷.

At the same time, if China is able to effectively manage tensions generated by economic conditions, both at home and in Latin America, it may emerge from the crisis with a dramatically stronger position in Latin America. The gradual evaporation of western capital from the region has increased the focus of Latin American leaders towards China, since the Chinese government has an announced two trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves, which has given it potential liquidity and international investment power. It is important to highlight that the present global economic stagnation has caused a decline in global commodity prices, and the value of the Chinese reserves provides an opportunity for China to invest in the region and acquire mass amounts of commodities at bargain prices.

China’s Political Objectives in Latin America

Based on the experience and events taking place in CHINLAMERICAN relations, it is not hard to understand that China has certain political objectives in Latin America. First of all, the intent is to counterbalance American hegemony by

enhancing multilateral relations. It is obvious that China would like to have more of a voice in that region. Secondly, China wishes to diversify its external relations to improve China's export strength, and to maintain China's economic conditions. Thirdly, as oil and food supplies are always important resources for national security and economic growth, China, with the largest population worldwide, would like to maintain good relations with major oil and food producers. Latin America, which is rich in oil (Venezuela) and food supplies (Argentina and Brazil), deserves China's special interest. Latin America is also a land of raw materials, like copper in Chile, nickel and cobalt in Cuba, and pulp in Brazil.

The Taiwan Factor in CHINLAMERICAN Political Relations

From time to time, the Taiwan issue stands out as an obstacle to bilateral relations between China and Latin America. This is always regarded as a political dilemma in China's expanding relationships with Latin America, since the region contains 12 of the 25 countries that still maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.¹⁸¹⁹ This number is down from 14 in 2004, as Granada and Dominica switched diplomatic recognition to The People's Republic of China.²⁰

Latin America has been in a complicated relationship with Taiwan for a long time. Latin America is new to China, but China is not new to Latin America²¹, despite the fact that the "two Chinas" are different in many ways. Taiwan is a so-called consis-

tent provider of financial assistance and investment in Latin America. The consistent corruption in many Latin-American countries that maintain relationships with Taiwan have provided conditions which force Taiwan to continue to provide funding. However, it is now severely pressed to compete against the growing economic and political clout of Mainland China.²² For example, in 2004, Dominica severed relations with Taipei after Beijing trumped Taipei's \$9 million in assistance with a pledge of \$122 million in assistance to the tiny country over six years.²³ In September 2004, China sent a peacekeeping mission to Haiti, another of Taipei's official relationships, marking Beijing's first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere. The PRC's ability to develop and expand contacts with Taiwan's friends in the region undoubtedly has been facilitated by a decision by the Organization of American States (OAS) on May 26, 2004, to accept China as a formal observer in the OAS²⁴. The OAS has 35 members, including the United States, with 12 of those countries continuing diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than the mainland. Meanwhile, Beijing has strongly objected to Taiwan's efforts to seek OAS observer status. It is an important campaign for Mainland China against Taiwan in Latin America.

China has demonstrated a strong desire for countries in Latin America to support a "One China" policy and shift diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing as the legitimate representative of China in international affairs²⁵. For the major Latin-American countries, China has become an important partner in several ar-

eas, including closer trade and investment as well as collaboration in devising new trade strategies; Latin-American countries are turning their diplomatic policies towards a new direction.


CHINLAMERICAN Economic Status

It is obvious that the bonding of China and Latin America's economies are driving into high-speed lanes, however, challenges and threats are also predictable. According to the World Bank's chief economist for Latin America, Augusto de la Torre, the long-term challenge for Latin America is to "manage well" the commodity bonanza that is fueled by Chinese demand and to channel earnings into improvements in human capital, infrastructure, and innovation²⁶. In addition to trade, the doubling of Chinese investments in the region between 2008 and 2009 (from \$3.7 billion in 2008 to \$7.3 billion in 2009) suggests that China's role in the region is continuing to accelerate at a rapid pace. Statistics from China's Ministry of Trade indicate that, after Asia, the region is the second largest destination for Chinese investments^{27,28}. How best to profit in terms of development constitutes the principal challenge for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

CHINLAMERICAN Economic Linkages

Much of China's interest in Latin America is economically motivated, with Beijing eager for access to such commodities as iron and other ore, soybeans, copper, iron and steel, integrated circuits and other

electrical machinery, and oil in order to meet the demands of China's booming economy.



China's imports from Latin America grew from almost \$3 billion in 1999 to \$120 billion in 2010, a more than 4000% increase in eleven years^{29,30}. Because of this growth in imports, China has run a trade deficit with the region for the past five years. While China's trade flows have increased dramatically, both globally and with Latin America, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad has not been significant. China's cumulative FDI worldwide amounted to \$33.2 billion at the end of 2003, just 0.48% of global FDI stock, with 41% concentrated in Hong Kong, the United States, Japan, and Germany. Turning to yearly investment flows, China's foreign investment flows for 2003 amounted to \$2.85 billion, and more than one-third of that was going to Latin America³¹. Chinese investment in Latin America has focused on the extraction and production of national resources, but has also included investment in manufacturing, assembly, telecommunications, and textiles. China's FDI in the region has been concentrated in Brazil, Mexico,

Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela.³² Since the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, China has viewed Mexico as an access point to the U.S. market.



Among the investment pledges highlighted by the press during President Hu's 2004 trip to Latin America were railways, oil exploration, and construction projects in Argentina, a nickel plant in Cuba, copper mining projects in Chile, and a steel mill, railway, and oil exploration projects in Brazil. In January 2005, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez traveled to China to sign nineteen cooperation agreements, including plans for Chinese investment in oil and gas exploration. Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe traveled to China in mid-April 2005 promoting increased investment in his country. In addition to China's plans for increased investment, China and Chile announced in 2004 that they would be negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement. In response to China's requests, many Latin-American nations,

including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, have conferred on China the status of a market economy, decreasing the potential impact that anti-dumping measures may have on cheap Chinese imports³³. China has also designated many nations throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as official tourism destinations for Chinese citizens, allowing Chinese citizens to visit for the first time.

CHINLAMERICAN Economic Status at the Current Stage

A publication from the Inter-American Development Bank reminds us that "China's size, rapid growth, external openness, and trade performance are being felt everywhere in Latin-America but perceived differently."³⁴ China will experience significant sustainable economic growth and Latin America should be able to provide the commodities needed for that development. According to *The Economist*, predictions estimated China with an average of 8.2% increase in its annual Gross Domestic Product in 2011, while the United States is estimated to have only a 2.9% increase. Latin America is a great exporter of commodities to China, but it is also a provider of commodities to other regions of the world. If China continues to experience economic growth, while the rest of the world continues to experience economic stagnation, the supply and demand of Latin-American commodities will shift towards the development of Chinese industries.

III. Trends of Chinese-Latin American Economic Development

The trading quality between China and Latin America is improving and Latin America's trade partnership with China is increasingly important. However, it is not enough. Despite the benefits of high export prices, the concentration of exports to China in specific areas, such as soy, raw materials, and minerals makes Latin America vulnerable to an economic downturn and reinforces its traditional production structures. A more complicated economic cooperation system should be established in order to achieve sustainable growth. The CHINLAMERICAN trade model must move beyond free trade agreements and mutual trading benefits. Investments, however, should be in a positive direction. Statistics demonstrate that Chinese FDI in Latin America is now low, and 80 percent of FDI is directed toward tax havens. It is a weakness in CHINLAMERICAN economic development now. However, that means there is room for development as well.

From a strategic perspective, China's interests in Latin America are becoming more and more sophisticated, and economic pursuits are tied to political wishes. This is distinct from Russia's ideologically based military and diplomatic alliance with the government of Venezuela, described by Cunningham as aimed at balancing U.S. influence in the region³⁵. Latin-American countries may have initially pursued the Chinese market to serve as a "strategic counterweight" to the region's historical commercial and political dependence on the United States. Yet the relationship has not necessarily fulfilled these expectations.

But building a CHINLAMERICAN strategic relationship is challenging, not only because of the low levels of Chinese investments in Latin America, but also because the investments that do occur generally employ Chinese laborers and materials brought over for specific infrastructure projects. While there are negative characteristics to China's economic model, such as less attention on environmentally sound practices, making it an easier commercial partner as compared to the United States and Europe, the CHINLAMERICAN relationship requires deeper cultural understanding. Within this context, the economic relationship between China and Latin America will go further with improved cooperation.

Can China and Latin America Bond Culturally?

The cultural exchange between China and Latin America can be traced back to a long history. The first group of Chinese people reached Latin America in 1849 through the Port of Callao in Peru.³⁶ The cultural exchange between China and Latin America can be traced back to a long history. The first group of Chinese people reached Latin America in 1849 through the Port of Callao in Peru³⁷. An agreement of commerce was established between China and Peru in 1874, which was the first legal statement of cooperation between China and Latin America³⁸. Since then, Chinese people have spread over the whole of Latin America, and Chinese culture and Latin American culture were integrated.

In the academic world, hundreds of Chinese students are sent to Cuba, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina to study every year.³⁹ At the same time, learning Chinese has become popular for Latin-American people. Chinese language programs and China studies programs in Latin-American universities have proliferated since 2004.⁴⁰ Confucius Institutes, which are mainly for the spread and promotion of Chinese culture, are widely established in Latin America. They are now very efficient and work as communication bridges in CHINLAMERICAN relations.

The intellectual and cultural exchange between China and Latin America has been beneficial to both. Some earth resource satellites are co-produced and launched by China and Brazil. Agreements, statements and lawful documents signed by China and Brazil cover certain areas in the science and technology fields, including aeronautics, information technology, hydropower, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, chemistry, medical sciences, environmental protection, resources and new materials. There is also cooperation in the field of producing and launching satellites, and Chinese-made satellites for Venezuela have been successfully launched, leading many other Latin American countries to now be in communication with China for their satellite industry. In regards to other high-tech exploits, Chinese companies have been undertaking the modernization of Cuba Telecom. An Internet upgrade project in Venezuela is supposed to be completed by Chinese companies as well.

The cultural relations between China and Latin America are no doubt one of the most impressive accomplishments in China's cultural outreach. China and Latin America are achieving mutual benefits through such collaboration. While the United States remains a dominant cultural reference, the increasing mass of Chinese culture is expanding in Latin America and achieving growing importance as well as meeting expectations.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The initiatives between China and Latin America are active and will continue. There is no doubt that China is trying to claim more of a voice in Latin America. The political interaction between China and Latin America will not only benefit China by gaining more support from developing nations, but it will also strengthen China's leadership in South-South cooperation. China's political approach in Latin America is friendly; however, it is also strategic in its search for deeper cooperation. Latin America is regarded as a major supplier for China's energy and raw material consumption. To keep a good relationship with Latin America is also beneficial in maintaining China's economic security.

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Rule of Law in Senegal and the West African Economic and Monetary Union: Information Technology Initiatives

Katie Kilroy



Abstract

This article discusses the individual and collective issues that the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) faces on its path towards regional political and economic integration. The economic development of WAEMU must occur alongside political developments such as improving the rule of law and emphasizing democratic principles within each country. These principles include solidifying good governance, the adherence to legal principles, vertical accountability, improved freedom of expression and an enhanced grassroots-level civil society within each member country. Furthermore, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire have the potential to enhance their economic integration by following a common market strategy, similar to that of the European Union. With that, this article argues that Senegal can be a model for the rest of WAEMU, given its history of democratic principles and freedom of expression. There is the potential to improve the rule of law in Senegal through various existing organizations working in the realm of Information Communication Technology initiatives (ICT). It is the hope that with Senegal leading by example in enhancing the rule of law and improving its economic relations with Côte d'Ivoire, that the future integration and growth of WAEMU may occur.

Biography

Katie Kilroy is currently pursuing her Master's degree in Global Development and Peace at the University of Bridgeport, having earned a Bachelor's degree from the University of Connecticut in Political Science, International Studies and Human Rights. She has also studied at Université Catholique de l'Ouest in Angers, France, as well as at Uppsala University in Sweden. She has worked at the China Care Foundation, at the Human Rights Institute at the University of Connecticut, and was an Urban Agriculture Volunteer for the Peace Corps in Senegal.

Introduction of Initiatives in Senegal and the West African Economic and Monetary Union

In West Africa, greater economic and political unity is essential for future growth. The foundation of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), established in 1994, shows promise for such harmony, but policies within the member-states must first be solidified. Fundamental progress may be achieved by improving the rule of law, a key to integration, within the model member country of Senegal. By promoting the democratic principles of civil society, good governance, adherence to legal principles, and vertical accountability in Senegal, with the help of the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Oslo Governance Center, the Panos Institute of West Africa (PIWA), and by using Information Technology Initiatives (ICT), it would enhance the stability of the WAEMU union towards a stable path in the future. As history has shown with the success of the regional integration of the European Union (EU), the WAEMU has the potential to model itself after certain aspects of the EU to promote future regional political and economic integration. With the improvement of the rule of law as the foundation, economic and political integration can persevere through the powerful relationship between Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal.

The history of the French-colonized region of West Africa has been one strongly influenced by wealthy European nations. The WAEMU was founded as a means to further integrate the shared currency

Franc-CFA zone. Inspired by the European Union, the WAEMU aims to harmonize legislation and integration of internal markets and interests.¹ Building off of a system set up by colonized interests, the WAEMU is a modern and independent concept whose establishment displayed a shift in respect for individual sovereignty in order "to complete" the monetary union.² The WAEMU stands on the principles of greater economic competitiveness through open markets as well as the rationalization and harmonization of the legal environment. It also abides to a convergence of macroeconomic policies and indicators, the creation of a common market, a coordination of sector policies, and the organization of fiscal policies. The existing framework attempts to cooperate in policy areas which have been autonomously controlled, such as trade patterns and monetary policies. The WAEMU is comprised of the following countries alongside Senegal: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Togo.

The WAEMU customs and currency unit formed to further economic integration and it has future plans of trade liberalization and macroeconomic policy integration with the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS). The 2000 ECOWAS Annual Report noted plans towards the harmonization of a common market, convergence of macroeconomic policies alongside the development of financing and private sector encouragement, and the synchronization of sectoral policies.³ ECOWAS has agreed to adopt WAEMU's customs declaration form and

compensation mechanisms, which are small steps towards political and economic integration.

Regional Integration and the European Union

Regional political and economic integration has several advantages. Not only does consensual collaboration prove beneficial when it comes to negotiating with outside actors, but a successful customs union allows for traits such as comparative advantage and less competition to improve the economic standing of the members. Furthermore, the shared history of colonialism and common currency has made the political and economic integration of the WAEMU opportune. It is the hope that as the rule of law improves and democracy becomes less top-heavy in the WAEMU countries, a well-balanced union can prevail.

Another regionally integrated actor, the EU, has inspired political and economic integration in many parts of the world and is a good model for the WAEMU. Founded on principles of economic cooperation, the EU has developed into a single market entity and integrated social policy body united under one common currency. While the EU has transformed over the centuries the EU is much less than a century old – this should be re-phrased based on the intent of the author, which is not entirely clear to me and was originally founded to partially avoid strife, it has valuable attributes which can be beneficial for WAEMU members.⁴

Regional Integration and the European Union A system rooted in the rule of law is crucial for regional political and economic integration, as evident in the EU. Binding agreements allow the practice of economic and political integration to become enforceable, amendable, and fitting to the times. Member countries must abide by the rules and rights laid out in treaties. Both the EU's institutions and the EU governments must adhere to such provisions whenever it is applicable and as in accordance to EU law.⁵ At this point, the EU is committed to improving the transparency and democracy of member states and is also in pursuit of other goals such as promoting human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and human dignity worldwide.⁶

The single market is one of the main objectives of the EU, so that each member country can benefit and trade resources and services with other members. With efficiency and connectivity at an all-time high, this makes the economic exchange easier. By sharing political institutions and laws, economic benefit can be greater and integration further improved.⁷ The WAEMU must follow in the footsteps of the most politically and economically integrated institutions in the world, as such has been a functioning and successful mechanism to increase regional integration.

Functionalist Framework – the EU and WAEMU

The EU or, as its predecessor was known in 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community, was founded on principles

of economic integration with political goals in mind. From the creation of the EU, it was understood that in order for political integration to occur, it must be based on economic collaboration. Through the formation of a “common market,” EU countries removed barriers and streamlined policies as economic transactions occurred. As in the EU, the functionalist approach implies that for the WAEMU political integration may develop from the basis in the “common market” and unified interactions.⁸ Although a key to EU integration, the functionalist approach does not show much promise towards the future economic and political integration of the WAEMU. While the more powerful economic players of Ivory Coast and Senegal can lead the economic integration, the WAEMU has developed in a different manner than that of the EU.

The arrangement of the Franc-CFA zone of the WAEMU, which is between France and fifteen African countries, has been a key element in sustaining the relationship between countries. The zone has provided sufficient protection from monetary crises in the past, as it was pegged to the French Franc until 1994, a brief explanation of what happened since the EURO was introduced would be appropriate here and has arguably tied the region to its former colonial power ever since. As such, the CFA-Franc is managed by the French Treasury, which guarantees its full convertibility. It is these beginnings as a monetary union, rather than an economically integrated zone as in the case of the EU, which sets the WAEMU apart.⁹ At this point, the WAEMU re-

quires a system of political norms, or a base in the rule of law, in order to enhance its economic integration. That being said, the WAEMU can develop both aspects synonymously through the special relationship of Ivory Coast and Senegal.

As evident in the founding of the EU, France and Germany played an instrumental role in establishing the relationship by trading coal and steel.¹⁰ The dynamic forces eventually influenced other European actors to become involved and branch into their own comparative advantages. The role that France and Germany played in the foundation of the EU can translate to the relationship between Ivory Coast and Senegal in the WAEMU. These two countries can positively influence the future of the union as the economic forces develop alongside the enhancement of the rule of law.

Economies of WAEMU

The economies of WAEMU countries are mixed and have the potential to complement one another in the future. The more advanced countries of Senegal and Ivory Coast have primarily manufacturing and industry economies, while the less advanced countries of Guinea-Bissau, Togo and Niger have mostly agriculture-based economies. The import and export goods are varied as well. Senegal exports fish products, phosphates, and peanuts while it imports food, consumer goods, petroleum and machinery. Côte d’Ivoire exports petroleum, cocoa, coffee and timber while it imports fuel, consumer goods, rice and wheat. Guinea-Bissau exports cashews, fish, shrimp and peanuts while it

imports food and petroleum products. Togo exports phosphates, cocoa, and coffee while it imports consumer goods. Niger exports uranium, livestock and gold while it imports consumer goods, petroleum and foodstuffs.¹¹

The world's import and export relations with WAEMU countries are varied. Most of the nations which trade with the WAEMU are developed and influential in world affairs. Senegal exports to Mali, France, and India and imports from France, the United Kingdom, Nigeria and China. Ivory Coast exports to the United States, the Netherlands, Nigeria, France and Burkina Faso while it imports from Nigeria, France, China and Thailand. Guinea-Bissau exports to India and Nigeria while it imports from Senegal, Portugal, Brazil and Cuba. Togo exports to India, Germany, Benin, Ghana, and Burkina Faso while it imports from China, France and the United States. Niger exports to Nigeria, the United States, and Ghana while it imports from China, France, French Polynesia, Nigeria and Ivory Coast.¹²

Senegal holds a respectable profile in the WAEMU with the second highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which was \$25.4 billion in 2011.¹³ In 2011, Ivory Coast had a GDP of \$35.6 billion, Niger had a GDP of \$11.93 billion and Togo had a GDP of \$6.324 billion.¹⁴ Over half of West Africa's petroleum products and oil go through Ivory Coast and it is a major exporter of petroleum products as well as electricity to Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Togo.¹⁵

While there is a wide spectrum of import and export relations and varying GDPs, there is potential for future collaboration amongst WAEMU countries, as some countries currently import what another country exports and vice-versa.¹⁶ For example, Senegal imports petroleum while Côte d'Ivoire exports petroleum. The relationship between these two countries has the potential to be the economic drivers of the WAEMU through trade, which could have a positive influence over the future political and economic integration of the union. If the Ivory Coast and Senegal follow a similar path to that of France and Germany, which was rooted in trade policy, the future looks promising. Also, in the future, there is potential for trade integration with ECOWAS nations, such as Nigeria and Ghana.

Roadblocks of the WAEMU Countries

Despite functioning economies, sovereignty values and a strong connection between the WAEMU states and France, there are economic, political and social disparities within the member countries. The WAEMU lacks cohesion, financing and unifying policies, and it experiences the hesitance to reduce individual sovereignty. The West African region struggles with issues of rampant corruption, ongoing decentralization, frequent judicial violations, and sparse human rights protections.¹⁷ Corruption can further inhibit effective governance and can negatively affect rule of law enforcing mechanisms. Out of 178 countries, Senegal ranked 105, Ivory Coast ranked 146, and Guinea-Bissau ranked 154 in Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perception

Index.¹⁸ Furthermore, the WAEMU member states are all deeply impoverished and indebted Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). Nearly 54% of the population of Senegal lives below the poverty line.¹⁹ Togo ranked 186 out of 187 countries in the UNDP's Human Development Index and has 43% of the population living below the international poverty line of \$1.25 per day.²⁰

In common with many LDC countries, the primarily agriculture-based economies are unable to properly extract and control the resources found within their borders. In the WAEMU member state of Guinea-Bissau, for example, the economy is based on farming and fishing. Rice and mangos are widely produced crops and if their respective industries were properly developed, the country could be self-sufficient in rice production and export mangoes worldwide. In addition, in Guinea-Bissau the industrial development of petroleum and phosphates are not pursued due to the high price of the initial start-up. Unexploited off-shore oil reserves also deem cause for future economic development in the region.²¹

The WAEMU economies are heavily dependent on international funding from other countries including the United States, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. For example, the United States provided \$98.7 million in assistance to Senegal in 2011.²² The European Commission has provided 297.8 million Euros to Senegal for the years of 2008-2013.²³ With such external dependence comes astronomical debt, which makes it difficult for WAEMU countries

to make profits and invest in their economies. There is also a limited availability of well-trained labor in WAEMU nations. The lack in trainable individuals can be seen in the education levels of the countries. Senegal and Ivory Coast have the more stable school attendance rates, with 87% and 88% primary school enrollment respectively.²⁴ Corruption, poverty, the inability to export goods, dependence on international actors and the lack of trainable labor have all contributed to the inability of the WAEMU to politically and economically integrate.

Steps Forward Begin with Democratic Principles and Senegal

Strong democratic institutions are necessary for the successful integration of the WAEMU, for it is the basis for further cohesion and cooperation. As evident in the European Union (EU), the rule of law is the foundation for the development of an economic and political union. Within the EU, decisions are based on treaties that are voluntarily and democratically agreed to by all member countries. As one of the EU's core values, rule of law must endure in the WAEMU countries. The respect for human rights, democracy and equality must be systematically inherent for future agreements and integration. It is for these reasons that the WAEMU must respectfully enable itself in a similar capacity to that of the EU through transparent and democratic institutions alongside a reliable rule of law.²⁵

However, unstable democracies exist within the WAEMU and include Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali

and Togo. These countries have been plagued with civil strife, face restrictive political freedoms, endure limited human rights protections, have experienced reoccurring coups, and experience rampant nepotism. The stable countries of Benin, Niger and Senegal can lead the way for other WAEMU countries if these democracies continue to advance. The path towards cohesion begins by strengthening and enforcing the rule of law in Senegal, a country that is on the path towards solidifying its own governance, which will eventually promote unity amongst all WAEMU countries.

Individual country stability is an imperative component of WAEMU political and economic integration. Besides having one of the highest GDPs, Senegal also has a one of the highest rankings in the region in its functioning of government, political participation, political culture, civil liberties, democracy index, and electoral processes and pluralism.²⁶ It is one of the few countries in Africa that has not had a coup since independence. The capital city of Dakar is a hub in West Africa, with its high profile in world affairs, shipping, transport, and as a home to many banks including the BCAO bank, which controls the CFA-franc monetary policy. There is also a free and diversified media in which Senegal is home to dozens of independent newspapers. There are numerous NGOs which operate freely in the country or host West African regional offices in Dakar.²⁷ In addition, according to the democracy watchdog *Freedom House*, which conducts extensive analysis and evaluation through a team of scholars and experts, Senegal is considered “Partly

Free,” in between “Free” and “Not Free.” In addition, on a scale of one to seven, with one representing the most free and seven representing the least free, Senegal was given a three in terms of political rights, civil liberties and a freedom rating.²⁸

Workers’ rights to organize, strike, and bargain collectively are protected except for employees that work in the security industry. This right was evident in August 2010 when the national telecommunications company, SONATEL, severely damaged all country-wide communications as a result of its one day strike. The unionized workers were protesting a government contract with a U.S. telecommunications company but after the strike, the contract was cancelled, further showing the intact rule of law in Senegal.²⁹ Above all, respect for fundamental rights, open political discourse and freedom of expression, association and religion are strong and guaranteed in the country.

The educational environment in Senegal is steadily improving, as attendance levels are strong enough to inform the citizens and improve country-wide democratic institutions. As mentioned above, primary school enrollment in the country is 87%, secondary school enrollment is 37% and tertiary school enrollment is 8%. Meanwhile, 50% of adults and 65% percent of youth are literate.³⁰ Educational improvements have been enforced as Senegal is pursuing the Millennium Development Goals, which stress the achievement of universal primary school education for all by 2015. With international backing and a national agenda to improve education,

Senegal has set a good example for the improvement of a crucial component of political and economic integration. The stability of Senegal can become a model for progression of the WAEMU region.

The Political Climate of Senegal

The political development of democratic Senegal officially began upon independence from France in 1960. In Senegal's secular pluralistic society, the president, the parliament, the government, the social and economic council, the supreme court, the court of auditors and the lower courts constitute the government. The president is elected by popular vote and may serve two terms of five [since 2001 according to Wikipedia] years each. The constitution allows political parties to disagree with government policy and grants them the right to openly oppose it. Human rights are protected in Senegal's constitution through its announced commitment to fundamental rights, as defined in the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights of 1789 and in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Locally, human rights institutions include the Ligue Sénégalaise des Droits de L'homme (Senegalese League of Human Rights), Amnesty International, the Institut Africain pour les Droits de L'homme (African Institute for Human Rights) and the Institut des Droits de L'homme et de la Paix (Institute of Human Rights and Peace), all of which protect the rights of the Senegalese.³¹ For these reasons, a stable framework is in place to improve the rule of law, enhance democracy, and build vertical accountability through civil society support.

Recent events in Senegal have proven its stability, adherence to the constitution, and the endurance of the voice of people. Former President Abdoulaye Wade ran for a third term on February 26, 2012, despite strict rules against the practice in the constitution. In the first round of elections, international observers and small-scale protesters in fierce opposition urged Wade to refrain from running. After no candidate received the necessary percentage of votes to win the election, a run-off was announced between Wade and the runner-up, Macky Sall. After the second round of voting on March 25, 2012, Wade conceded the election to Sall after realizing the people had spoken. The young population and distinctive youth culture of Senegal mobilized against the authoritarian Wade who refused to let up his power. As exposed during the election season, Sall openly criticized Wade's nepotism and grand expenditures.³² The free elections and democratic character of the military not only prevented a coup during the elections; they have done so since Senegal's independence.

Not only has the political discourse, transparency and accountability in Senegal been a good model for the WAEMU, but President Macky Sall has claimed he will institute a subdued, more financially-controlled administration intent on "a new republic, in which the equilibrium between institutions is respected."³³ With a new President, Senegal is not only on the path towards improving its democratic stability and balancing governing bodies, but the country is on the path to equip people with the tools to sustain themselves. As observed by *Freedom House*,

“the reportedly free and fair elections should serve as an important example to neighboring countries in a region where electoral turnovers are often fraught with violence.”³⁴ President Sall promises to take Senegal in a new direction, which is a good example for the future political and economic WAEMU integration. Through effective civil society openness, leader-initiated as well as grassroots change, and citizen participation, it will enhance the rule of law as a model for other WAEMU countries.

Despite the successful recent events in Senegal, which have proved its longstanding democracy is still strong, there is a disparity of representation of men and women in the government and a tremendous shortfall of sufficient vertical accountability. Although in May 2010 the National Assembly passed legislation requiring candidate lists to show the parity between men and women, which led Wade to allot for 30 percent of the nine new cabinet posts to be given to women, some thought the action was to improve the power of his own party.³⁵ While Wade was in office, many accused the former President of providing preferential treatment to his associates in business, specifically the allocation of frequencies and broadcasting fees associated with radio stations.³⁶ Such recent actions in Senegal still threaten the future democracy.

There are reports that the legacy of the Wade government continues in the country. This demonstrates the need for more vertical accountability, which is necessary for a strong democracy, and the need to improve horizontal accountability, which

some critics say is nonexistent in Senegal, despite the recent change in president.³⁷ Abdoulaye Wade, who was president for twelve years and maintained a heavy influence in the political opposition for about thirty years before he took office, is still ever present in society despite the new government of President Sall. There is a deep connection between marabouts, or holy leaders, and government leaders, which Wade created when he was the head of state. Wade allegedly handed off resources such as cars to marabouts, created government agencies with no purpose and placed those connected to him in high government offices.³⁸

The resources Wade took advantage of while he was in office demonstrate the need to improve vertical accountability in Senegal, or the means through which citizens, mass media and civil society attempt to hold leaders responsible to adhere to good governance principles.³⁹ While horizontal accountability is technically in place, through a system of checks and balances between the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of the government, leaders must be held responsible for their actions to the public and ensure that they are responsible to the population they are meant to serve.⁴⁰ Regardless, the limited vertical accountability has the potential to increase under the new government, as it is necessary to strengthen the rule of law within the country and is needed for the country to lead the path towards further regional political and economic integration of the WAEMU.

Non-Governmental Initiatives and ICT

It is the belief that by reaching effective rule of law with full citizen participation and vertical accountability, WAEMU economic policy and political cooperation can drastically improve. Senegal will serve as an example given its well-rounded social, political, and economic stability. Such improvement in the rule of law within Senegal can be done through ICT, which would increase political participation and awareness through cell phones, computers, and other modern technologies. Currently, 50% of the population uses cell phones and there are almost 2 million Internet users.⁴¹ By promoting transparency of the political processes and improving the quality of information transferred to the public, it can help strengthen the rule of law. Citizen participation needs to be enhanced so that individuals can actively partake and become informed members in their civil society.⁴² ICT initiatives will then in turn improve the rule of law in Senegal and the rest of the WAEMU countries.

E-governance, or governing through electronic means, can strengthen democratic governing processes. In addition, e-participation, or the use of ICT to politically participate, allows citizens to voice their concerns, hold elected officials responsible and promote lasting development and change in their remote communities. Through increased access to information, representation, consultation, volunteering, and monitoring, citizens have the ability to participate in their governments.⁴³ ICT also organizes the bureau-

cratic nature of governments, can help businesses establish more easily and allows individuals to become active participants from their regions.

Senegal will enhance the rule of law within its borders with the help of the established motivators and ground-level initiators. The UNDP's Oslo Governance Center office in Dakar encourages networking and teamwork as pillars in establishing democratic governance while working in collaboration with leading institutions, including the Panos Institute of West Africa (PIWA). By spreading information and expressing the voiced concerns of citizens, the ICT program under the UNDP's Oslo Governance Center, in conjunction with PIWA, plans to build well-grounded relationships between the media and civil society organizations in the coming years.⁴⁴ Since the 1990s, UNDP has been promoting the use of ICT as a catalyst for development in Senegal; since 2001, UNDP has increased its focus on promoting e-governance and access to information for the general populace so that they may be involved in the democratic processes.

Additionally, the National Good Governance Program (PNGB) in Senegal, overseen by UNDP and the World Bank, is also helping to monitor and evaluate the indicators inhibiting and protecting effective and influential governing mechanisms.⁴⁵ PNGB's approach is enabling and solidifying democratic governance with special attention paid to marginalized groups often denied access to the political decision-making processes. This approach allows for more accountability

within democratic institutions, and promotes democratic governance principles.⁴⁶ The WAEMU is also promoting the implementation of a legal framework to validate electronic documents and protect personal data.

Senegalese ICT Progress

The government of Senegal has been active in its promotion of ICT within the last few decades, which is a good indicator for the longevity of improved citizen participation and increased civil society involvement. The government's pursuit alongside non-governmental organizations and international donors has equipped the system to handle future changes to ultimately reach a model level of transparency and awareness that WAEMU countries may strive to achieve.

Some initiatives in Senegal include the Agence de l'Informatique de l'Etat (ADIE), which was established in 2006 by a governmental agency to encourage the modernization of government services through the adoption of ICT. As an information hub, ADIE informs users of their rights and provides various forms and tools to ensure citizen protections within the system. Another program is the Net Interactif Multimédia, which works to decentralize, improve awareness of local issues and promote development through ICT. In addition, Forum Civil is a grassroots organization which works to promote global and participatory democracy, establish responsible citizenry, promote transparency, good governance and anti-corruption markers, and encourage national objective expertise. Through its

website, Forum Civil provides materials for Senegalese citizens to enable comprehensive citizen monitoring.⁴⁷ Under the assistance of NGOs such as PNGB, Vision e-Senegal is the national ICT plan that works to include citizens and businesses as a top priority for the government, to enable citizen response to government leaders and improve overall access to information.

While the existing programs in the realm of good governance and promotion of civil society through ICT mechanisms is promising, there have been noticeable problems. Proper infrastructure, specifically electricity, computer machinery and routine maintenance have been lacking. Also, many people did not know about the existence of forums such as the ADIE program. The slow launch of ICT has also been attributed to low levels of French literacy, as the most widely-spoken language, Wolof, is not a written language.

Despite uncertainties, the promise of ICT is vast and solutions are attainable with the right institutional guidance and international assistance. Given the recent increase in school attendance and completion rates in Senegal, the educational improvements will help improve citizen participation as individuals become informed. Educational pushes and ad campaigns through the Internet, newspapers and television can increase awareness and inform citizens of the ongoing programs aimed at developing their country. In addition, the encouragement of audio-equipped devices will hopefully enable people to actively engage even if their na-

tive tongue is not a written language. The existing Senegalese framework and initiatives will enable the UNDP and PIWA to continue to work in good governance and grow civil society throughout the country.

Conclusion

The media and ICT play a crucial role in changing the way the government functions in Senegal and in the region. In the evolving environment, the Senegalese government must promote and support ICT progress and vertical accountability. Although the movement is in the earliest stages, institutional support is imperative. The connection between governmental offices and the general populace must be bridged for the enhancement of the rule of law in Senegal and the future regional political and economic integration of the WAEMU. Through the use of ICT programs such as ADIE, Net Interactif Multimédia, Forum Civil, and Vision e-Senegal under the support of the UNDP, PIWA and PNGB, the progress of the rule of law may continue to further economically and politically integrate Senegal and eventually the WAEMU.

Senegal has the potential to be a leader through its democratic principles which can improve relations and solidify policies of the WAEMU. Through an emphasis on vertical accountability via civil society and ICT initiatives, the future of the WAEMU looks bright. The democratic advances and improved trade relations between Ivory Coast and Senegal can also help lead other WAEMU members in a similar direction. By modeling relevant traits of the EU, specifically in the

same way that Germany and France influenced members of the EU to take a similar path, the dominant countries of Ivory Coast and Senegal can improve the future of the union. The EU and the WAEMU have many common attributes which, if put into practice, can benefit the WAEMU in the future. Furthermore, the “common market” and unified actions through trade can improve the development of the WAEMU only if they follow a path of enhancing the rule of law. Furthermore, as ICT initiatives improve vertical accountability, economic relations may be enhanced.

It is in Senegal’s best interest for democratic progress and rule of law enforcement to continue. ICT will provide valuable information to many including marginalized rural farmers and urban college students. It will educate the public about political events, streamline bureaucratic and administrative processes, assist Senegal in reaching its Millennium Development Goals and promote overall governmental transparency and accountability in the open. Given the democratic situation in Senegal, it is ripe for ICT investment and coordination through enhancing existing institutions.

Political and economic integration requires governmental cooperation, public involvement and grassroots support. The opportunity to strengthen the rule of law in Senegal must be utilized in the midst of the rapid rise of technology and ICT progress in the region. The composition and relationships between the WAEMU countries is rapidly changing but depends on the strength of each individual country,

and the power of the people within each country. The political validity and rule of law can swiftly improve if the technologies are properly used to benefit the people. From there, future integration within the WAEMU may occur.

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Enhancing Regional Integration to Advance Stability in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Stella Kim



Abstract

Political and economic integration's main objective is to establish peace and stability in a region through trade and cooperation. The Democratic Republic of Congo currently lacks both peace and stability, and has a long way to go before achieving these objectives. In efforts to gain stability through economic growth, the DRC is a part of four Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, which are all at different levels of integration and implementation. The four regional blocs are the SADC, COMESA, ECCAS, and CEPGL. However, due to the challenges of overlapping memberships in these RECs, it is recommended that the DRC concentrate on furthering integration with SADC and COMESA, while applying for membership in the EAC in hopes that the three RECs merge in the near future. Through good governance, support of the rule of law, and curtailing corruption, the DRC can continue strengthening its regional cooperation. Furthermore, it must focus on reforming the mining sector, which offers the best prospects for economic growth, while diversifying through further development of the Inga Power Complex project.

Biography

Stella Kim is currently a graduate student in the Global Development and Peace program at the University of Bridgeport, with a focus on Political Economy and Development. She also has a B.A. in Psychology from the University of Chicago.

Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country full of contradictions. On the one hand, the DRC has been endowed with an abundance of natural resources that represent immense potential for economic growth and wealth. However, the DRC continues to maintain its status as a country in humanitarian crisis. This crisis persists at a level that has the nation chronically teetering on the edge of becoming a failed state. Violence, corruption, a weak government, and warring militia groups plague the DRC, yet the country is striving to move towards stability. There has been recent economic growth that indicates that progress in the right direction can still be realized.

Progress for the Democratic Republic of Congo is possible due to its strategic geographical location on the continent of Africa. Its borders touch every region of Africa, providing opportunities for integration in the form of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). This article explores why RTAs are so prevalent in Africa, and addresses the notion of a resource trap. As a way to combat the negative effects of the resource trap, South-South Cooperation is referenced. Later, some background information on the Democratic Republic of Congo will be provided, as well as the regional integration arrangements of the DRC. The DRC is currently a member of four different regional economic communities. Each REC will be covered, as well as the negative aspects of overlapping membership, finishing with a suggestion on how the DRC can correct this. In the conclusion, recommendations

are offered on how to enhance regional integration with a spotlight on the mining sector.

Africa and Political and Economic Integration

Regional trade agreements are prolific on the continent of Africa. David Lynch, a professor of political science, states in *Trade and Globalization: An Introduction to Regional Trade Agreements*, “There are over 30 RTAs (Regional Trade Agreements) in Africa, and African countries average four memberships each.”¹ The numerous RTAs came into being as African countries claimed independence from their colonizers. African nations have inherited countless difficulties, both as colonies and as post-colonial states. Aside from the damage to society and culture, whole economies were left in tatters as colonizers pulled out and left little behind for national reconstruction.

An example of this is found in the transport infrastructure of many African nations. These transport systems were originally built to move natural resources from their sources to markets in Europe and other developed countries. After independence, many of these transport systems were not maintained and now the lack of transport infrastructure in some African nations is proving to be an enormous detriment to development.

Furthermore, colonialism shaped African economies towards serving the purposes of hegemonic powers rather than the local population. Lynch puts it succinctly by stating, “Moreover, colonial rule halted

many organic economic arrangements such as local or regional trade and currency patterns, and forced economic relations with the colonial power – by colonial power rules.”²² Thus, it can be seen that the proliferation in Regional Trade Agreements in Africa was a response by newly independent nations to establish themselves against the hegemony of colonial powers, and as part of their own recovery and growth process. Smaller nations also realized that RTAs have a stronger presence in the global market as an amalgamation of economic influence.

Natural resources are abundant in Africa, which can either be a windfall or a curse depending on how the resource is managed. In *The Bottom Billion*, Paul Collier refers to resource wealth as “The Natural Resource Trap.”²³ Collier explains why resources are a trap that works to perpetuate extreme poverty in the poorest of countries by stating, “Economists term the excess of revenues over all costs including normal profit margins ‘rent,’ and rents seem to be damaging. Over time, countries with large resource discoveries can end up poorer, with the lost growth more than offsetting the one-off gain in income provided by the rents.”²⁴ It is the rent seeking culture and dependence on raw materials that creates damaging conditions for trade in a country. This can further be explained by what economists have termed, “Dutch Disease,” named for the problems associated with North Sea gas on the economy of the Netherlands.²⁵ In basic terms, Dutch Disease occurs when resource exports lead to a rise in value of domestic currency against foreign currencies, which renders other ex-

port activities uncompetitive.

South-South Cooperation

The negative effects of Dutch Disease and of rent seeking further reinforce the need for regional trade agreements in Africa. However, more recently, the concept of South-South Cooperation has played a significant role in RTAs. South-South Cooperation is defined as a general framework of collaboration between developing countries to share technical expertise, knowledge, and skills to achieve their development goals. The United Nations Development Programme’s Special Unit on South-South Cooperation states its guiding principle as, “South-South cooperation is a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South that contributes to their national well-being, their national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals.”²⁶ Based on the guiding principles and objectives of South-South Cooperation, regional trade arrangements provide the perfect forum to enhance trade among developing countries, while exchanging knowledge and skills.

Background Information on the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo is situated in the heart of Sub-Saharan Africa, and is bordered by Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, as well as six other nations.²⁷ It is the twelfth largest country in the world, and has an estimated population of approximately 70 million people.

The capital of the DRC is located in Kinshasa, with regional capitals located in eleven provinces. Independence from Belgium was gained on June 30, 1960. However, it has only been since 2001 that the country has been able to begin the rebuilding process after decades of intrastate conflict and wars with neighboring nations. Despite the unstable peace that has been secured in most of the country,⁸ violence still remains present in the eastern provinces where fighting between militia groups continue. Data reveals that around 45,000 people die every month as a direct or indirect result of the ongoing conflicts, and civilians are often massacred, mutilated, and subjected to horrific abuses.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has been referred to as a “country of superlatives.”⁹ As is the case with many of its fellow African nations, it has been endowed with an overflowing basket of natural resources that offers the potential for considerable growth. The World Bank’s view states, “With its immense extraordinary agricultural and mineral resources, the DRC has the potential to become one of Africa’s richest countries and one of the continent’s key engines for growth.”¹⁰

Although the DRC has been identified as a country of superlatives, it has also earned the title of the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis.” Most of the people there do not live to see the age of 50.¹¹ Poverty, malnutrition, and unnecessary deaths from preventable diseases have created an emergency situation. In No-

vember 2011, the United Nations Development Report 2011 was released, which ranks countries in relation to their Human Development Index (HDI).¹² According to the report, the Democratic Republic of Congo was ranked 187 out of 187 countries.¹³ Furthermore, Foreign Policy magazine ranked the Democratic Republic of Congo fourth after Somalia, Chad, and Sudan in their Failed State Index. This places the DRC in the critically failed category.¹⁴

Democracy has been established in the DRC and the first democratic elections were held in the country in 2006. Late in 2011, the DRC held their second free elections, and the incumbent president Joseph Kabila maintained his presidency. Although classified as a democracy, Kabila’s government is repressive and authoritarian. Human Rights Watch published a scathing report that points out the following: “There have been disturbing signs that Congo’s democratic transition is not only fragile, but the newly elected government is brutally restricting democratic space.”¹⁵ Political opposition, as well as government supporters face harassment and violence.

Lack of good governance goes hand-in-hand with lack of transparency and rampant corruption. Each year, the World Bank produces a “Doing Business” report that ranks countries by ease of doing business, disclosing how straightforward it is to start a business or register property. Out of 183 countries, the DRC was ranked 178.¹⁶ Transparency International also publishes an index each year that ranks countries by how corrupt their pub-

lic sector is perceived to be. The DRC ranked 168 out of 182 countries, showing high levels of corruption, the worst being in the mining sector.¹⁷

In the face of the nation's troubles, the economy continues to maintain a semblance of growth. The African Economic Outlook reported that the DRC's economy started to recover from the global economic downturn in 2010. Estimates revealed that real gross domestic product (GDP) growth increased from 2.8 percent to 6.1 percent in 2009, which was mostly driven by the mining sector. This growth then stimulated the services sector and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Sectors that were factors in overall growth were mining (11.8%), construction (10.1%) and wholesale and retail trade (6.3%). Projections show that the economy is expected to grow at around 6.5 percent during the next one to two years.¹⁸

Current data from the World Bank reports that Congo's GDP is currently at \$13.1 billion and GDP per capita is \$199, while GDP growth was at 7.2 percent.¹⁹ The World Trade Organization reported that trade represented 57.4 percent of the Democratic Republic of Congo's GDP from 2006-2008,²⁰ and amounted to \$7.5 billion in 2010. The major exports are mainly minerals and precious metals, and are destined primarily for China, Belgium, and Finland. Imports consist of machinery and equipment and the country's major trading partners are South Africa, Belgium, and Zambia.

As mentioned previously, the DRC possesses abundant natural resources, and

these represent a significant part of its economy. Resources include copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, petroleum and wood.²¹ Considering that electronic equipment, homes, and cars cannot be built without some of the minerals and metals found in the DRC, it is plain to see why the World Bank remarked about their potential for immense wealth. There is another source of potential wealth in the DRC that is not part of the mining sector. An article in Afribiz commented on their hydroelectric potential; "The DRC is also home to the single most powerful hydropower site, the Inga site, located on the Congo River."²²

The World Energy Council estimates that the Inga Complex can supply up to 50 million households in Africa with electricity. They already export power to Zambia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. The advantages created by this resource include greater export diversification, which is desirable since too much of the economy is reliant on minerals, as well as increases in foreign currency reserves.

The DRC and Political and Economic Integration

In terms of geographical location, the DRC is strategically located in Africa. It straddles both the eastern and western regions, and it is a link between the north and south of Africa. The regions of the DRC are then broken up into provinces. Since the country is as large as it is, and because of its location and regionalization within, the DRC is a member of four different regional economic communities.

The South African Development Community

Provinces within the DRC are not well integrated and they lack higher levels of mutual support. The Katanga and Kasai provinces in the eastern and southern parts of the country are well integrated with the southern part of the continent. This is where the SADC operates. The declaration for the formation of the South African Development Community was officially signed in August 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, and it currently has 15 member states. The SADC mission is “to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance, and durable peace and security, so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the world economy.”²³ By 2015, the SADC plans to boost integration and establish a common market. Their strategy also outlines plans for a monetary union by 2016, and a single currency by 2018.

In 2008, the SADC launched a free trade area that included the majority of its member states. The DRC is not yet a part of the free trade area due to its weak economy. The trade balance of the SADC is currently heavily in favor of South Africa.²⁴ With its GDP at \$363.9 billion and exports at around \$85.8 billion, South Africa is the continent’s largest and strongest economy.²⁵

South Africa also offers political stability, as well as good transportation infrastruc-

ture, which are both net positives for the region. However, Ashish Vaidya, an economics professor who specializes in international trade and development economics, writes that the inclusion of South Africa in the SADC has been a mixed blessing. He remarks that South Africa has close ties to the West, namely the U.S. and the EU, which offer areas for trade development. On the other hand, because it is such a large economy, smaller member nations at times rely too heavily on South Africa instead of developing their own domestic economies.²⁶

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

The provinces in the eastern part of the DRC, such as North and South Kivu, and Province Orientale are linked to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The mission statement for this regional arrangement is as follows: “To provide excellent technical services to COMESA in order to facilitate the region’s sustained development through economic integration.”²⁷ COMESA was formed in 1994 and currently has 19 member states. A free trade area was established in 2000 when nine of the member states eliminated tariffs on products originating from COMESA states. In 2009, a customs union was launched. By 2025, COMESA plans to introduce a common currency among member states that will be issued by a central bank. The location of these provinces also makes the region a natural trading partner with the East African Community (EAC) of which the DRC is not a

member. The EAC will be mentioned again in a subsequent section.

The Economic Community of Central African States

The following provinces in DRC are more integrated with the central part of Africa: Bandundu, Bas Congo, Equateur, and Kinshasa. Thus, the DRC is also a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). This particular Regional Economic Community (REC) has had a shaky past. It was established in 1983, but was not fully functional until 1985. However, due to warring between member nations and non-payment of dues by members, it remained inactive for many years.²⁸ Even after the revitalization of the ECCAS, it continues to struggle with its objectives in furthering integration. Lack of solidarity continues to hinder progress, and conflicts undermine efforts for member nations to develop internally. One of the greatest stumbling blocks has been the lack of transport infrastructure within the region, as this hampers movement of goods and people across borders.²⁹ However, the lack of peace, and political instability remain the biggest obstacles. As a counteractive measure, ECCAS established the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). Out of this came the creation of a peacekeeping force for military intervention in central Africa, which appears to be its only substantial achievement to date.³⁰

The Economic Community of the Great Lakes

Established in 1976, there is very little information available regarding the CEPGL. Member nations consist of the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. Due to warring between member states, this REC has been mostly inactive, but there is now a revitalization movement within the private sectors of the member states.³¹ This renewed collaboration will work to enhance cross-border trade and develop the regional economy.

This REC has a tumultuous history on the one hand, however, on the other hand, there is potential for success in its revitalization. Regarding Rwanda, during and after the 1994 genocide, fighting spilled over into the DRC. Even after the conflict was officially over, the eastern provinces of the DRC remained under Tutsi-led control, which was backed by the Rwandan Government. The eastern provinces are rich in mineral deposits and Rwanda used their strategic positioning to loot minerals in the DRC. The New York Times reported, "During these 12 years of Rwandan control, the mineral-rich provinces have been economically integrated into Rwanda. During this time, Congo's governments have been preoccupied with internal and external wars elsewhere, and have been unable to combat foreign control of the eastern provinces, a thousand miles from the capital, Kinshasa."³² Since the minerals are part of the economies of both countries, CEPGL provides a forum for both countries to enhance their economic cooperation, with the additional benefit of peace building in a conflict region. The United States Institute of Peace stated in a briefing, "A revitalized CEPGL would integrate regional

armed forces under one command, lay the foundation for police and judicial cooperation and harmonize economic policies/regulation. Some participants believed that the CEPGL could provide the framework for a viable regional common market.”³³

Steps to Enhance Economic Integration

Recent statistics have shown that the DRC is much better integrated with the SADC and COMESA, and that their exports are slanted towards the eastern and southern regions of Africa. Furthermore, considering how little information is available on CEPGL and ECCAS, it demonstrates how these two RECs are unstable and poorly integrated. It has been argued that the recently renewed effort to revive CEPGL is being driven by external forces, rather than occurring organically.³⁴ It is therefore recommended that the DRC should consider withdrawing from CEPGL and ECCAS and concentrate on the SADC and COMESA, which provide more potential for economic growth, access to foreign markets, and improved political stability. In addition, the DRC should consider applying for membership to the East African Community.

The East African Community

The East African Community is a regional intergovernmental organization that consists of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. It was established in 2000, and by 2005, the EAC established a customs union. In 2009, the protocol was signed by member states to es-

tablish a common market. The EAC vision and mission states, “The **Vision** of EAC is a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically united East Africa; and the **Mission** is to widen and deepen Economic, Political, Social and Culture integration in order to improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa through increased competitiveness, value added production, trade and investments.”³⁵

For the most part, the EAC has largely been successful in its economic integration and Hilary Clinton praised it for being the most successful REC in Sub-Saharan Africa, referring to it as a model bloc.³⁶ Trade among members has increased and the EAC is continuing on its path towards a monetary union. Considering the EAC’s success and trajectory, as well as the membership of Rwanda, who has economic ties with the DRC, it makes sense for the DRC to join this regional bloc.

Overlapping Membership

As was previously mentioned, there are over 30 RTAs in Africa, and most countries are members of more than two regional blocs. This overlapping membership tends to create inefficiencies, as well as hinder deeper economic integration. Several disadvantages to multiple memberships include:

- Burdensome membership dues;
- Low program implementation;
- Either duplication or conflicting policies and program implementation.³⁷

Essentially, multiple memberships create more bureaucracy, and are financially draining for a country. Furthermore, conflicting policies of one RTA can hinder trade with another.

Considering the inefficiencies related to multiple memberships, there has been collaboration between the SADC, COMESA, and EAC, to harmonize their policies towards merging these three RECs to create something called the Tripartite. The goal of the Tripartite is to establish a free trade area that covers all three RECs to establish a larger market with a single economic space.³⁸ The merging of the Tripartite would be in line with the Lagos Treaty that aims to reduce the 14 recognized RECs down to five through mergers. “According to the Lagos Treaty, ‘Geographical proximity, economic interdependence, commonality of language and culture, history of cooperation, and shared resources should define REC membership’.”³⁹

Enhancing the Political and Economic Integration of the DRC

Although the DRC is already a member of several RECs, domestic issues, some of which were previously mentioned, have hampered their integration into regional blocs. In order for the DRC to deepen integration, these issues must be addressed and resolved. Of course, as the DRC’s difficulties are complex and exist at many levels, there is no silver bullet for the nation’s woes.

In terms of governance, the DRC must work towards strengthening their central

government and focus on genuine democratization. This would require the current regime to alter its authoritarian policies, and work to uphold the rule of law. Aside from policy changes, the central government needs to establish greater hegemony over the provinces that still remain under the control of warlords and militia groups. There also needs to be more transparency, and corruption must not be tolerated at any level.

The mining industry offers the most hope for economic growth in the DRC. It also serves as the backbone of the current economy, and represents its most traded commodities. These minerals and precious metals are what make the DRC competitive in the RECs. However, in order to be profitable, the mining industry must continue to undergo an overhaul. In 2007, the government of the DRC began a review of all mining contracts, since some contracts were found to be abusive with inflated transaction costs that robbed the DRC of revenues.⁴⁰ Deputy Minister of Mines Victor Kasongo was quoted as saying, “The review had revealed the extent to which some contracts were not viable or had in some way failed on feasibility, adherence to the mining code, or had otherwise not realized the terms of business agreed upon in the outset.”⁴¹ Upon review of the contracts, many were renegotiated to provide better terms for the DRC, as well as local mine operators.

The DRC government has also committed to implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Plus, Plus (EITI++). According to the World bank,

“The EITI ++ seeks to support committed governments, notably in Africa, in implementing good policy and practice along the entire natural resources value chain, i.e. the entire natural resources development process.”⁴² EITI++ is a coalition of governments, the World Bank, investors, civil society organizations, and NGOs. They provide policy advice and technical expertise to improve extractive resource management, and are involved in every stage from how access to the resource is granted to how revenues are spent for sustainable growth.

In theory, if the revenues are spent on sustainable growth, infrastructure, and poverty reduction, the DRC will enhance integration with RECs. In turn, economic integration will provide further stability in the region, while aiding member countries in areas of deficiency, such as the building of transport and infrastructure.

Lastly, the focus has been on the mining industry. However, the DRC needs to diversify if they want to be more competitive. At the moment, their best option for diversification is in the Inga Complex project that was mentioned earlier. With the potential to supply 50 million households in Africa with electricity, the upsides for the domestic economy, as well as for the RECs are immense. The DRC has already requested assistance and cooperation from SADC countries that already benefit from the Inga Power Complex, thus furthering integration within this REC. Nations in West Africa, such as Nigeria have disclosed their plans to purchase power, and the World Bank has

invested nearly \$1 billion into the project. Mr. Latsoucabé Fall of the World Energy Council was quoted as saying that the Inga Complex is a “unique opportunity to promote economic independence, peace, and prosperity in Africa.”

Conclusion

Based on the point that the DRC has a strategic geophysical location in Africa, it is vital to the success of the continent. The DRC, as well as its neighbors, realize this, which is why it is linked to each region of Africa, and integrated into regional economic communities. Furthermore, considering its endowment in natural resources, potential for immense wealth generation from revenues, as well as trade exists.

The DRC should focus on integration in the eastern and southern regions and further its ties with the SADC and COMESA. It may also pursue membership with EAC, which has been largely successful in its integration. Future plans to merge the Tripartite and harmonize trade policies will create an economic powerhouse in Africa if it continues on a path similar to that of the EAC.

If the DRC desires to enhance its integration with RECs, it will need to continue to strive for good governance, a stronger central government based on rule of law, and put an end to domestic conflicts. One solution is to continue to reform the mining sector to collect taxes and fees and generate revenue, which can only be done by eradicating corruption and through transparency initiatives. This

revenue, with the aid of EITI++ must be applied to sustainable growth and poverty reduction measures. Furthermore, integration with the Tripartite can also help to fill in the gaps in regards to lack of infrastructure, skilled laborers, and knowledge sharing. Lastly, the end goal of political and economic integration is peace and regional stability, however, in a region where peace is intermittent, economic integration is also the means to that end.

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Rewarding Good Behavior with Cash: The Basis, Experiences and Features of Conditional Cash Transfers

Daulat Jha



Abstract

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are a relatively new form of targeted aid in the fight against global poverty. CCTs act as both a social safety net, and as a mechanism for investments in human capital for longer-term visions. They are based on the simple idea to provide “the poor money that will allow them to be less poor today, but condition it on behaviors that will give their children a better start in life.” This paper is a broad introductory overview of CCT programs. It looks at the philosophical, political, economic, and socio-cultural bases of CCTs. It briefly recounts the experiences of two of the most successful practitioners of CCT programs, Brazil and Mexico. Finally, it looks at the main features that are part of all CCT programs, and the various differences between countries within those features. It then goes on to rudimentarily explore some criticisms of the programs. The paper concludes that CCT programs, if well designed and implemented effectively can be a powerful tool to alleviate future poverty, while attaining the short-term goals of the UN Millennium Declaration and MDGs.

Biography

Daulat Jha has worked at The Carter Center, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), Chemonics International and local NGOs in support of the peace process in Nepal since 2006. He has also been an op-ed columnist in Nepal. He is currently pursuing his Master's degree in Global Development and Peace at the University of Bridgeport, having graduated with a Bachelor's degree in Philosophy from Wabash College, IN.

At the turn of the millennium, in September 2000, the 189 member states of the United Nations made a historic pledge, “to free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently subjected.”¹ The passionate tone of the pledge, enshrined in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, not only echoed other historic declarations such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it also built upon many other foundational documents as well. It adopted a bold vision of reducing poverty by half, infant mortality by two-thirds, and maternal mortality by three-quarters around the world. It also set a deadline – that the achievements were to be achieved by 2015.

Yet, according to World Bank data, over 2.1 billion people worldwide live on less than two dollars a day, classified as the relative poverty line. Of those, over 880 million are the absolute poor, eking out an existence at the edge of humanity. They survive on less than one dollar a day. The global economic crisis and rising food and fuel prices may further damage some of the gains made since the 1990s, pushing more people in to poverty in the short run. It is thus more imperative than ever to look at the different ways that governments and the international community are dealing with the problem of eradicating poverty in the long run, and meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the deadline looms.

Fighting poverty has thus become a major agenda for governments and the interna-

tional community. It has attracted the best economists from around the world to develop strategies. Anti-poverty causes have attracted celebrities like Bono, and made academics into celebrities, like Jeffery Sachs. Multilateral agencies like the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund have made it their crusading cause.

Whatever the causes of the “culture of poverty,” perhaps the most salient feature of it is that it implies that not only are poor families currently poor, but they will remain so in the future. Called the “cycle of poverty” or the “poverty trap,” this idea contradicts our very basic notions of justice, equity, and fair opportunity. This is why the transmission of poverty through generations, “intergenerational poverty” has become a fundamental problem for the modern world, and a much researched and debated topic amongst political economists.

It was only in the mid-1990s that a new approach to poverty alleviation began taking hold. This approach was not focused on the supply-side of the poverty problems (access to better education and healthcare, state-sponsored creation of employment, food subsidies, etc). The approach, called Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) instead focused on the demand side of the development problem. This deceptively simple, yet elegant idea, to “give the poor money that will allow them to be less poor today, but condition it on behaviors that will give their children a better start in life”² is called Conditional Cash Transfer. Within a short span of a decade and a half, more than 30

countries have now adopted some form of CCT.

This paper is a broad overview of CCT programs as currently implemented. Even though CCT programs are relatively new, there is a trove of academic research in various fields, being most prominently examined in political economy. There are also many statistical analyses of the impacts of CCT activity. Because many CCT programs began as pilots, there were both treatment and control groups in these studies, making it one of the most heavily researched, monitored, evaluated and documented social programs in recent times. Furthermore, many governments (in particular Mexico) have put entire datasets online for scrutiny by any outsider. This enables the program to continuously adapt to criticisms, and tweak the program to certain recommendations. As the program is continuously evolving, many papers can become quickly outdated or superseded by more recent research.

Prominently, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank heavily promote these programs. They too have released several documents and annual reviews of the program. This paper is heavily indebted to a World Bank Policy Research Report titled, “Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty,” that was published in 2009. It is, to the author’s knowledge, the most comprehensive document of its nature that broadly outlines the global experiment with CCT programs.

Basis

For the purposes of this paper, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are defined as payments made to poor households on the condition that those households invest in the human capital of their children in certain, pre-specified ways.³ The basic assumption is that while direct cash transfers alleviate current poverty in the family by providing much needed monetary relief among the extremely poor, the program will also increase the likelihood of the next generation being able to break the cycle of poverty, by investing in human capital formation via education and health requirements.

Political Basis

Firstly, as all UN member states are signatories of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the main political justification of CCT programs would be the Declaration itself. The 26th article of the UN Declaration of Human Rights affirms the “right to a free and compulsory education with the goal of strengthening human rights and fundamental freedom,” while also recognizing that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.”⁴

Thus, in the developing world, conditional cash transfers can have an immediate appeal among the local citizenry. As we will see in Mexico, even after the fall of Ernesto Zedillo’s government, which had instituted the first CCT programs in the country, his successor, Vicente Fox not only continued, but also expanded the program, albeit under a different name. In

Brazil, the CCT programs that were independently launched by municipalities in mid-1980s not only withstood the constitutional changes of 1988, but in fact, the constitution further enshrined the precepts of redistributive justice, until the mid-1990s, when the government took it upon itself to commandeer the Bolsa Familia program and expand it nationwide.

However, in many Latin American countries with a sizeable middle class, the sense that the poor are getting cash that they do not deserve remains strong. With a solid middle class in many countries, politicians cannot afford to alienate these voters. In such cases, CCTs can convince the citizenry that the poor are not merely getting handouts but are being rewarded for “good behavior.” This CCT model can be advantageous in political contexts, which are hostile to redistribution, as recipients have to demonstrate certain attitudes to be deserving.⁵

Economic Basis

To invest in any social program is a significant governmental decision that requires a cost benefit analysis, since the resources used in one area could easily be used in another. Thus, it is never an easy decision to make. And thus, for any CCT program to be accepted and to have a meaningful impact, it is necessary to see how CCT programs compare to other programs of social welfare.

In many countries, the introduction of CCT programs was in response to already existing social welfare programs. Most common among them were subsidies,

particularly of food, fuel and electricity for the poorest citizens. However, many of these subsidy programs were considered poorly designed and inefficiently implemented. Corruption was rampant. Hoarding of essentials to artificially inflate the prices of these essentials was widespread. Politicians often were gatekeepers of such programs, whereby they would dispense the benefits to whom they saw fit. Many of the poorest people were also left out of the schemes for various other reasons. Thus, it has been argued that CCT programs are often implemented as part of a broader reform of social services, regularly leading to the elimination of poorly targeted and inefficient programs.⁶

Many other social welfare programs rely heavily on social workers or government bureaucrats. This increases the chances of leakages and of corruption in aid delivery. Most CCT programs increase efficiency and decrease corruption by using a centralized system of design and delivery of benefits, with local administration and bureaucracy used for implementation. This means better targeting (as local administrations are better able to evaluate incidences of poverty in their areas), by making the delivery of benefits directly to the beneficiary through a check that is delivered directly. This greatly limits corruption.

Compared to traditional programs, CCTs also have low operational costs, even though that cost still remains high. As we can see below, the financing of CCT programs has six components.

*Costing conditional cash transfer programs usually involves an analysis of six major expenditure components: (1) targeting costs, which usually involve geographical targeting and proxy means tests, (2) costs of implementing and managing conditionalities, (3) monitoring and evaluation expenses, (4) logistical costs of delivering cash, (5) costs of supporting the supply of human capital services, and (6) the private costs to beneficiaries from participation in the programs, including their costs of compliance.*⁷

As we can see, in each of the six categories, governments can choose how much to spend according to their priorities and capabilities. For example, while the Mexico CCT program spends heavily on monitoring compliance with conditionalities, Brazil is less strict about it. Similarly, costs vary greatly depending on the existing infrastructure of government and their presence at the local level. Targeting costs in themselves vary from around 4% to 15%. It is up to each government to decide and customize what their priorities are. This makes CCT programs a highly malleable system that can be adapted as per the need of each country.

On a much longer-term note, the very concept of CCT programming is to enhance human capital for the future. This means that CCT programs can play an essential role for building a sustainable market in the future with capable human resources.

Because they often transfer benefits directly to a recipient's bank account, an ancillary outcome of these programs is that they increase the poor's incorporation in to credit markets and the banking

system.⁸ This in itself is also good as access to credit is essential in increasing the chances of poor families making it out of poverty.

Similarly, one of the primary aims of CCT programs is to act as a social safety net. As stated in the introduction, any economic downturn affects the poorest the most. CCT benefits can act as a shield during such times by providing much needed cushioning. Not only do global economic factors disproportionately impact the poor, there are a host of other factors that can provide a shock to poor families. They include natural disasters such as floods and droughts, eviction, violence to a member of the family, unexpected diseases, death of a wage-earning member of the family etc. CCT programs can be designed to address particular situations with careful targeting and proper calibration of conditionalities. They ensure that in spite of such shocks, even the most vulnerable of the poor, the children, can still go to school, meet basic nutritional and health needs, and increase their capabilities to become productive members of society in the future.

Socio-cultural Basis

Since CCT programs have been implemented in more than 30 countries, a wide variety of literature is available on social and cultural contexts of such programs, how they vary, and how specific programs have adjusted to meet particular needs.

First, let us look at the gender dimension of CCTs. Many (by some estimates

around 70%) of the CCT programs identify female heads of household as the primary beneficiaries of their programs. This means that money is delivered to them in their name and they control the cash. Many studies have shown that when women control the money, they often spend it more on family needs than men do. This has been the guiding rationale for many social programs including micro-credit lending.

When women control incomes, they not only tend to spend it wisely, but the proc-



ess also empowers them and increases their sense of self-esteem. This can have a powerful effect, particularly in countries where gender discrimination is high and where girls, from the outset, are taught to think of themselves solely in the terms of “objects for marriage.”

The involvement of local communities in program design can have an impact on social cohesion too. Thus, when designing the program, it is essential to understand local communities and their culture and design the program with due consideration of such factors. When some poorer (and thought of as inferior) members of a community get benefits that bypass the other relatively better-off mem-

bers, resentment may be generated. This will particularly be the case in communities where social cohesion is already weak, for example, in the case of rural India. A CCT program in rural India that targets only the lower-strata of the caste system will inevitably breed resentment among the upper strata. Thus, it would be wiser in such communities to use gender as the primary criteria with universal coverage for women who deliver babies at government health posts. Upper-caste people who can afford private healthcare inevitably choose so, but poorer households among the upper-caste can benefit from such services too, even if they are better off than their lower-caste neighbors. Similarly, engaging the local community (particularly local elders in rural areas) can have a strengthening effect on social cohesion. However, care has to be taken that this does not lead to exclusion of those most needy.

Origins

The two most studied and widely praised instances of CCT programs are being implemented in Brazil and Mexico. Both programs have some key differences that shall be reviewed individually below. While Brazil’s program evolved more organically from the 1980s onwards and in a much more decentralized way, Mexico’s program was adapted and imposed by the central government. Brazil’s target had been the urban poor, whereas Mexico targeted the rural poor, though both eventually widened the social safety net. Adherence to conditionalities also varies between the two countries. As different as they are in some ways, in many others

they are quite similar. Both Brazil and Mexico focus on the development of human capital, with a particular emphasis on education and health. The conditionalities of each country are also strikingly close; both require between 80-85% attendance at schools, monthly medical checkups, and attendance of meetings that focus on women's empowerment and other social programs.

The Bolsa Escola/Familia Experience



In terms of numbers of beneficiaries, the Bolsa Familia Program is by far the largest conditional cash transfer model in the developing world. Although officially started in 2003, the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) has a long and interesting history of its own. To understand the program fully, one has to understand the political context for the development of the program and its gradual evolution from a decentralized, ad-hoc mechanism to a highly centralized operation, with significant input and participation of decentralized bodies.

The foundations of the BFP were laid during the political upheavals of the 1980s. Brazil had been ruled by non-democratic populist or military rulers

from 1930 to 1985. During these years, even though there was significant investment in social welfare (particularly focused on workers), poverty remained a blight for Brazil. In early 1980s, unionized workers and intellectuals started challenging the ossified Brazilian political system. This led to a confrontation with the military regime of the time throughout 1984, which led to the emergence of new ideas of social justice.

Emerging from these basic principles, the Bolsa Escola Program was started in the Brasília and Campinas municipalities in 1995 by Governor Buarque and Mayor Teixeira, respectively.⁹ These programs targeted poorer neighborhoods in each of their municipalities. They were already counting school attendance and health metrics among their main conditionalities. The program was proving to be very popular, and many other municipalities were adopting the program, tweaking the deliverables (in terms of how much money the beneficiaries would receive) to the conditionalities (e.g. the percentage of attendance levels in classes).

Federal support to the Bolsa Escola began in 1998, with the government providing 50% of the required funds to finance the program in different municipalities. By 2003, the newly elected President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made it a centerpiece of his administration's efforts to fight poverty. This new policy was so successful that according to the World Bank data, during President Lula's first term in office (2003-2006), poverty rates in Brazil fell by more than 27%. While President Cardoso was the first to federalize the program,

there were many different CCT programs being simultaneously implemented when Lula took office. Lula is also credited with combining four other CCT programs: Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão Alimentação, and Auxílio Gas (a transfer to compensate for the phasing out of the federal gas subsidy program). He also created a new ministry, the Ministry of Social Development, to streamline the BFP, thereby greatly reducing administrative costs and bureaucratic complexity.¹⁰ This integration achieved the desired results. Henceforth, the priorities of the program targeting the neediest of the population and at human capital formation as a long-term strategy for poverty alleviation.

The PROGRESA/Oportunidades Experience

It was in the wake of the “tequila economic crisis” that Mexico began its experiment with CCT programs. Already in the early 1990s, economic indicators painted a poor picture of Mexico. A third of its population lived in extreme poverty, an affliction that was more severe in the rural areas. The government provided social welfare mainly in the form of subsidies on bread, tortillas and milk. The program was widely lampooned as being “inefficient, badly targeted and corrupt” in the media. Then, in 1994, the peso crashed and the economy subsequently shrank by 6%, pushing more people into extreme levels of poverty. President Zedillo recruited the help of economist Santiago Levy, an undersecretary of finance in the government to come up with radical solutions to resolve the growing

poverty crisis. Levy came up with an idea that was considered so frivolous by many in the administration that he piloted his program in secrecy.¹¹

... [Levy] launched a pilot project in three cities in the southern state of Campeche, using the databases of beneficiaries of two existing subsidized milk and tortilla programs... The pilot project had two features that broke with the tradition of Mexican social programs: the assistance consisted of direct monetary transfers instead of foodstuffs, and it required people in vulnerable groups (pregnant women, lactating mothers and infants) to get regular medical checkups.¹²

The program was called PROGRESA, and the name was changed to Oportunidades by the new administration of Vincente Fox. By 2006, already around a quarter of the population was enrolled in the program. Evaluations conducted in 2004 showed that among other things, beneficiaries of scholarships increased by 28% in elementary schools and more than 40% in secondary schools. The number of students enrolled in schools increased by more than 100% each year as the program net expanded, leading to a decrease in failure rates among students by 13% in rural areas, and 20% in urban areas, a 17% reduction in school drop outs in rural zones, and almost 10% in urban zones (compared with 1997 figures), combined with an 11% reduction in maternal mortality, as well as a 2% decrease in infant mortality, and many other improvements in indicators of health and nutrition.¹³

Problem Identification and Design

The first part of any conditional cash

transfer is the program design. For this, it is essential to first identify the problem and to design a solution that is customized to solve the problem. CCTs are particularly effective in this customization because they can isolate a behavior, and make it conditional that the behavioral requirement be met in order to receive any cash transfers.

To take an example, in Mexico in 1997, the problem identified was the crash of the peso in 1994, and the subsequent shrinking of the economy by 6%. President Ernesto Zedillo, himself an economist, rightly identified that this was going to effect the poorest most.¹⁴ In rural Mexico, this would mean several things. Firstly, the poor may be forced to pull their children out from schools and instead use them for labor to supplement their income, either helping with farming or with other income-generating activities. This would not only mean more child labor, but also under-education, which would make it more difficult for the children to overcome poverty when they become adults. Similarly, the poor would also have to cut back on their nutritional needs, damaging the long-term well being of their children. Mexico already had a subsidy on foods where the government subsidized food to the poor, providing tortillas and wheat at a cheaper price. However, the food subsidy program was commonly considered a failure because of its leakages, inefficiency, and corruption. Similarly, pregnant women could forego going to a hospital or health facility post-delivery, risking the lives of both the mother and the child.

With these problems in mind, PROGRESA was designed to shift money from the food subsidy program by directly giving cash to the poor in rural areas. This would mean that the families could use the money by making decisions on which food to buy. Assuming that the price of staples would be cheaper in rural areas, they could use the money on other items (beans for protein, for instance). The conditions required to be met were 85% attendance rate at schools, regular health check-ups for targeted children (thus ensuring vaccinations), health check-ups for pregnant and lactating women, and attendance of regular meetings on health and sanitation.

Another example of specific targeting includes the gender disparity in child literacy. To counter this specific problem, several Islamic countries have used gender targeting to enhance girls' enrollment. These include Bangladesh¹⁵, Pakistan and Yemen. In Cambodia, the problem was that girls were dropping out as they reached higher levels of education. To ensure that the brightest girls would stay in schools, they received a government scholarship based on their performance.



In India, to tackle the problem of a large number of women in rural areas not going to a health clinic to deliver babies, another program called Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) was implemented in 2007 to reduce the numbers of maternal and neonatal deaths. Recent studies have found that JSY payment was associated with a reduction of 3-7 prenatal deaths per 1000 pregnancies and 2-3 neonatal deaths per 1000 live births.¹⁶

Targeting

A crucial element of CCT programs is the targeting. Targeting is important because governments want to ensure that the right people are receiving the benefits of the program. Almost all CCT programs target the bottom segment of the population. However, the population segment largely varies. The CCT program in Ecuador targets 40% of the population, Brazil and Mexico target about 20% of the population, while Cambodia only targets 1% of the population.

Most often, it is the most vulnerable population segment, the extremely poor, orphans, and girls in societies where gender discrimination is prevalent that are targeted.

Conditionality

The key to CCT programs is to have enforceable conditionalities that promote human capital building, hence making the design of conditionalities extremely important. Sometimes, conditionalities that are too rigid can have a detrimental effect, further marginalizing members of a com-

munity. For example, for a family with only one child whose parent is taken sick for a long period, it would be unreasonable to expect an 85% attendance rate.

Conditionalities should also be based on access to services. To expect monthly check-ups for pregnant women when the hospital is more than a day away will not only increase the risks for the intended beneficiary, it increases the costs she has to incur to adhere to the conditionality, and this in turn, becomes an obstacle to participation in the program. Thus, when designing conditionalities, one has to take into account not only the desired outcomes, but also, the existing infrastructure, ensuring that the conditionalities are not inhibiting, but rather encouraging the participation of families in the program.

Delivery

As mentioned earlier, the delivery mechanism of benefits can have a significant impact not only on program design, but also on program implementation and participation of the extreme poor. There are many institutional hurdles for providing the beneficiary with the benefits of participation and compliance, including information management and databases, and access to banks and government line agencies.

CCT programs often differentiate payments by the number of children in the eligible age range, but otherwise have rather simple benefit structures. Only two differentiate by poverty level, none by cost of living, and few by age/grade or gender of the student.¹⁷ However, one of

the criticisms of the program has been that it increases the fertility rate, especially in countries with already high fertility. To counter this, many programs cap the number of children who can benefit from the program.

Payments are usually made either bi-monthly or quarterly to decrease the transaction costs and administrative burdens. Payments, as mentioned earlier, are usually made to the female head of household and only in certain scholarship programs are they made to students themselves.

The method of payment also varies greatly among countries. For example, Brazil makes payments directly to debit cards and cash can be withdrawn at banks, ATM machines, or lottery sales points. Turkey uses the state bank, and beneficiaries receive the payment in cash, with clients going to tellers to withdraw funds. Mexico uses a 'low-tech' solution combining paying through community centers or government offices, such as the post office. In Kenya, payments are made through the post office, but experimentation is being undertaken to see if payments can be made through cell-phones, which have proliferated in Kenya and are used for other social programs. In Tanzania, payments are made through a government representation.¹⁸

The existing level of technology and access of the recipients should be taken into mind when designing the method of delivery. The method of delivery and also monitoring can provide a country with incentives to increase access to banking

(and thus credit to the poor), maintain a large database, and create national identity cards.

Evaluation

CCT programs are usually finalized after piloting, which includes assessments and adjustments based on feedback. The programs are complex and therefore need to be locally contextualized. Usually, when the program is introduced, there are some communities that are especially targeted. These are the treatment groups. At the same time, data is also rigorously maintained for communities where the CCT programs are to be implemented in the next phase (a year or so later), which is the control group. It is this feature of CCT programs that makes it ideal to study the impact of social welfare programs, and to carefully evaluate the changes occurring before and during the program. Some countries, like Mexico, have posted all their data online and encourage outside groups, academics, universities and think tanks to evaluate their programs and actively seek recommendations. Similarly, organizations like the World Bank are increasingly seeing CCT programs as an effective strategy in the fight against poverty. Thus, multilateral agencies have also spent considerable time and resources studying the CCT phenomenon.

Criticisms of CCT Programs

Criticisms against CCT programs have been remarkably muted. The most common forms of criticism goes along the lines that the program is not cost-

effective, and that the returns are lower than other development projects, such as developing infrastructure and providing other public services. Some opponents also say that CCT programs are more difficult to target and deliver than other public expenditure programs. A commonly used argument is that CCT programs provide the wrong incentives leading to reduced work, dependency, and lower self-esteem.

Another set of arguments is against the setting of conditionalities themselves. Many believe that it is wrong to further burden the poor and think that this reflects on the patronizing attitude of the state and the elite. Yet another set of arguments that oppose CCT are set on the basis that it is unsustainable, and that the rewards of human capital enhancement are too slow and not guaranteed, whereas the money used in CCT programs could push a country into debt and dependency. Corruption is also a commonly used argument, and leaders promoting CCT are often labeled as populists.

A common criticism that is often used against CCT programs is that while these programs have significantly achieved the short-term goals of providing a social safety net, and other increased indicators (school enrollment, graduation rates, health and nutrition indicators), there is as yet, no evidence of any long term benefits of the program, i.e. no proof that the participating children and students will be able to escape the poverty trap. Some studies have pointed out statistically insignificant impacts, such as increase in height, improved performance classroom achievement tests, or greater employabil-

ity of participants. Despite the argument being self-defeating in that a literate workforce is inherently superior to an illiterate workforce, or that human capital development is a pre-requisite for sustained market growth, it does raise an important challenge for development experts and policy makers. It is a reminder that focusing solely on the demand-side of the development equation is in itself not a sufficient criterion for either economic growth or the escape from poverty. Equal emphasis must be given to the supply-side, especially in countries where absenteeism among teachers and health workers is high, where infrastructure is poor, access by people living under the poverty line is difficult, and communities are marginalized from the formal employment and banking sectors, as well as being socially discriminated against. One of the reasons why CCT programs have been more successful in countries like Brazil and Mexico is that these countries already boast a strong middle class, and that infrastructural development over the past half a century has been significant.

Conclusion

As with any social welfare programs, CCT programs are complex structures. Yet in a remarkably short period of time since state-level adoption of the programs (1997), they have been emulated by many countries, with more joining the bandwagon every year. Because of the relative short period that the program has been active, it is difficult to predict the long-term consequences of CCT programs. However, they have succeeded remarkably in two ways: by providing a social

safety net for the extremely poor and other vulnerable groups, and in facilitating the achievement of the MDGs by increasing literacy, gender equity, infant mortality, maternal mortality and other core goals.

The experience in both Brazil and Mexico shows us that CCT programs can be highly effective, far more comprehensive, and attained in a cheaper and more efficient way. Those experiences show us the resilience and malleability of CCT programs, as do their adaptations across Latin America and other continents.

While there are some criticisms of the program, most reports show a high correlation between objectives and achievements, at least in the short run in CCT programs. It will be interesting to observe how CCT programs, already one of the most studied social welfare strategies, will be translated in the remainder of the world and if, within the foreseeable future, they will be able to eradicate what Mahatma Gandhi has called “the worst kind of violence” – poverty.

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Water Rights and the Potential for Conflict in the Nile River Basin

Kristine LeBlanc

Abstract

As nations address their immediate concerns of population growth, alternative energy sources, economic stability and national security, the problem of water scarcity looms. The 2010 decision by the United Nations to include water as a basic human right serves as a catalyst for change in long-standing agreements and practices with respect to resource distribution. Change is not without consequence; the economic, political, and social impact of any change to the supply and availability of a coveted resource may very well be met with escalating tensions among states. This paper examines the theoretical concepts of resource conflict and distributive justice within the context of sustainability and the right to water. A case study of Egypt and Ethiopia serve as a framework from which to examine how economic and political forces can influence the distribution of natural resources within the region.

Biography

Kristine LeBlanc is a Project Analyst at University of Bridgeport and is a graduate student in the Global Development and Peace program. She earned her MS in Higher Education and Leadership in 2011 from Kaplan University and her BA in Liberal Studies in the Great Books from St. Anselm College in 1992. Prior to launching her career in higher education, Kristine held product and project management positions in the financial services sector for a number of years. A former volunteer in Buduburam, Ghana, Kristine continues to support the initiatives of Population Caring Organization, a Liberian-based NGO.

Introduction

The Nile River basin supports the communities and citizens of ten riparian states. The major source of the river begins at the highlands of Ethiopia, yet the majority of this water is claimed by Egypt through a long-standing agreement that was influenced by colonialism. Egypt currently holds a privileged position with respect to water distribution, wealth, military strength and influence. However, this position grows ever more tenuous as development efforts, as well as water scarcity, grow. There are a number of elements that influence the present situation in Egypt and Ethiopia. This case study explores different factors influencing this situation, as well as existing agreements and their impact on the right to water and the right to development in each country, assessing the potential for interstate conflict in the region.

Since 1891, Egypt has entered into various agreements pertaining to water rights with other countries. In 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed *The Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters*, which gave Egypt rights to utilize 85% of the water flowing into the region. Egypt continues to benefit from this position; its economic position within the region, the strength of its military, as well as its control over the Nile River influences and hinders development efforts made by other riparian states.

In 2010, Ethiopia attempted to enter into an agreement to claim their share of rights to the waters of the Nile, however Egypt and other riparian states would not

agree to their terms. Egypt maintained its position on the Nile stating that access to water was, and still is, a matter of national security. As Ethiopia strives to reduce poverty and participate with other developing countries in the global market, it has begun a series of large-scale alternative and sustainable energy projects. These power capabilities have largely been gained through the construction of large-scale dams such as the Great Millennium Dam, and have been met with opposition by Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea, as well as the World Bank. By providing a reduced rate to energy resources, several states within the region stand to benefit. Revenues generated from the project will provide funding needed for infrastructural development programs in roads and schools, and will support education and health care initiatives for the citizens of Ethiopia. Yet, the states along the Nile River Basin, as well as the international community, do not support the project.

Literature Review

Establishing the Human Right to Water

A number of Covenants, Treatises and Conventions expressly state or provide support and justification for the basic human right to safe drinking water and sanitation. A rights-based approach to policies and legislation regarding water use should provide accountability, citizen empowerment and active participation, transparency in national development processes, complete and rational development frameworks, safeguards against harm, effective and complete analysis, and a more authoritative basis for advo-

cacy (Robinson, 2005). The rights-based approach is one way to evaluate the existing agreements governing water rights along the Nile.

A number of international agencies have lobbied for the inclusion of the basic right to clean water and sanitation in the framework of human rights. The concept of water as a basic need was established at the UN Water Conference in 1977 (OHCHR, 2010). Since then, a number of International Conferences on the Environment and Development, on Population and Development, and regional declarations, have affirmed the right to water. The result of these efforts has consequently defined the duty of the state in providing safe drinking water. Similarly, obligations to safe drinking water and sanitation were formulated in The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979, art. 14(2)); the International Labour Organization's Convention No 161 concerning Occupational Health Services (1985, art. 5), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989, arts 24 and 27 (3)) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006, art. 28) (OHCHR, 2010). Most importantly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee has stated that "the right placed a duty on States to ensure access to the means of survival and required States to adopt positive measures" which are reflected in the HDIs (OHCHR, 2010, p. 5). Assurance to clean water, as an economic, social and cultural right, must be provided for by the participating States. The position of the World Water Council maintains that hu-

man security is needed first, then economic security, followed by water and energy security (OHCHR, 2011). The right to water is a straightforward State responsibility; however, it is a complex issue, particularly in light of globalization, where the interests of other states play a role in this conflict.

In October 2011, the Human Rights Council adopted the *Resolution to the Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation* (A/HRC/RES/18/1) acknowledging a number of past Conventions, Covenants and outcome documents that had adopted these and other issues, affirming:

- "The need to focus on local and national perspectives in considering the issue, leaving aside questions of international watercourse law and all trans boundary water issues"
- The resolution calls upon states "to assess existing policies, programmes and activities in the sectors of water and sanitation, giving due consideration to waste-water management, including treatment and reuse, and to monitor resources allocated to increase adequate access, as well as to identify actors and their capacity..." (7 (b)).
- "To assess whether the existing legislative and policy framework is in line with the rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, and to repeal, amend or adapt it in order to meet human

rights standards and principles. (art. 7 (d)).

In addition to the Resolution (UNHRC, 2011), The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses (1997) provides two key guidelines: the rule of equitable and reasonable use, and the no harm rule (A/51/49, art. 1(1) (2); Shiva, 2002). With respect to the agreement established in 1959 between Egypt and the Sudan, the Convention provides that States under existing agreements may “consider harmonizing such agreements with the basic principles of the present convention” (A/51/49, art. 3(1)). These affirmations support the position of both the existing agreement because of the no-harm rule and the position held by the other riparian states in their claims for equitable use (Shiva, 2002; Klare, 2002). The challenge here is that the Convention is not binding; there are no laws governing what Vandana Shiva (2002) refers to as the “natural law of the water cycle” (p. 76). On the one hand, the global community acknowledges the right to water and, on the other, the economic and political environment that leads to the high-stakes dispute over water.

The issue of water rights must be viewed first within the framework of the distribution of resources (i.e., state ownership of water and sovereignty), and then in the context of globalization. With respect to the distribution of resources, there are two widely held philosophical positions: that of John Rawls on universality or John Stewart Mills on utilitarianism.

Whether one adopts a Rawlsian position on distributive justice whereby the distribution of rights (wealth and income) is beneficial to the most disadvantaged, or a utilitarian approach whereby distribution of rights based on the greatest good for the greatest number of people is the determinant for justice, is a philosophical debate. One could argue either way on which population is more disadvantaged. Furthermore, examining the issue of water rights is more complex given that the debate is over a trans-border waterway. According to Shiva (2002), four theories have guided water rights:

- territorial sovereignty,
- natural water flow,
- equitable apportionment, and
- the community of interest.

According to Shiva (2002) the Helsinki Rules on the *Uses of the Waters of International Rivers* adopted in 1966, “recognized that states are ‘entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of waters’ of an international drainage basin” (p. 79). The real issue however remains: there is no formal agreement on ownership of trans-border waterways.

Causes of Resource Conflict

A number of theories seek to explain resources as a cause or factor in conflict. Collier (2001) finds that there is a correlation between political regimes and economic conditions whereby democracies in richer countries are less prone to violence. Klare (2002) posits that conflict for resources can be one of conquest in territory or access to resources in another

country. As supplies of coveted resources dwindle, as world population expands, as prices for goods rise, and as political leaders use resources (or the lack thereof) to remain in power, the risk for conflict rises; interest in resources therefore outweighs ethnic and religious affiliations (Klare, 2002). Water security, economic stability and national security are likewise intertwined.

Other theories seek to explain resources as causes of war. Both Collier (2000) and Humphreys (2005) suggest that the commodities themselves do not cause war, but serve as a mechanism. Humphreys (2005) postulates six mechanisms:

- *Greedy Rebels Mechanism*: Domestic groups engage in quasi-criminal activity to benefit either the individual or state. Natural resources increase the prize. Rebels may focus in a particular area where resources are concentrated. The aim is not necessarily to control the resources, but rather to extract rents.
- *Greedy Outsiders Mechanism*: States and corporations foster conflict.
- *Grievances Mechanism*: there is a dependence on natural resources. Notably, the extraction of resources and forced migration and the unjust distribution of wealth attributed to the resources.
- *Feasibility Mechanism*: Financing of rebels through resources to achieve other goals.

- *Weak States Mechanism*: Weak state-society linkages and the natural resource dependent economy. Government structures do not engage citizens; society has less information about governmental activities and there is little accountability. The state is reliant on resources rather than on taxes.
- *Sparse Networks Mechanism*: Social cohesion is low due to low levels of internal trade. The economy is fragmented into independent enclaves of production.

The supply and demand for resources within economic, political, and social structures is an element of a number of resource conflict theories. Daniel Pederesen (2002) suggests that inequalities over access to critical resources contribute to an escalation of armed forces. Economic structures and political opportunities that promote engagement in policies that “bleed development efforts dry” are problematic and contribute to resource conflict (Collier, 2001; Ron, 2005, p. 447). These theories, however, do not account for the historical influences of the political environment as a whole. The political ecology theory provides a historical perspective of scarcity and abundance within the social construct and political economy of resources; the theory accounts for the exclusion of countries from globalization rather than expansion (Le Billon, 2001).

Resource conflict theory is used to evaluate the current relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia, and the other riparian states. The relationship between com-

modities and resources, and the state, within the global economic environment provides a complete perspective in which to assess the mechanisms.

Politics and Globalization

The challenges facing the development efforts of Ethiopia can be seen through the lens of globalization. Globalization, first and foremost, expands the number of stakeholders in state development initiatives. Not only does it increase the number of actors, but it also provides the opportunity to advance social agendas (Bhagwati, 2007). The political and economic matrices of globalization are enmeshed. The policies provide a means for attracting foreign capital and direct investment (Stiglitz, 2002). While freer trade is intended to promote growth through increases in exports and demand in unskilled workers, access to opportunities undermines trade policy efforts for many poor countries. In some instances, particularly in Ethiopia, the policies themselves present limitations to growth and development (Stiglitz, 2002). With the Grand Millennium Dam project, Ethiopia stands to increase revenue that will support infrastructure; however, the World Bank and other countries and donors do not support its efforts.

Case Study

Historical Perspective

The Nile is the longest river in the world; it is shared by Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of

Congo, and Eritrea. Conflicts over the river between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have occurred over the years. In 1903, Ethiopia signed an agreement with Sudan not to manipulate the flow of the Blue Nile. It also establishes the state borders between the two countries. The treaty was made by Great Britain as a colonizer of Sudan. The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement gave Egypt the right to veto development in the upstream territories without any restrictions regarding its own development. Batstone (1959) proposes that international lawyers approved the agreement because it separated “the problem of the Nile waters from the political dispute between Egypt and Great Britain” (p. 531). The signing of the 1929 Agreement highlights how political and economic influences undermine a state’s ability to protect the rights of its citizens.

At this point in history, Egypt had secured the majority of the Nile flow and secured the right to undertake projects without the consent of upper riparian states. Egypt was in a position to engage in hydroelectric development initiatives. Egypt began construction on the Aswan Dam in 1958, displacing over 100,000 Sudanese; with the promise of more water, a bilateral agreement between Egypt and the Sudan was signed (Shiva, 2002). The *Full Utilization of the Nile Waters* allotted the majority share of the water to Egypt and a small share to Sudan. The agreement was reached without input from the

other riparian States, and was made without regard to their demands (Shiva, 2002, Klare, 2002).

Policies and Precedents

At the outset, it is important to establish the precedent that was set by the international community regarding the right to water and how it relates to the situation in the Nile Basin. The debate over the Egyptian agreement and the right to the Nile reveals an important distinction between property or land rights and treaties. If the matter at hand were regarding land rights, Sudan's independence from Great Britain should have dissolved the treaty between Sudan and Egypt (Batstone, 1959). Because Egypt maintained its level of access to the Nile waters, the distribution of the Nile waters was based on a treaty rather than human rights. If the distribution of the Nile waters had been based on property rights, the inequitable burden put on Sudan would have resulted in the dissolution of the original agreement (Batstone, 1959). Given that inequities in the distribution of the Nile remain today, one must consider the impact this precedent has had on the continued fight to recognize the basic human right to water.

For over ten years, the World Water Council has been organizing the World Water Forum to promote "hydro-policy" for the protection of human rights, sustainability, water security and accessibility.

The Right to Water Fact Sheet (2010) published by the OHCHR, UN Habitat, and the WHO provides an overview and guide on the right to water and international human rights obligations as defined in a number of Covenants, Treatises and Conventions among participating states. Most notably, hydro-policies must not exclude marginalized groups; the policies put forth seek to "inform water management by clearly prioritizing, in the allocation of water among competing users, personal and domestic uses as defined in general comment No. 15. (ICESCR)" (OHCHR, 2010, p. 16). The rights-based approach is outlined and is consistent with Robinson (2005) whereby non-discrimination, transparency and accountability in reporting are noted.

Political and Economic Influences

Political and economic influences have a direct bearing on resource distribution negotiations. Friedman's theory of globalization has influenced the emphasis placed on economic relations in international affairs and the market mechanism approach to resolution (Klare, 2002). However, the manner in which those factors are employed is changing, and with that change, we must promote equitable distribution of resources.

The other factor in the approach to resolution is the economic influence of third party states. Russia and China have supported past projects undertaken by Egypt,

Sudan, and Ethiopia respectively (Klare, 2002, UNDP, 2011). The upstream riparian states have lacked the financial capital to develop extensive waterworks programs, which has placed Egypt in a privileged position (Klare, 2002). Resource privilege is a component in reducing poverty, which may also contribute to conflict (Anderson, 2012). Without external support to the other riparian states, Egypt continues to impede Ethiopia's development efforts by restricting access to the waters of the Nile.

National Security and the Risk for Conflict in the Region

The distribution of the waters of the Nile has created a condition that could lead to conflict. With the World's growing population, competition for water and hydroelectric resources increases. This scenario could prove to be a hot spot for conflict in the region. At this point, any state engaging in new water schemes may provoke conflict. Since Sudan has an established right to water, it could be the target of another state's desire to acquire Sudan's oil and water resources. Most notably, the rising tensions between Sudan and South Sudan today over oil-rich lands demonstrates the grievance mechanism as a source of conflict (Humphreys, 2005). If there was a war in the region over water or oil, it is likely to receive the attention of the UN Security Council.

Matters of national security are generally viewed in light of the stability of the state. However, the absence of a vital natural resource such as water would likely invoke a rebel response if a state were not to uphold its obligation to protect and secure the basic human rights of its people. There is no doubt of any nation's dependence on water; the scarcity of water could potentially serve as a catalyst for war as grievances would incite rebellion (Humphreys, 2005). Other grievances could also cause tensions to rise as a result of displacement due to dam construction. Conflict may arise both between states and within states due to the denial of water rights. It seems plausible in the case of the Nile River Basin that if a state does not take proactive measures to secure its people's right to water, the state itself risks civil unrest within its own borders.

Civil unrest in this region could engage the support of foreign actors. This would, of course, engage the other mechanisms of conflict that would further complicate relations. Financial support of rebel forces (i.e., the feasibility mechanism) would likely provide stakeholders an opportunity to expand claims to water. It would seem unlikely that one state within the region would make an appeal militarily for water rights. The interdependence of Egypt and Sudan, as well as China's financial backing of past water schemes surely serve as deterrents for the improv-

erished nations in the region. Foreign investment in the region complicates the matter at hand. Even if there were a multilateral governing body to manage the distribution of waters, it seems unlikely that Egypt would forego its position without force.

Sustainability and Intergovernmental Agency Solutions

The World Bank (2012) projects population growth of 152% within the region by 2025. The rise in population will drive the demand for resources (Klare, 2002). The scarcity of resources, such as water, food, and energy will become all too burdensome for the inhabitants of the Nile River Basin. At the international level, organizations, corporations and scholars have been united in their support of efforts in educating people and promoting the cause of environmental sustainability. The utilization of a rights-based approach with the assistance of intergovernmental agencies in developing and negotiating agreements and policies that focus on environmental sustainability provides the framework for the equitable distribution of natural resources.

There is an overwhelming need for a collaborative intergovernmental, regional and local approach to resource management. Calls for a coherent approach for sustainable water-use policies by environmentalists and human rights activists have made some progress (WWC, 2011 and

2012; Armstrong, 2012; Klare, 2002; and Shiva, 2002). The approach of human rights advocates can't do enough to preserve precious resources for future generations; according to Shiva (2002), an ecological paradigm can link resource allocation to economically sound practices. The Carnegie Commission (1997) calls upon the business community to sensitize. For risk-reduction, businesses should work with national authorities to develop practices that permit profitability and contribute to community stability (Carnegie Commission, 1997).

Conclusion

The international community has a responsibility to ensure equality in the distribution of water rights in order to avert conflict. Standing idly by while access to vital resources are being unjustly distributed is no longer in any state's best interest. Globalization, foreign investment, modernization, and advances in the acknowledgement of water as a human right have afforded citizens with the information needed to act upon injustices in the distribution of water rights and other human rights violations. The perpetuation of extreme poverty is the result of poor policy making and indifference to the plight of the poor. Without action, the problem of the fair and equitable distribution of water resources will result in conflict and further suffering. The time for intergovernmental involvement in the de-

velopment of agreements with a focus on sustainability rather than profit is now – before there is an escalation in tensions over a significantly diminished supply of water. Governments, corporations, and citizens have a responsibility to protect the security of water resources. Environmental sustainability efforts are a global responsibility.

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HIV/AIDS and Disability: Why South Africa needs to realize the Millennium Development Goals

Rebecca Witherington



Abstract

South Africa is the epicenter of the global pandemic of HIV and AIDS. As the infection rate among adults creeps closer to one in five, the need to address the elements contributing to this increased infection rate is vital. That being said, amidst the effort to determine and minimize risk factors, individuals with disabilities are often excluded. Whether due to social marginalization or issues of accessibility, disabled individuals are less involved in the discourse regarding HIV/AIDS in South Africa. These individuals are, as a result, often at a greater risk of contracting the virus. The United Nations Declarations on the Rights of Disabled Individuals, paired with South Africa's disability inclusive National Strategic Plan, have increased awareness and begun effective campaigns to combat this discrepancy. The factors that most often place disabled individuals at risk parallel those issues addressed by the Millennium Development Goals. By using this well-known international effort as a guideline for how to approach HIV and disability, South Africa may bolster more support, resources, and other assistance needed to fully realize the rights of disabled individuals and lessen their risk of infection.

Biography

Rebecca Witherington received her B.A. in Anthropology and Iberian Studies from New York University (New York, NY). Before enrolling in the University of Bridgeport's Global Development and Peace M.A. program, Rebecca was a Community Inclusion Counselor at The Kennedy Center, Inc. (Trumbull, CT), a non-profit organization that offers programs and services to individuals with disabilities. She is currently employed as a Graduate Assistant with the University of Bridgeport's Office of Graduate Admissions.

Introduction

Of the 50 million plus people living in South Africa, it is estimated that as many as 5.9 million are living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), about 12% of the entire population. Of those 5.9 million individuals, as many as 5.5 million are adults between the ages of 15 and 49. This boosts the prevalence of the disease within the adult population to 18%, meaning that nearly one in five adults in the country of South Africa is living with HIV/AIDS¹. South Africa is, as a result, the country with highest rate of HIV infection in the world. This places it at the forefront of the discussion regarding how to lessen the impact of the disease, and of efforts to eradicate it.

As the general population is placed in the limelight of the HIV/AIDS movement, a small group of South African individuals continues to be neglected. These individuals are living with disabilities. The Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa recently reported in a national survey, an HIV prevalence of 14.1% among individuals with self-reported disabilities as opposed to 10.9% among the general population². This number does not accurately reflect the disabled population, as some individuals may not have reported on their disability status. However, this number does reveal that the nature of disability and the social conditions in which it thrives may be placing disabled individuals at a higher risk of infection due to their circumstances.

A few agencies provide services to dis-

abled individuals in South Africa, but they have limitations, and their effectiveness is not certain. Disabled individuals often lack the ability to adequately advocate for their needs. For this reason, it is necessary to assess services currently available to disabled individuals and attempt to employ systems of sex education that will provide disabled individuals with the information that they need to protect themselves from HIV infection in a way that effectively accommodates the different styles of learning necessary to ensure that the information provided is understood and implemented.

What is a Disability?

According to the World Health Organization, 1 in 10 individuals, or approximately 600 million people worldwide, are living with a disability that is significant enough to affect their everyday lives. Eighty percent of these individuals live in developing countries³. The definitions of what constitutes a disability are very general; so it is important to recognize that disabilities take a variety of different forms, and each require their own approach for accommodating them.

The World Health Organization's International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) provides the framework for quantifying the term disability. It outlines disability as the interface between an individual living with an impairment and the circumstance in which he/she lives (including attitude towards that circumstance, the environment around them, and the barrier that their attitude, environment, and other personal

factors may create), thus affecting his or her ability to actively participate in society⁴. In this definition, disability is used as an umbrella term to describe a wider array of issues that include impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions. The word impairment suggests an issue of body function or structure. It can also describe a lack of, or difficulty with, neurological function. Activity limitations are those difficulties faced when attempting to complete a certain action or task. Participation restrictions are described as problems experienced by individuals with regard to their involvement in life situations and community⁵.

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD)⁶ affirms that disabilities include individuals with long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments that create barriers to their full and effective participation in their communities on an equal platform as those around them. It should be noted that intellectual disability falls under what was formerly referred to as mental retardation. This term is being phased out of use when talking about disabilities, though it may still appear in bureau titles or less recent documents on disability. Mental retardation is still used as a medical diagnosis, but is no longer socially acceptable for use when describing the individual.

Neither ICF nor UNCRPD claim to define disability, and in so doing, both acknowledge that disability is constantly changing. Whether or not they are appropriately worded to encompass what it means to be disabled, their intention is to

create a context for understanding disability. From this framework, countries can better identify populations that may require different levels of assistance and therefore be more effective in accommodating them.

Disability in a human rights context

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)⁷ set a precedent in the international community for how all human beings were entitled to live. It encompassed the most basic human necessities: access to food, shelter, security, as well as more societal freedoms such as the right to religious, cultural, and political opinions. It created a level playing field for all individuals on the planet with no discriminations⁸.

It was not until December 20, 1971, that the United Nations adopted a set of rights specifically catering to individuals with intellectual disabilities. The Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons affirms that individuals living with intellectual disabilities have, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the same rights as all other persons. Though this may seem obvious due to the non-discriminatory nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the nature of disability, and the lack of education about it may create some confusion regarding how to best fulfill the rights of intellectually disabled individuals. Although the rights affirmed to these individuals, via the Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, are the same as those in the UDHR 23 years earlier, it makes clear accommodations for

those individuals whose levels of functioning are low enough to draw into question their abilities to make decisions for themselves. For example, it affirms the right of an intellectually disabled person to have a qualified guardian, when necessary, to protect his or her interests. It also notes items like the right to employment. Disabilities can create barriers to employment and a lack of knowledge regarding intellectual disability can lead employers to assume that a disabled person cannot work. The Declaration of the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons makes it very clear that intellectually disabled individuals have the right to engage in meaningful and productive work to the fullest extent of their capabilities⁹.

Thus, in December of 1975, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, reiterating the importance of realizing that the rights of disabled individuals are equal to the rights of all others¹⁰. In the following years, the General Assembly proclaimed 1981 to be the International Year for Disabled People, with the years between 1983 and 1992 as the United Nations Decade of Disabled Persons. The hope of dedicating these years to the discussion of disability was to draw attention to this marginalized population and to bring about effective change in the mechanisms used to serve and protect these people.

The 1990s saw the creation of a number of human rights instruments relating to the particular issue of disability. These instruments included the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, the Principles for the protection

of Persons with Mental Illnesses and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, and the United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities¹¹. But along with the creation of such strategies and the establishment of time periods to focus on disability, came great expectations. These expectations were largely unmet, and realizing the rights of individuals with disabilities has been an ongoing process ever since¹².

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities came into effect on May 3, 2008¹³ and, after decades of discussion regarding disability in the international community it finally provided a true rights-based conceptualization of disability. This concept stemmed from a social model of what it means to be disabled, meaning that disability is not only the state of the individual, but also the state of that individual's environment¹⁴. The Convention includes fifty Articles, which, more than its predecessors, outlines in detail the rights of disabled individuals.

Article 11 refers to "situations of risk": It states that governments, having a responsibility to protect their citizens, are under the obligation to take all necessary actions to ensure that their citizens are safe in situations of risk¹⁵. Though the article goes on to cite such examples as armed conflict and natural disasters, it leaves room for interpretation.

The South African population may be seen as being at a higher risk of contracting a debilitating and often deadly disease.

Disabled individuals, as citizens of South Africa, should therefore have the right to protection from this disease and their government should therefore be committed to providing such protection through this document and those that preceded it.

Article 21 of the convention addresses the right of disabled individuals to access information. This ensures that disabled individuals have the right to access information regarding HIV, disease prevention, and sexual health. These individuals have the right to obtain this information through whatever means suits them. This includes providing reasonable accommodation for individuals who require assistance in fully understanding that information. "Reasonable accommodation" is defined within the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as a necessary and appropriate modification made to assist the disabled individuals in understanding, performing an action, etc., that does not impose an unnecessary burden on the person, establishment, or otherwise, that is providing the accommodation¹⁶.

Article 24 notes that disabled individuals have a right to education and to receive the supports necessary to obtain that education within the general education systems of a country. This would include science, health, and sexual education classes, if these classes were standard for all students. These students would again, have a right to reasonable accommodation in order to realize their full potential in an educational environment¹⁷.

Article 25 states that disabled individuals

have the right to access the same level and quality of health care as provided to other people. The article specifically states that this healthcare is to include sexual and reproductive health¹⁸. This means that no individual should be denied adequate healthcare on the basis of his or her disability. Disabled individuals therefore have the right to seek information, testing, and treatment for HIV/AIDS, with the assistance of reasonable accommodation when necessary. They have a right to know and understand the status of their sexual health and, in so much as they have the capacity, to make decisions regarding their health.

Article 28 outlines standards of living and social protection for disabled individuals, including the right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and decent living conditions¹⁹. But these rights that cannot be realized when disabled individuals account for a significant percentage of the world's poor. Poverty and disability are undeniably connected and Article 28 serves to point out that disabled individuals have the right to the same standards as the general population may hold for themselves.

These Articles in particular have been highlighted to provide background information specific to the topic at hand regarding the rights of disabled individuals living with HIV/AIDS. This information will help in understanding how the risk factors that disabled individuals face in contracting HIV/AIDS are often tied to violations of these rights.

In terms of what has been done on a na-

tional level, South Africa has, since the adoption of the new Constitution, begun to include disabilities in its domestic discourse regarding HIV/AIDS prevention. The country first included disabled individuals in its National Strategic Plan to combat HIV in the plan that was enacted from 2007 to 2011. In the plan that will be enacted from 2012 to 2016, individuals with disabilities are highlighted as a key population for HIV services. As a part of this plan, South Africa hopes to halve the number of new HIV infections, as well as ensure that at least 80% of infected individuals who are eligible to receive treatment are receiving it²⁰. Being a key population, people living with disabilities should then hope to see such changes in their infection rates and access to health-care if the conditions of the latest plan are favorable.

Disabilities at Risk

The risk of contracting HIV/AIDS for disabled individuals is higher for a number of reasons. The first is poverty. A cycle exists between poverty and disability, one perpetuates the other and creates a vacuum from which a disabled individual would have great difficulty escaping²¹. A 2001 census of South Africa found that only 19% of disabled individuals in the country were employed as compared to the 35% of non-disabled individuals. Poverty often prevents disabled individuals from seeking HIV services and treatment due to a lack of money for transportation²².

In addition, a lack of education creates and perpetuates a cycle in which disabled

individuals are marginalized. In many school systems, individuals with disabilities are less likely to be included in science or health programming and are more likely to be excused from sexual education under the assumption that fewer disabled individuals are sexually active. Schools, especially in rural areas, are inaccessible for individuals with physical impairments and do not provide assistance for individuals who may require them. Children with disabilities are often turned away from schools under the assumption that they are incapable of learning or that they would create distractions for other children. This assumption therefore supports UNICEF statistics that show that one third of all street children are disabled. In addition, literacy rates for disabled individuals are as low as 3%, while disabled women are as low as 1%²³. Often, the issue facing educators is a lack of expertise or resources in communicating with disabled individuals. Regardless of whether or not the child is allowed to remain in school, they may not understand the information presented to them due to the barrier created by their disability²⁴. This lack of education creates a culture in which disabled individuals do not have the skills necessary to obtain and retain employment, leaving them without a regular source of income and again, placing them at risk for situations of great poverty and reinforcing the cycle discussed above.

Along with the lack of general education for disabled individuals is the lack of information and resources available to them to ensure 'safer sex'. There is a common misconception among the general public

that individuals with disabilities are not sexually active. Studies show that individuals with disabilities are just as likely to be sexually active as their non-disabled peers. Disabled individuals are as likely as their non-disabled peers to engage in sexual activity under the influence of substances, which subsequently raises the risk of having unprotected sex, creating higher risk of exposure to HIV. The experience of social stigma may also lead some disabled individuals that are seeking social acceptance to engage in unprotected sex in order to feel sexually attractive or loved²⁵. Despite the fact that most of these individuals reach puberty at approximately the same time as their peers and that rates of homosexuality and bisexuality parallel those of the non-disabled population, these individuals are actually less likely to receive messages about HIV²⁶. Disabled individuals are also less likely to have access to condoms and other prevention methods²⁷. They may be turned away from educational programs or simply not approached to participate. This may be tied to the assumption that disabled individuals are not sexually active or that they do not engage in intravenous drug use²⁸.

Additionally, disabled individuals may have limited access to, or not be able to fully benefit from, HIV and sexual health services. This may be due to lack of knowledge about disabilities on the part of healthcare providers who shy away from approaching such individuals. It may also be due to social stigmas or misinformed attitudes regarding disabilities. These healthcare facilities may also lack the reasonable accommodations needed

for a disabled individual to fully utilize them. Such accommodations would include, for example, a sign language interpreter for deaf individuals to ensure confidentiality and eliminate the necessity for the disabled individual to bring a friend or relative with them to their private appointments²⁹.

Some disabled individuals are at a higher risk of sexual violence, which, in turn, elevates their risk of contracting HIV. According to Moffett³⁰, one in three women in South Africa will be raped in her lifetime, and one in four will be beaten by her domestic partner. These statistics are for the population in general and do not address the additional risk factors facing disabled individuals. Some studies have shown that disabled individuals are up to three times more likely to be the victims of physical and sexual abuse, as well as rape³¹. This may be due to disabled individuals' reliance on others for assistance in their everyday lives. Children, for example, may be isolated within their families and depend solely on adults for their everyday necessities. Women and girls who are blind or deaf are often more vulnerable to sexual assault because they are viewed as easy targets. Their inability to identify their rapist because of their disability means that assailants are less likely to face prosecution for their actions³². Disabled individuals may not have the access to police, legal counsel, or courts for their protection, especially in developing countries or rural areas. They also have less access to medical care following such abusive incidents, including critical psychological counseling, when compared to their non-disabled peers³³.

Within the disabled population, women are considered to be at an even greater risk than disabled men for contracting HIV due to social hierarchies and stigmas against disabilities. There exist myths that having intercourse with a woman or child who is disabled can cure HIV or AIDS under the assumption that disabled individuals are not sexually active and are “pure”. These beliefs stem from virgin cleansing myths that have been documented as early as 16th century Europe through the present day in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Europe. Through interviews with disability service providers, connections have been found between incidents of virgin rape of disabled individuals and HIV/AIDS. Some service providers, such as the Down Syndrome Association of South Africa, list it among their most serious concerns for their clients³⁴. This concept of a virgin cleansing places women and children, particularly young girls, at great risk for infection through sexual violence in efforts to find a “quick fix” to cure the virus³⁵.

The cultural practice of wife inheritance leaves widowed women at a higher risk as well. A study by the World Bank in 2010 noted that in some cases, women with disabilities are more sexually active in efforts to secure normalcy in their communities. Because disabled women often have a lower social status and higher levels of unemployment, it becomes important for them to secure relationships that will provide them with basic necessities for survival in the community³⁶.

These encompass the main reasons why

disabled individuals are a high-risk population for contracting HIV/AIDS in South Africa. In looking for tools to better serve and protect disabled individuals, one cannot help but notice the similarities between the issues that increase the risk of infection for disabled individuals and those issues which are to be addressed by way of the Millennium Development Goals.

Disability and the Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Goals underline a commitment set by the United Nations in 2000 to end poverty and hunger, provide universal education, realize gender equality, maximize both child and maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, create environmental sustainability, and build a global partnership. The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by the target date of 2015 would allow less developed nations to realize the human rights of their citizens. The Millennium Development Goals and disability are inherently linked. Poverty is a factor that creates a higher level of risk for contracting HIV/AIDS among disabled individuals in South Africa. The cycle of disability and poverty leaves many disabled individuals without adequate standards of living. The World Bank estimates that 10% of the world's population lives in extreme hunger. Of that population, approximately 20% are living with one or more forms of limitation. Also, the majority of disabled individuals live in developing countries and 82% of these individuals are living below the poverty line³⁷.

Disabled individuals are more prone to poverty. The obstacles that confront them in seeking an education often deter them from finishing school. This happens most often in developing nations that either cannot or will not provide the reasonable accommodation necessary for a disabled child to attend school. A lack of schooling often leads to a lack of marketable skills in the workplace. Disabled individuals with no education would have difficulty securing a permanent position and therefore have no means by which to support their lifestyles financially. Disabled individuals may be burdened by the direct costs of medical care, rehabilitation services, aides, and adaptations necessary for them to have access in their own homes. This direct financial burden is coupled with an indirect financial burden. Many developing countries do not have social welfare or healthcare systems properly in place. Such systems would assist in supporting disabled individuals and their families in financing important tools and services to raise the quality of life for the individual. Surrounding this situation of poverty are social stigmas that continually oppress disabled individuals, further lessening their chances for advancement and independence in a lifestyle that meets an adequate standard of living³⁸.

Therefore, the Millennium Development Goal to eradicate poverty would have a significant effect on disabled populations. In the context of South Africa, where poverty plays a key role in the risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS, this could mean a safer environment for disabled individuals. It would allow disabled individuals to seek HIV services, including prevention

information and treatment. Also, with the eradication of poverty, disabled individuals would be more likely to have the money to purchase and install the tools necessary to facilitate their inclusion in society. Disabled individuals would be at a lesser risk of becoming victims of sexual violence due to their isolation. Lessening the risk of sexual violence, in turn, diminishes the risk of exposure to HIV/AIDS.

Because disabled individuals are more likely to be denied access to schools, whether by the schools themselves or their families, realizing the goal of achieving universal primary education would also serve to minimize the factors that place disabled individuals in South Africa at such a high risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. Of the 75 million children between the ages of 7 and 12 who do not receive primary education, approximately 33% have a disability. In developing countries, less than 2% of children with disabilities attend school and less than 5% of those who attend complete their primary education. The majority of these children have moderate disabilities that are not necessarily visible such as learning disabilities, and cognitive, or sensorial limitations. With a lower level of education, these individuals are less likely to obtain and retain employment by which to support themselves. As a result they are more likely to fall into abject poverty, which creates more at-risk situations for contracting HIV/AIDS³⁹.

The realization of the Millennium Development Goal of providing universal primary education would, in the case of South Africa, provide disabled individuals

with a means to secure their positions in their respective communities. It would make them more aware of their rights as citizens, and perhaps help to bolster their own self-advocacy. By completing primary education, disabled individuals who have the capacity would be able to read and write, allowing them better access to information about their sexual health and HIV transmission. Also, by attending school, these disabled individuals would be exposed to South Africa's "Life Orientation" program. This program provides, among other things, HIV prevention information, as well as how to access testing or treatment if necessary⁴⁰. All of these factors would serve to curtail the risk of HIV infection faced by disabled individuals.

Women have been identified as a population that is particularly vulnerable to HIV infection. This is the case with disabled women as well. As a result of this marginalization, women account for 70% of those individuals living in extreme poverty. Only 1% of disabled women in developing countries have the ability to read and write because women are less likely to receive primary education. Having a disability merely increases the chance that a woman will not attend school. Not only that, but the social stigmas attached with disability make it more difficult for disabled individuals to find partners and raise families when they choose. There are pervasive beliefs that disabled women are incapable of performing the duties expected of mother and wife⁴². As a result, disabled women, in the example of South Africa, may be more likely to engage in sex in order to prove their normalcy^{43,44}.

This kind of sexual behavior creates a greater risk for HIV transmission.

By achieving the Millennium Development Goal of gender equality, women would be less at risk. The empowerment of women in general would also empower disabled women. These women, having been granted a more equal footing in society, would not have multiple stigmas attached to them. Indeed, having addressed one of the factors that limits their full participation in society, disabled women will have made a great stride forward in asserting themselves. Through this assertion of their rights as women, disabled individuals may feel less need to establish their normalcy within the social structure through sex. Disabled women who are empowered may be less likely to become victims of sexual violence as well. Therefore, the realization of gender equality in South Africa would stand to diminish the risk of HIV infection among disabled women in particular.

Minimizing the risk of HIV infection in developing nations sits at the heart of the Millennium Development Goal of combating HIV/AIDS. As the global community works to curtail the impact that HIV/AIDS has on developing nations, it will surely focus on South Africa as a hub of infection. By focusing on South Africa's HIV/AIDS pandemic, progress may be made in reducing the infection rates, reducing the impact on at risk populations, and providing treatment to those who need it. Combating HIV/AIDS is critical to the disabled community, as they have long been at a higher risk for contracting the disease. The fac-

tors that contribute to the risk of HIV/AIDS are often more prevalent in the disabled community. It is suggested that disabled individuals are up to three times more likely to get infected than the general population⁴⁵. Thus, by combating HIV/AIDS, South Africa would be forced to combat HIV/AIDS among disabled individuals residing there.

Discussion

For disabled individuals, inclusion is a key factor in establishing a quality of life that is concurrent with human dignity. Disabled individuals need access to the world around them. Without this access, they are more vulnerable to a number of maladies, not least of which is HIV/AIDS. When looking at the risk factors that exposed disabled individuals to the virus, it is often clear that the reason for the existence of these factors is their social marginalization. Disabled individuals are simply not treated the same way as the rest of the population. This ostracism occurs despite the repeated declaration of their rights both as human beings and as disabled individuals.

It may be suggested then, that the declarations of rights set in place by the United Nations are not enough. The general population fails to recognize the rights of disabled individuals as the same. This may be due to a lack of education surrounding what disability is. For example, a community with no education regarding disability may not know how to approach a lower functioning individual, or one who is non-verbal. Ignorance about such disabilities creates fear or, at the very least, discom-

fort. If, because of this ignorance, the disabled community is not being reached as effectively as they could be, then perhaps it is necessary to explore other approaches to providing them with the services that they need in order to live healthy lives.

There are direct and indirect approaches that can be taken towards inclusion. Direct approaches towards supporting disabled individuals would include the creation of more agencies to serve the disabled, particularly in rural communities. These rural communities have been excluded due to their distance from urban centers where most agencies are based.

Also, in terms of lessening the risk of HIV infection, South Africa should provide some means for accessing information that addresses the needs of disabled individuals. For example, written messages to target the deaf, audio messages for the blind, visual diagrams and pictures to assist those with learning disabilities or who cannot read, pamphlets in Braille, use of sign language, and opportunities for educational programs to the general public that provide physical access and reasonable accommodation for those in need. Though these ways of directly including disabled individuals are known, they are often not well implemented. This may be due to a number of factors. Agencies may lack the proper funding. It is possible that agencies may provide some accommodations but not all those that may be necessary, and they thereby may not be able to reach all the individuals that they serve. Also, agencies that are not dealing specifically with disabled individu-

als may not reach out to the disabled population when holding educational events. It is for these reasons that an indirect approach, linked to another mainstream effort, may be a more effective way to bring about change. This mainstream effort would have goals that affect the disabled community with regard to their risk of infection but would not necessarily be disability-centered.

Therefore, in terms of an indirect approach, South Africa should consider using the Millennium Development Goals as a tool to assist disabled individuals in their country. The country should realize the strong ties linking these goals and the risk of HIV infection among disabled individuals. The areas that the goals seek to improve are related to the areas that put disabled individuals at the greatest risk of contracting HIV/AIDS in South Africa. By piggybacking off of these goals and supporting their realization, the disabled community would ultimately benefit.

The major criticism of such a suggestion would likely be that taking an indirect approach to assisting disabled people is not disability-centered. The fact that the approach itself is not developed specifically to better the situation of disabled individuals could be understood as another effort to undermine the disabled community. What needs to be emphasized is that this would not be a singular approach. Using the Millennium Development Goals as a way to alleviate the high risk facing disabled individuals would be used in conjunction with already existing policies and plans that address the rights of disabled people to fully participate in their

societies.

Consider, for example, agencies that cater to disabled individuals using the Millennium Development Goals to outline the important services that they need to be providing to their consumers. This would create links between local agencies, regional groups, and the government as they simultaneously strive to attain the same goals within their respective settings. At the same time, it provides disability organizations with a set of guidelines that can determine how to best serve the community.

This would also apply to HIV/AIDS education programs and health services. If these providers were to focus on addressing their immediate needs as set forth in the Millennium Development Goals, it might create an atmosphere in which disabled individuals were more likely to seek and receive the education and care that they need to protect themselves from HIV/AIDS.

Even though the global community is working to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the likelihood of that happening is uncertain. This could minimize the legitimacy of efforts towards approaching the dilemma of HIV/AIDS risk among disabled individuals. However, because the disabled community is one that is often marginalized, it is the notoriety of the goals that should be used to bolster support. The mad dash to meet them is more likely to affect immediate action. Though discussion regarding the best way to protect disabled individuals may continue to go on as it has, the

Millennium Development Goals may begin to produce results if focused on as an interdependent project between different groups of people in South Africa.

Conclusion

As the number of individuals infected with HIV/AIDS in South Africa continues to grow, the likelihood of the infection rate going down under the current circumstances is doubtful. This puts South Africa at the forefront for receiving crucial assistance and attention with regard to HIV/AIDS. The global community is aware of the severity of the situation and is poised to help.

Many factors place disabled individuals at a higher risk for acquiring HIV. These risk factors that place disabled individuals at high risk for contracting HIV/AIDS clearly resemble the same items addressed in the Millennium Development Goals. As 2015 is quickly approached, more attention is being paid to the fact that these goals have not yet been sufficiently addressed. It is this dash to realize the Millennium Development Goals that could create a very positive impact on the risk facing disabled individuals in South Africa.

Though this approach would not be very disability-centric, it does have the potential to produce results that actually affect the disabled community in a more immediate time frame. Though there are efforts being made to provide disabled individuals with the services they need, their risk of HIV infection is still greater than the general population due to those risk factors, which would be directly influenced

by the realization of the Millennium Development Goals. Agencies that provide services and supports to disabled individuals and those that provide sexual health services and education could also use the goals as outlines to better approach the critical issues facing the populations they serve.

The use of the Millennium Development Goals as a driving force and set of guidelines for prioritization would provide direction for all parties involved in minimizing the risk of HIV infection that currently faces disabled individuals. The time frame created to realize the goals, while unlikely to be met, might create a sense of urgency in the coming years. Such an urgent push to achieve the goals could affect the kind of change necessary to see results in terms of HIV incidence and disability in South Africa.

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The program can be completed in two years.

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Internship Opportunities

The Masters of Arts in Global Development and Peace includes a two month overseas internship for all domestic students.. Non-US may do their internship if their first language is not English. Domestic students are expected to intern in a country where they can practice the foreign language that they have studied. Students will normally work with an international organization, a governmental agency or an international non-governmental organization.

Career Opportunities

International College graduates have gone on to work for the United Nations, for international agencies, for International Non-Governmental Organizations. Many have also gone on to work in the corporate world in venues such as General Electric, UBS Warburg, Goldman Sachs, BNY-Mellon, Pitney-Bowes. We anticipate students with the Masters of Arts in Global Development will integrate well into International organizations, development agencies and into corporations which have a significant overseas presence.

